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Summary 
The objective of this study is to examine the significance of introducing and 
strengthening apartment ownership in China. The research aims to explore and 
scrutinize various apartment ownership options from selected jurisdictions in order to 
provide a framework for similar legislation in China. Hence, the research seeks to 
provide a legislative framework for a uniform condominium statute by closely 
examining the South African Sectional Titles Act and the American Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act. This comparative study will help to establish a uniform 
condominium statute suitable to the Chinese national character and compatible with 
the pace of the country’s economic development. 
  The thesis is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter explains the research 
topic, theoretical basis of the thesis, and research methodology. Moreover, in this 
chapter the historical background and status quo of Chinese condominium institution 
are also illustrated. 
  Following this introduction, Chapter Two explores the theoretical structure of 
condominium ownership. It depicts the legislative innovation arising from its sui 
generis features and explains the objects of condominium ownership on the basis of 
its unique definition. 
  In Chapter Three, a wide spectrum of provisions is identified pertaining to the 
creation of condominium in China with reference to South African and American acts. 
Specifically, it observes the requirements for land intended for subdivision and the 
buildings that comprise a condominium project. It is highlighted that a 
condominium’s constitutive document is unregulated in China. Moreover, the 
characteristic Chinese land registration procedure is also presented. 
  Chapter Four demonstrates the significance of the participation quota and analyzes 
the advantages and disadvantages of different participation quota calculating methods. 
Chapter Five emphasizes that inherent in the condominium living is the 
 v
interdependence of interests among unit owners. Consequently, this chapter focuses 
on condominium owners’ use and enjoyment of their apartments and the common 
property. 
  Chapter Six elaborates on condominium management. This chapter examines the 
management body, the general meeting, the executive council and the managing agent. 
It concludes that having a well-structured management body is essential since a 
condominium community cannot function efficiently without a management 
association to represent all of the owners and to handle day-to-day operations. 
  The last chapter concludes that China needs to enact a uniform condominium to 
protect private interests within the condominium context.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM 
STATUTE IN CHINA 
China has a unique political and economic system meshing Marxism and a market 
economy. The country currently finds itself in the midst of an all-encompassing and 
in-depth economic and political reform. Many observers believe that China’s legal 
reform is downright sluggish.1 In fact, the current Chinese legal system is not 
reconcilable with its fast-growing economy. A powerful economy can only be 
achieved with a corresponding impartial and efficient legal system. 2  Hence, 
expediting legislative development and reform is necessary and the prospects for such 
reform appear promising.    
  The clear definition of property rights is already a legislative concern in China, 
because the property system is being transformed by both the state’s commitment and 
Parliament’s activities.3 Nevertheless, China is still in the shadows, for it has no 
                                                        
1 See Liang Huixing Struggle for a Chinese Civil Code 10-15 (Chinese version); Lubman Bird in a 
Cage, Legal Reform in China after Mao 22-30; Peerenboom China’s Long March towards Rule of Law 
144-169; Zhou Yongkun “Ten Dilemmas of the Modernity of Chinese Law” 2006 (6) Legal Science 
Monthly 77. (Chinese version) 
2 Oi & Walder “Property Rights in the Chinese Economy: Contours of the Process of Change” in Oi & 
Walder (eds) Property Rights and Economic Reform in China 1-3. 
3  The Working Report of the 16th CCP National People’s Congress has indicated the state’s 
commitment, as a matter of policy, to the formalization of property rights through special laws, see 
Report to the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party titled “Build a Well-off Society 
in an All-round Way and Create New Situations in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. 
Online: http: //english.people.com.cn/200211/18/eng20021118_106983.shtml.[2008.2.20]. Additionally, 
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uniform condominium act in spite of a fast-growing real estate market and the 
increasingly popularity of condominiums. Even though apartments are the dominant 
form of housing in China today, it is still largely unregulated. Hence it is increasingly 
becoming a source of disputes in China. As a matter of necessity, therefore, apartment 
ownership should be improved and strengthened.  
  The question that lies at the heart of this research relates to the apartment 
ownership structure most suitable for an emerging Chinese private property market. 
The research is based on the supposition that there is a dire need for a uniform set of 
rules governing apartment ownership in China, particularly in view of recent 
economic developments. The purpose of the study is to provide a starting point to 
introduce, strengthen and increase apartment ownership in China. The main objective 
of the research is to scrutinize apartment ownership options from selected 
jurisdictions in order to provide a framework for similar legislation in China. Hence, 
the research seeks to provide an exemplary foundation for a uniform condominium 
statute by closely examining the South African Sectional Titles Act and the American 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act. This comparative study will help to 
establish a uniform condominium statute suitable to the Chinese national character 
and compatible with the pace of the country’s economic development. 
1 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
The concept known in different jurisdictions as condominium, apartment ownership, 
strata titles or sectional titles, is a unique legal institution with three components, 
namely: (1) individual ownership of an apartment, (2) joint ownership of the common 
property and (3) membership in an incorporated or unincorporated owners’ 
association.4 Condominium law encompasses both the law of property and the law of 
                                                                                                                                                               
the constitutional amendments of March 2004 elevate private property rights to a level deserving better 
protection. See n 30 infra.  
4 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 23. 
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associations.  
Apartment ownership is a legal phenomenon with a long history dating to the ancient 
Oriental legal systems in existence more than a thousand years before the Christian 
era.5 Surprisingly, even though it is the main representative of the oriental legal system, 
today China has no specific uniform condominium act. This is particularly surprising in 
light of the country’s booming economy and flourishing real estate development 
market. A brief survey of the historical reasons and current legal and economic 
conditions may provide some insights. 
1 2 1 Historical Background 
The Chinese Civil Code (1929-1931) recognized the concept of condominium in two 
relevant articles.6 While article 799 dealt in principle with the cost of maintenance and 
repairs, article 800 drew on customary Chinese law and stated that an apartment owner 
had no exclusive use right of the main gate or entrance of his/her multi-unit building 
belonging to all the owners unless local customs or specific agreements allowed the 
owner to do so.7 The earlier Chinese condominium legislation seems to have adopted a 
minimalist approach and left much of the regulation of life in a condominium complex 
to the owners themselves. This corresponds with articles 234 and 235 of the Japanese 
Civil Code and is somewhat like an older version of article 664 of the French Civil 
Code.8 Although these provisions are unsophisticated and inchoate, they are significant 
                                                        
5 Pappulias “Zur Geschichte der Superficies und des Stockwerkeigentums” 1906 (27) Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stifung für Rechtsgeschichte Romanistische Abteilung 363-364. 
6 The Chinese Civil Code (1929-1931) is still applicable in Taiwan despite numerous amendments 
since its enactment. See Wang Zhenmin “The Roman Law Tradition and Its Future Development in 
China” 2006 (1) Frontier Law China 76. 
7 Wang Tez-chien Law of Things: Part 1 General Principles and Ownership 238-240. (Chinese 
version) 
8 Art 664 of Code Napoléon (older version) provides as follows: “Lorsque les différents étages d’une 
maison appartienment à divers propriétaires, si les titres de propriété ne règlent pas le mode de 
réparations et reconstructions elles doivent être faites ainsi qu’il suit:Les gros murs et le toit sont à la 
charge de tous les propriétaires, chacun en proportion de la valeur de l’étage qui lui appartient. Le 
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in introducing and stimulating the concept of modern apartment ownership by 
clarifying the rights and duties of apartment owners in respect of the common property. 
 Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, social, political 
and economic conditions have been substantially altered. The law in general and 
property law in particular have been repealed without being replaced.9 All land is 
owned by either the state in urban areas or is owned collectively in rural areas.10 Until 
1988, the fundamental rule pertaining to all land in China was that there were no 
individual rights in land and no private ownership of land.11 The burden of government 
to provide enough housing for its citizens was seriously challenged by gradual 
urbanization and an exploding population. 12  To release the tremendous financial 
burden imposed on the government to supply housing, in 1988 China embarked on a 
new economic policy based on the advance of wealth through realizing housing 
marketization.13 With this new economic policy, China amended its Constitution in 
order to recognize privately owned transferable land use rights.14 This constitutional 
amendment was far-reaching since it allowed the creation and extensive use of a new 
                                                                                                                                                               
propriétaire du premier étage fait l’escalier qui y conduit; le propriétaire du second étage fait, à partir 
du premier, l’escalier qui conduit chez lui, et ainsi de suite.” See also Cao Jie Law of Things in Chinese 
Civil Law 60; Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 57-58. (Chinese version) 
9 Wang Zhenmin “The Roman Law Tradition and Its Future Development in China” 73-76. 
10 Randolph & Lou Chinese Real Estate Law 3-10. 
11 Ho & Lin “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban China: Policies and Practices” 2003 The 
China Quarterly 681-682; Wang & Murie “The Process of Commercialisation of Urban Housing in 
China” 1996 (33) Urban Studies 971-989; Wang Xiaoli Land Law 22. (Chinese version) 
12 Kremzner “Managing Urban Land in China: The Emerging Legal Framework and Its Role in 
Development” 1998 (7) Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 611-622. 
13 In 1988 the State Council embarked on a staged housing reform by adopting a Scheme of National 
Housing Reform in Urban Areas. This stimulated the government’s initial efforts and provided a 
ten-year blueprint to expedite the commercialization of residential property and reduce state subsidies 
of housing. See further, Lee “From Welfare Housing to Home Ownership: The Dilemma of China’s 
Housing Reform” 2000 (15) Housing Studies 66. 
14 The commercialization of land-use rights was first tried in Shenzhen on 9 September 1987 and was 
formally adopted when Article 10 of the Constitution was amended on 12 April 1988 to permit the 
assignment of the right to use land. See further Ho & Lin “Emerging Land Markets in Rural and Urban 
China: Policies and Practices” 2003 The China Quarterly 686. 
 5
form of land-use right.15 The recognition of this land-use right generated a building 
construction boom and an unprecedented level of commercial dealings in real estate 
and housing particularly in the condominium industry.16 
   However, while the state-owned land is beginning to be commercially transferable, 
the predominance of public housing was still characterized as a form of socialist 
well-being. Hence, China’s lawmakers seldom paid attention to condominium 
legislation in that period.17 Then in 1994, the State Council adopted a groundbreaking 
housing reform policy nationwide by issuing the Decision on Furthering Housing 
Reform in Urban Areas.18 The privatization and commercialization of the housing 
market has helped to relieve the government of the responsibilities for maintaining and 
managing buildings that were originally built to accommodate state employees as one 
of their major social benefits.19 However, housing privatization usually proceeded 
without a proper legislative and institutional framework and therefore created many 
difficulties.20  
1 2 2 Current Situation   
It is clear that the non-market/welfare housing era in China is coming to an end. 
However, government-driven conversions to condominium buildings have been 
                                                        
15 The amended Constitution of 1988 states: "the right to use land may be transferred according to 
law." Soon thereafter, article 2 of the Land Administration Law was revised stipulating that "the right to 
use State owned or collectively owned land may be assigned pursuant to the law." 
16 Selden & Lu “The Reform of Landownership and the Political Economy of Contemporary China” 
in Selden (ed) The Political Economy of Chinese Development 187-205.  
17 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 8. (Chinese version) 
18 The Decision on Furthering Housing Reform in Urban Areas of 1994, issued by the State Council. 
19  Lee “From Welfare Housing to Home Ownership: The Dilemma of China’s Housing      
Reform” 61-76. 
20 Chen Limei “Management of Sold Public Housing in Urban China: A Case Study of Railway New 
Estate, Shanghai” paper presented at the ENHR conference “Housing in an Expanding Europe: Theory, 
Policy, Participation and Implementation” Ljubljana, Slovenia 2 -5 July 2006. 
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fraught with problems.21 Chinese lawmakers were not much concerned about the 
property management issues until 1998 when a departmental rule was issued 
pertaining to management of privatized public housing.22 By now, every province in 
China and most cities have their own incomplete condominium regulations. While 
this absence of a uniform statute has created a great amount of flexibility, it has also 
led to divergent and inconsistent local standards and in some cases a flaunting of the 
law that has dramatically slowed the pace of legal reform.23 A related issue is that 
local and provincial authorities seem only to be concerned about economic viability 
and real estate development.24 These authorities pay little or no attention to reforming 
and updating their condominium regulations, and instead they often circumvent 
national planning and land administration laws in order to stimulate the local real 
estate market.25 For instance, some local governments indulge the developers by 
permitting them to sell roof-gardens to top floor unit buyers as annexes where there 
                                                        
21 Zhou Wenguo & Han Guobo “Problems and Counter-measures in Current Development of Chinese 
Property Management” 2004 (6) Construction Management Modernization 56. (Chinese version)  
22 The Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings in Housing Common 
Areas of 1998, issued jointly by the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Finance of PRC. 
23 Chinese local authorities often creatively interpret the economic policies of the central government 
in order to improve their own districts’ economic development. This results in a phenomenon that 
different areas have a relatively different interpretation of central policies. Inconsistent and divergent 
local rules put Chinese legal reform at peril. This can be called “local protectionism”. See Zhu Suli 
“‘Federalism’ in Contemporary China–A Reflection on the Allocation of Power between Central and 
Local Government” 2003 (7) Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-14. 
24 Yi Xianrong “The Developers and Local Governments Jointly Stimulate the High Price of Real 
Estate in China” Xinhua News online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2005-12/27/ [2007.12.18]; Jia 
Hao & Lin Zhimin Changing Central-local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity 30-37. 
(Chinese version) 
25 Ho “Who Owns China’s Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity” 
2001 The China Quarterly 403-404. In this article, Ho cogently enquired who represents the state in 
light of confrontation between different state institutions on ownership disputes; see also Huang Mei & 
He Fenglun “Be Cautious! Local Governments’ Circumvention Response to the Central Government’s 
New Controlling Policy on Real Estate Market” Xinhua News online: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2006-08/22/content_4990916.htm [2007.10.28]. (Chinese version) 
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are no pertinent local provisions.26 Consequently, local condominium rules have 
lagged despite a booming market and flourishing housing schemes.27  
Nevertheless, the most recent constitutional amendments of March 2004 protect 
private property on an equal legal footing with state-owned property.28 This symbolic 
milestone is a constitutional signpost for the promulgation of special laws relating to 
property, including a uniform condominium statute.29 Particularly noteworthy is that 
the newly enacted Property Code is another catalyst for the formalization of 
condominium law. It sets up a separate chapter on condominium ownership.30 Hence, 
the hypothesis of this research is that China needs a uniform Condominium Act to 
keep pace with a booming economy and flourishing real estate market. 
  
                                                        
26 Liu Kai “Entitlement of Common Property of Condominiums” 2007 (167) Law Science Magazine 
127. (Chinese version) 
27 Chen Su “Study on Condominium Ownership” 1990 (5) Legal Studies 47; Duan Qiwu “The Study 
of Apartment Ownership” in Liang Huixing (ed) Essays on Civil Law 223. (Chinese version)  
28 Liu Baoyü “Combination of The Categorization of Ownership and The Principle of Equal 
Protection–A Basic Thought on Framework of Ownership Chapter of Proposed Property Code” 2005 
(23) Wuhan University Law Review 97.Wang Liming “The Constitution and the Protection of Private 
Property” 2004 (25) Law Science Magazine 9-12. (Chinese version) 
29 Miao Lianying “Safeguarding Constitutionalism in a Harmonious Society” 2006 (24) Wuhan 
University Law Review 10. (Chinese version) 
30 The long-awaited Chinese Property Code has been passed by the National People’s Congress on 16 
March 2007. The main purpose of the property code is to define and specify property rights in detail 
and to improve the protection of private property rights. The final text of the property code consists of 5 
sections, 19 chapters and totals 247 articles. See Chen Lei “The New Chinese Property Code: A Giant 
Step Forward?” 2007 (11) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. Online: 
http://www.ejcl.org/112/abs112-2.html. 
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       (Note: (1) Yuan: Chinese currency, also CNY.; (2) sq.m. means square meter)31 
   
  The above chart demonstrates that quite recently, the yearly growth of 
condominiums’ development in China is soaring, which renders condominiums the 
main type of tenure in China’s urban areas.32 Since the latest statistics for years 2006 
and 2007 are not yet published, the chart only provides data available from 2002 to 
2005. The chart also indicates that one of the most striking hallmarks of China’s 
economic development is the vast number of residential condominiums throughout 
the country.  
1 3 THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RESEARCH  
It is widely believed that well-functioning legal institutions and a government bound 
by the rule of law are important to economic and political development. 33 
                                                        
31 Source from: Chinese Centaline Property Red Book 10. (Chinese version) On February 29, 2008 
the Yuan traded at 7.105 yuan per U.S. dollar. See www.xe.com.  
32 Wang & Murie Housing Policy and Practice in China 86-98. 
33 There is abundant literature on property right formalization and the causal relationship between 
legal formalization and economic development. The following literature deals with the legal, economic, 
anthropological, and sociological perspectives; Demsetz “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” 1967 
(62) American Economic Review 347-359; Diermeyer, Ericson, Frye & Lewis “Credible Commitment 
and Property Rights: the Role of Strategic Interaction between Political and Economic Actors” in 
Weimer (ed) The Political Economy of Property Rights: Institutional Change and Credibility in the 
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Consequently, practitioners in the development field have turned increasing attention 
to reforms intended to improve legal institutions. The best-known relationship 
between legal institutions and development is Max Weber’s theory. He demonstrated 
that “the universal predominance of the market consociation requires… a legal system, 
the functioning of which is calculable in accordance with national rules”.34 Trubek, 
one of the Law and Development movement’s torch bearers advanced the view that 
the modern legal system, including contract and private property rights, can promote 
the development of markets, and hence economic growth.35 North also asserts that an 
efficient judicial system has been the crucial underpinning of successful modern 
economic growth.36  
The legal deficiency in China, in particular the lack of sufficient legal institutions, 
hampers sustained economic development and potential political reform. This is 
underscored by De Soto’s work: based on the amalgamation of development theory, 
western property law and institutional economics theory, De Soto pointed out that 
developing countries should set up an equitable and accessible institutional system in 
order to achieve economic development.37 In making this point, he maintained that 
the fundamental obstruction to economic growth in developing countries is the lack of 
a uniform law which would allow such assets to function as capital, i.e., the lack of a 
                                                                                                                                                               
Reform of Centrally Planned Economies 19-21; Hann “The Embeddedness of Property” in Hann (ed) 
Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition 18; Murrell “Can Neoclassical Economics 
Underpin the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies?” 1991 (5) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
59-76; Wolf “Institutions and Economic Development” 1955 (45) American Economic Review 
867-883. 
34 Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism translated by Talcott 22-28. 
35 Trubek “Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development” 1972 
(82) Yale L J 46. 
36 North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 35. 
37 De Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
163. De Soto argues that “[w]ithout an integrated formal property system, a modern market economy is 
inconceivable.” He also maintains that the formalized property system should be made accessible to all, 
thus restricting and diminishing adverse influences of the “extralegal sectors”.  
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“unified property system”.38 He continues to claim that the solution to incomplete 
property systems is to incorporate those property systems which already exist in the 
informal sectors into the official one, to create a “unified property system”.39 The 
simplest but the most efficient way is by legislation. Without a well-functioning 
property law, the society cannot accomplish any kind of development in a sustainable 
manner. In the wake of this theory, it is necessary to facilitate the development of new 
types of property rights in China. This theory underlines that today, legislators, legal 
practitioners and condominium owners need more than governmental policies and a 
mish-mash of divergent local norms. They need legal certainty provided by a uniform 
set of laws. 
Kennedy, complementing De Soto’s approach, cautiously suggested that the revived 
law and development theory should focus attention on economic assumptions and 
political choices embedded in policy-making.40 The traditional assumption leaching 
the political intervention from the development process must be avoided.41 With the 
emergence of a market economy, China, a Communist state, increasingly recognizes 
individual interests in immovable property. On the basis of what Kennedy pointed out, 
China must tone down public power and distribute more private interests, wealth and 
status to people. From the Chinese government’s perspective, respecting property 
rights, emphasizing that policy decisions must be accounted for and maintaining state 
intervention for good governance are indispensable for sustainable development.42 In 
the light of both De Soto’s theory and Kennedy’s critique, one can conclude that 
legislation is a precisely reliable tool for distributing power to individuals and thus an 
                                                        
38 De Soto The Mystery of Capital 61-66. De Soto cogently pointed out that capital is not created by 
money, but “by people whose property system helps them to cooperate and think about how they can 
get the assets they accumulate to deploy additional production.”  
39 De Soto The Mystery of Capital 52-54. 
40 Kennedy “Laws and Developments” in Hatchard & Perry-Kessaris (eds) Law and Development: 
Facing Complexity in the 21st Century 17-19. 
41 Kennedy “Laws and Developments” 20-25. 
42 Seidman & Seidman State Law in the Development Process 5-22. 
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efficient resolution to the problem of a lack of legal institutions, which cannot be left 
to good conscience, informal rules or traditional civil customs.43 As far as the 
institution of condominium is concerned, without a specialized and uniform 
condominium act there is the risk that private property rights will be disregarded.44 
Moreover, apartment ownership is thwarted by inconsistent provincial, municipal and 
local norms, which now awkwardly twist and hinder the Chinese condominium 
system.45 A set of rules recognizing and defining the rights of individual apartment 
owners in a commonly owned building along with enforcement mechanisms and 
supporting organizations is vital, therefore, for sustainable growth of the market 
economy in general and the Chinese real estate market in particular.  
The way to achieve sustainable development, which was for a long time an 
essential epistemological component of the theory of law and development, retains its 
importance. Recognizing that institutional law is central to development, this study 
will not merely explore the options that enhance the protection of private property, but 
also promote wider access to homeownership in China.  
1 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study proposes to identify unexpected sources of risk for condominium owners 
in China. In addition, the study will present means of reducing these risks for future 
Chinese condominium legislation by making legal comparisons of apartment 
ownership legislation in some jurisdictions and identifying elements which most 
                                                        
43 Keith China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law 137-141; Ostrom Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 15-20; Clarke “Economic Development and the Rights 
Hypothesis: The China Problem” 2003 (51) Am J Comp L 111. 
44 Wang Xiaoxia “The Intensifying Condominium Disputes Call For Institutional Revolution” China 
Economic Times 2005. 11.23. (Chinese version) 
45 For an insightful comment on conflicts and incompatibilities between local rules in Chinese law, 
see Dicks “Compartmentalized and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional 
Barriers to Reform” in Lubman (ed) China’s Legal Reforms 90; Cui Jianyuan Research on Chinese 
Real Estate Law 45. (Chinese version) 
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favorably might be translated into Chinese law.  
In this thesis, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of the United States of 
America (hereafter the UCIOA) and the Sectional Titles Act of South Africa (hereafter 
the STA) are the chosen comparative entities for the potential Chinese condominium 
legislation. 46  There are several reasons for this choice. While the Chinese 
condominium system is relatively youthful, its American counterpart appears to have 
reached a comfortable middle age. Despite apparent differences in the two, such as 
those between Chinese socialist property values and American capitalist values, the 
primary reason why it is worthwhile to make a comparison is that in both China and 
the United States provincial and state governments respectively have different norms 
regarding condominium schemes. 47  Moreover, China is experiencing rapid 
urbanization that has the condominium system standing out, the same forces that at 
one time occurred in the United States. Finally, there are similarities between the two 
countries relating to the land use system which is inextricably linked with 
condominium schemes. As Randolph shows, the fixed use of land in China often is no 
more specific than the zoning classifications that limit the use of property in many 
parts of America.48  
Moreover, it is worthwhile to make a comparison between the Chinese regulation 
of condominiums and the South African Sectional Title Act. Although there are 
                                                        
46 United States: the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (as amended in 1994); South 
Africa: the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
47 As of this writing, the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA), the predecessor of the Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) has been adopted by the states of Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, Alaska. The UCIOA has been adopted by states of Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, 
Nevada, Vermont, and West Virginia. Indiana and New Jersey are considering adoption in 2008. Thus 
over a third of the states have become subject to one or another version of the UCIOA. Resource from 
online: http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/ [2008. 1.15]. 
48 Randolph “Thoughts on Chinese Real Estate Law: Integrating Private Property into a Socialist 
Governmental Structure” online: http://lawweb.usc.edu/faculty/workshops/documents/Randolph.pdf 
[2007.5.15]. 
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differences between China and South Africa, the two countries display a number of 
similarities. Both countries have an emerging economy with the price of housing 
having risen substantially and rapidly. In addition, both countries are experiencing 
growing urbanization and both have formulated social public housing policies 
enabling low-income and average-income people to buy their own houses.49 The 
enactment of a uniform condominium statute in China can accommodate the rising 
need for home-ownership caused by growing urbanization.  
The Sectional Titles Act of South Africa is indirectly derived from the American 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.50 The South African context is therefore 
interesting in this comparison, because it illustrates the manner in which foreign legal 
rules were and can be translated into a different political and economic setting, and 
the adaptations that such a translation necessitates to the legal rules of the original 
jurisdiction. This facilitates a simultaneous comparison of the needs of the three 
jurisdictions that should show what works best. Further, on this point, the South 
African statute is well developed having been amended several times. Presently, a 
third generation of sectional titles act is thought to be necessary and therefore appears 
to be imminent. It therefore represents a good example of the manner in which new 
legal principles may be introduced, amended and adjusted in the housing context to 
suit particular circumstances and developments within an emerging market economy.  
In summary, a comparative approach is worth pursuing because it has the potential 
to inform both Chinese legal researchers and lawmakers on the empirical legislative 
information that derived from the historical, geographical, social, cultural and political 
                                                        
49 In South Africa it is called social housing policy. See Maree “Sectional titles in the New Urban 
South Africa: Vista or Spectacle?” 2002 (Jan/Feb) De Rebus 34. In China, it is called “Economical but 
Functional Housing” policy, better understood in Chinese as the “Anju” project. This project aims to 
provide more affordable urban housing, to push forward the Housing Reform policy, and to solve the 
difficulties for families which had inadequate living spaces, i.e. each person has a living space of less 
than 8 square meters in average by the end of the 20th century. 
50 Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in the Light of the Uniform Condominium Act” 1987 (20) 
CILSA 2-3. 
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contexts of the United States and South Africa. Moreover, the value of comparative 
study also lies in the role of “undercutting the taken for granted”.51 This means quite 
often, researchers in a single country believe that the nature of the institution or the 
ways in which national policies are made, is the natural way to organize. A 
comparative perspective can shed a light on the origin and objective of particular 
legislation and therefore confront and challenge the parochial assumptions. If the view 
is taken that law is introduced in order to resolve disputes and sustain economic 
development, learning from the successes and failures of others will be a worthwhile 
contribution to legislative formalization. Nevertheless, comparison is not an end but a 
means, perhaps just an initial step of providing insights.52 Knowledge can be only 
gained if the relevant factors are properly identified. Comparative research itself does 
not “resolve the problem of possible intervention from other than these identified 
variables.”53 That said, a significant point is that China, like any other country, has its 
own unique and special national characters. State land ownership and the very special 
Chinese culture needs to be heeded in this comparative study. Therefore, sensitivity to 
cultural and historical context cannot be downplayed.54 However, it is noteworthy 
that Chinese culture should not be exaggerated in undertaking a legal comparison to 
formalize Chinese condominium law since otherwise it could defeat the purpose of 
the comparison and trigger a refusal to borrow ideas.  
1 5 THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THESIS 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter is a building block 
providing the thesis’s research topic, theoretical basis, and research methodology.  
                                                        
51 Dickens, Duncan, Goodwin & Fray Housing, States and Localities 29. 
52 Ruskola “Legal Orientalism” 2002 (101) Mich L Rev 180-185. 
53 Lundquist Housing Policy and Equality: A Comparative Study of Tenure Conversions and Their 
Effects 21. 
54 Potter “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation” 2004 (29) Law & 
Soc Inquiry 465-495. 
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Moreover, in this chapter the historical background, status quo and future outlook of 
the Chinese condominium institution are also illustrated. The theme is clear: a 
uniform condominium statute is badly needed in China. 
  Following this introduction bringing forward a legislative task for Chinese 
condominiums, Chapter Two explores the theoretical structure of condominium 
ownership. It depicts the legislative innovation arising from its sui generis features 
and explains the objects of condominium ownership on the basis of its unique 
definition. In Chapter Three, a wide spectrum of regulations is identified pertaining to 
the creation of condominium developments in China. Specifically, it observes the 
requirements for land intended for subdivision and the buildings that comprise a 
condominium project. The fact that a condominium’s constitutive document is 
unregulated in China is highlighted. Moreover, the characteristic Chinese land 
registration procedure is also presented.  
  Chapter Four demonstrates the significance of the participation quota and analyzes 
the advantages and disadvantages of different participation quota calculating methods.  
The starting point of Chapter Five is the remark that inherent in condominium living 
is the interdependence of interests among unit owners. Subsequently, this chapter 
focuses on condominium owners’ use and enjoyment of their apartments and the 
common property.  
Chapter Six elaborates on condominium management. This chapter is quite 
practical by respectively examining the management body, the general meeting, the 
executive council and the managing agent. It concludes that having a well-structured 
management body is essential since a condominium community cannot function 
efficiently without a management association to represent all of the owners and to 
handle day-to-day operations. The conclusion in the last chapter is that it is imperative 
and necessary for China to enact a uniform condominium statute in the near future.
 16
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP 
 
2 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the theoretical structure of the condominium. By laying out its 
features and characteristics, some of the major and correlated elements which help to 
shape the legal structure of the condominium are described and analyzed. Hence, the 
legislative innovation arising from its sui generis features are dealt with in more detail. 
Therefore, it is relevant to explain the objects of condominium ownership on the basis 
of its unique definition.  
Condominium, the term popularly applied in North America, particularly in the 
United States, may easily be confused with communio which according to its original 
Latin meaning, means joint dominion or co-ownership.1 It is not a very accurate term 
considering the complexities of this form of ownership. It gives the impression that 
the condominium as a legal institution emphasizes co-ownership. Therefore, this term 
downplays individual ownership of the apartment that necessarily deserves particular 
attention.2 Sectional title, used in South Africa, is also not appropriate since literally it 
emphasizes individual property intended for exclusive use. Although understandable 
to lay people, it does not encompass the entire multi-faceted legal structure of 
                                                        
1 Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 314; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-28; Pittman “Land without 
Earth–the Condominium” 1962 (15) U Fla L Rev 203. 
2 However, this term is already widely used and undoubtedly will remain as the single word describing 
this new form of property ownership. Thus, this thesis will employ the term Condominium for its 
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condominium ownership.3 Apartment ownership would seem to be more appropriate 
given that it is a sound compromise between the term “condominium” and the term 
“sectional title”. However, the condominium schemes are utilized not only for 
residential use but also for industrial, professional and commercial purposes.4 On the 
one hand, the fragmented nomenclature of the term underlies the difficulty to 
conceptualize this institution but on the other hand illustrates its key characteristics 
and multi-functions.  
While different terms for the same institution are preferred in different 
jurisdictions,5 the well-received tenet is that under both the United States’ Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) and South African Sectional Titles Act 
(STA), the concept of condominium comprises three elements, namely individual unit 
ownership, joint ownership of the common property and membership in an 
incorporated or unincorporated owners’ association.6  
2 2 A TRIPARTITE CONCEPT OF CONDOMINIUM  
2 2 1 Definition 
Variously described as the individual ownership of a cubicle of air space,7 a single 
                                                                                                                                                               
conciseness. 
3 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-28. 
4 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 20. 
5 In the United States it is known as a condominium; under the law of England and Wales it is called 
commonhold; in Singapore, it is established as strata titles; in South Africa, it is called sectional titles; 
in civil law jurisdictions such as Germany, it is established as Wohnungseigentum and in Japan it is 
referred to as divided ownership of buildings. 
6 Rohan “The ‘Model Condominium Code’–A Blueprint for Modernizing Condominium Legislation” 
1978 (78) Colum L Rev 587; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 23. 
7 Ball “Division into Horizontal Strata of the Land-space above the Surface” 1930 (39) Yale L J 617; 
Thompson “The Condominium as a Subdivision” 1963 (14) Hastings L J 302-304; Becker 
“Subdividing the Air” Lawyers Title News (April 1969) 5; Riselli “Air Space Utilization toward a 
Super-environment Symposium: the Environment and the Law” 1971 (5) Suffolk U L Rev 1020. 
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unit in a multi-unit building,8 a blend of private and communal housing,9 or of a 
planned unit development,10 the condominium is basically the ownership of a part of 
a building.11 Condominium ownership refers to the title of a specific part or parts of a 
building or buildings. It consists of the individual freehold ownership of units and the 
undivided interest of the common property as well as membership in the owners’ 
association consisting of all the unit owners, an association that manages and 
administers the property.12  
The condominium regime is divided into either a unitary system or a dualistic 
system. For the unitary system, only one kind of ownership is recognized, namely a 
modified form of co-ownership. Each co-owner is entitled to use and enjoy a specified 
part of the building, the unit or the section. The exclusivity of an individual right for a 
specified unit acquired by each condominium owner is merely regarded as an 
ancillary, carved out of the co-ownership of the land and the buildings.13  An 
individual title to a unit would be a burden on the co-ownership of the other 
co-owners. This “all-inclusive” co-ownership includes the right to have the sole use of 
a certain part of the building and therefore every unit owner is co-owner of the entire 
condominium building or buildings. The unitary systems have been adopted mainly in 
legal systems which still adhere to the maxim superficies solo cedit.14 The Swiss and 
Dutch systems of condominium ownership are the prime examples of the unitary 
system.15  
                                                        
8 Di Lorenzo New York Condominium and Cooperative Law 2. 
9 Schreiber “The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association?” 1969 
(117) U Pa L Rev 1104. 
10 Krasnowiecki “Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of 
Land Use Control” 1965 (114) U Pa L Rev 47. 
11 Pike “The Condominium as a Mortgage Investment” 1963 (14) Hastings L J 282. 
12 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 23; Kerr “Condominium Statutory Implementation” 1963 
(38) St John’s L Rev 1. 
13 Switzerland: CC art 712 (a); Netherlands: New Dutch CC art 5:106 (3). 
14 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 24. 
15 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-11. 
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The dualistic system, on the other hand, recognizes two types of ownership, namely 
individual ownership and joint ownership. A condominium regime involves a 
mingling of these two distinct forms of real property. Under the dualistic system, the 
individual ownership of a unit is given primary attention. The dualistic system has 
gained ground world-wide and has been applied in many countries including both 
common-law and civil-law jurisdictions.16 Both the UCIOA of the United States and 
the STA of South Africa have adopted the dualistic system.17  
 
UCIOA § 1-103 (8) reads:  
  “Condominium means a common interest community in which portions of the real 
estate are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of the real estate is 
designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those portions. A common 
interest community is not a condominium unless the undivided interests in the 
common elements are vested in the unit owners.”  
 
STA section 2 (a) reads: 
  “A building or buildings comprised in a scheme and the land on which such building or 
buildings is or are situated, may be divided into sections and common property in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where a scheme comprises 
more than one building, any such building may be so divided into a single section and 
common property.” 
 
From the above two statutory definitions, it is clear that under a dualistic system of 
apartment ownership, two autonomous species of rights, namely individual ownership 
of an apartment and common ownership of the land and common parts of the building, 
                                                        
16 Portugal, as an example of civil law countries, see art 1414 & 1420 of Portuguese CC of 1966; 
Singapore, as an example of common law countries, see section 3 & 13 of the Land Titles (Strata) Act 
41 of 1967 (as amended in 1999). 
17 UCIOA § 1-103 (8); STA s 2 (a). 
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are combined to form a completely new type of composite ownership.18 
Condominium, although presently the subject of ongoing legislation reform in both 
the United States and South Africa,19 remains a novel and largely unformulated 
property institution in China. The recently enacted Chinese Property Code formally 
accepted the idea of a dualistic system of condominium ownership that has been 
vigorously advocated by academic scholars20 and implicitly adopted in practice.21 
However, prior to the Property Code, the Chinese legal framework did not 
acknowledge a formal condominium concept.  
Condominium is regulated indirectly and awkwardly by a plethora of statutes,22 
                                                        
18 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 24. 
19 In the United States, the first generation of condominium statutes modeled on the Puerto Rico 
apartment ownership statute have mushroomed in 1960s, especially boomed by the legislation of 
National Housing Act empowering the Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages on 
condominiums. The second generation condominium statutes with more detail on such issues as 
consumer protection and developer’s right for staged development have been enacted in late 1970s. The 
prime examples are the Uniform Condominium Act of 1977 and the Uniform Common Interest 
Ownership Act of 1982. In the hope of bringing uniformity to the law, used the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) as a vehicle to propose a model condominium law, 
the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) of 1977 (as amended in 1980). On the basis of the UCA, the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) extends the same provisions to cooperatives and 
planned communities. Thereafter, the NCCUSL substantially amended the 1982 version of the UCIOA 
in 1994. For South Africa, the first generation Sectional Titles Act was enacted in 1971 and was 
subsequently superseded by the second generation Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. Thereafter, the 
second generation Act was also amended in a number of times, among others, Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act 63 of 1991, Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 1992, Sectional Titles Amendment Act 
15 of 1993, Sectional Titles Amendment Act 29 of 2003, Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 2005, and 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act 6 of 2006. 
20 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 80; Chen Lei “The New Chinese Property 
Code: A Giant Step Forward?” 2007 (11) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, online: 
http://www.ejcl.org/112/art112-2.pdf [10 January 2008]. 
21 Wang Liming and Liang Huixing, leaders of the Chinese Property Code draft groups, both 
incorporated condominium provisions on the basis of problematic practices in their proposed property 
code drafts. 
22 Among others, the General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC of 1986, Law of Contracts of the 
PRC of 1999. In terms of Chinese legislative ranking, statutes are legislated by the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the supreme legislative body in China. The statutes are ranked as the highest 
legislative documents after the Constitution and are applied and enforced nationwide. 
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central governmental (State Council) regulations,23  ministerial and departmental 
circulars 24  and scattered local norms. 25  Statutes pertaining to condominium 
ownership include, among others, the Urban Real Estate Administration Law of the 
PRC of 1994 and the Land Administration Law of the PRC (Amendment) of 1999. One 
ministerial circular that mistakenly referred to condominiums is Measures Governing 
the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of the PRC.26 Many scholars point out 
that this departmental circular is very outdated and rudimentary and did not cover 
many crucial aspects of condominium such as the condominium creation, the 
condominium management structure, the by-laws of management body, and the 
owner’s exclusive use right over certain common property.27 Only on June 8, 2003 
the State Council enacted the first national level regulation about condominium 
ownership management. 28  However, this regulation was heavily criticized 
immediately after its promulgation. The main criticism is that its provisions are 
                                                        
23 For example, the Interim Regulations for Granting and Transfer of Land Use Right on State Owned 
Urban Land in Cities and Towns of 1990 by the State Council and the Regulations on the 
Administration of Urban Private-owned Buildings of 1982 by the State Council. The regulations issued 
by the State Council are administrative orders in nature which rank lower than the statutes. But they are 
also applied nationwide. 
24 For example, the Measures Governing the Registration of Titles in Urban Buildings of 1997 issued 
by the Ministry of Construction. The ministerial and departmental circulars are administrative orders 
but are ranked lower to the State Council’s regulations. However, they are applied nationwide. 
25 For example, the Procedures and Related Taxes and Fees Concerning Real Estate Development and 
Operation in the City of Beijing of 1995 issued by the Beijing Municipality; the Shanghai Municipality 
Real Property Mortgage Measures of 1994 issued by the Shanghai municipality; and the Rules on 
Condominium Management of Guangdong Province of 1998 issued by the Guangdong Provincial 
People’s Congress. The local rules in China are the statutory documents with the lowest authority. They 
are only applied locally at the place where they are enacted. 
26 The Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989 issued by the 
Ministry of Construction (as amended on 15 August 2001). 
27 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 306; Jin Jian Housing Law of China 138. 
(Chinese version) 
28 See the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended on 26 August 2007) issued by the 
State Council.  
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skeletal and provide little detail about day-to-day management practices.29 Another 
criticism is that the regulation pays considerable attention to its administrative nature 
and says little about the proprietary aspect of condominium management such as the 
entitlement of parking lots.30 It is apparent that provisions that indirectly or partially 
deal with condominiums are rudimentary and incomplete.31 Most of the regulations 
that are partially concerned with the condominium are provisions that focus on the 
management of condominium buildings.32 There are barely any provisions at national 
or local level, which deal with other important pillars of condominium law, such as 
the detailed rights and obligations of condominium owners and sanctions for 
non-compliance.33 
This lacuna in the legal framework has caused legal uncertainty as regards the 
development of condominiums. It is unacceptable that such outdated and unsystematic 
provisions designed for the old planned economy are still in force. Some scholars 
argue that, based on the general principles contained in the new Property Code, a 
special condominium statute should be enacted to better protect the private apartment 
owners’ interests in view of changing social and economic conditions.34 It is certainly 
possible that a special condominium statute can be fleshed out on the basis of 
formalizing the dualistic nature of the condominium system, such as is found in the 
UCA in the United States and the STA in South Africa. 
2 2 2 Key Features 
The uniqueness of condominium can be observed through its main features. The most 
                                                        
29 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 28-29. (Chinese 
version) 
30 Hu Zhigang New Discourse on Real Property 236. (Chinese version) 
31 See n 30 supra. 
32 See n 29 supra. 
33 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 17-18. 
34 Hu Zhigang New Discourse on Real Property 234; Randolph & Lou Chinese Real Estate      
Law 48-49. 
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striking feature of condominium as a legal entity is that composite condominium 
ownership is a new “three-dimensional” concept.35 A condominium property scheme 
involves the division of a real property parcel into “unit” and “common property”. 
The units are then individually acquired by separate owners who also obtain an 
undivided interest in the common property. A condominium parcel comprises a unit 
coupled with an undivided share in the common elements. The third important aspect 
of condominium is that an owner of a unit automatically becomes a member of the 
management structure of the condominium. Hence, a purchaser of a condominium 
does not only obtain exclusive individual ownership of a unit but the purchaser also 
acquires joint ownership in the common property and gains membership of the 
owners’ association. This three-dimensional character of condominium has been 
recognized explicitly in article 70 of the new Chinese Property Code: 
 
  “The owner has exclusive ownership with regard to his or her individual apartment and 
unit for commercial or another use, joint ownership with regard to the common 
property as all portions of the project other than the apartment, and is entitled to 
manage and maintain the common property.”  
 
Secondly, the three components are so inextricably linked to each other that they 
form a “threefold unity”.36 None of these components can be disposed of separately. 
The undivided interest in the common property is appurtenant to a particular unit. The 
interest cannot be separated from or alienated independently of the unit. It can only be 
alienated, burdened or disposed of as a whole entity.37 Because of the threefold unity, 
                                                        
35 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-10; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property 415. 
36 Bärmann Kommentar mit Wohnungseigentumsgesetz 152; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 
23. 
37 STA s 16 (3) & s 36 (2); UCIOA §1-105 (b) (1) & § 2-107 (f). 
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the three components have a reciprocal influence on each other.38 When an individual 
interest in a unit is changed due to reconstruction or extension, the undivided interest 
in the common property of a condominium also changes accordingly.  
Thirdly, condominium owners’ rights and duties are multiple and complex. As the 
threefold unity theory implies, the condominium owner not only is entitled to use and 
enjoy the exclusive interest in his/her unit but also bears many duties and obligations 
imposed on the owner since each and every owner shares in the collective interest of 
the common property. The owners also have the right to take part in the operation and 
management of the whole condominium community, attending the meetings of the 
owners’ association, and the duties of abiding by the by-laws of the association and 
paying dues to keep the common property in good repair and the association running 
well. Compared with the owners of traditional freestanding houses, the rights and 
obligations of condominium owners are multiple and therefore more complicated. 
Thus, it is safe to say that condominium ownership is an example of the recent trend 
in property theory that considers ownership to be defined as much by the 
responsibilities it creates as by the rights it bestows.39 
Fourthly, condominium ownership straddles and encompasses the law of property 
and the law of associations.40 Not only does the owner have a property interest in his 
or her unit and in the common property, but also automatically joins a condominium 
owners’ association to deal with the administration of maintenance and management 
of the common areas of the building.  
Finally, the exclusive ownership of individual property is accorded primacy over 
the other two components.41 In other words, individual ownership of a unit is the 
most important element of the new composite ownership. Although the rights and 
duties of unit owners are multi-faceted in the light of the threefold unity theory, 
                                                        
38 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 23. 
39 Van der Merwe “Is Sectional Ownership True Ownership?” 1992 Stell L R 131-136. 
40 Van der Merwe & Butler Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-sharing 25. 
41 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-9. 
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individual ownership is central in determining rights and obligations of owners. 
Without certainty of individual ownership of a unit, the share value/participation 
quota of the common property cannot be decided and the membership of the 
association cannot be obtained. It is illogical to assume that condominium ownership 
is genuine without the centrality and emphasis on individual ownership. Accordingly, 
individual ownership can be thought of as the nucleus of the three components. 
2 2 3 Condominium in Comparison with Leases and Cooperatives 
Condominium ownership is genuine ownership rather than something nebulous.42 
Unlike a leasehold or cooperative or share-blocks scheme, condominium owners are 
always in control of their own destiny despite numerous restrictions imposed on the 
title.  
There are many advantages of a condominium structure as compared with other 
types of housing, including leases and cooperatives. Buying a condominium as 
opposed to renting a flat is often considered to be a wise decision to hedge against 
inflation. Another disadvantage of the lease is that the tenant’s right of use and 
enjoyment of an apartment is subject to the strict rules and terms imposed by the 
landlord. Moreover, a rental often can be variable and uncertain.43 Another advantage 
of condominium ownership is that an owner is assured of the benefits of fee simple 
ownership for his or her heirs. 44 In comparing condominium ownership with 
cooperatives45 or share blocks, condominium owners acquire a real right to an 
                                                        
42 De Wet & Tatham “Die Wet op Deeltitles” 1972 De Rebus 205 quoted from Badenhorst, Pienaar & 
Mostert 415; Markle “The Condominium As Homestead Property”1963 (14) Hastings L J 320-326. 
43 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 192; Fetherstonhaugh, Sefton & Peters Commonhold 8-12. 
44 Cribbet “Condominium: Home Ownership for Megalopolis?” 1963 (61) Mich L Rev 1237; Notes 
“Cooperative Apartment Housing” 1948 (61) Harv L Rev 1407; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 
182-183. 
45 UCIOA § 1-103 (10) “Cooperative” means a common interest community in which the real estate is 
owned by an association, each of whose members is entitled by virtue of his ownership interest in the  
association to exclusive possession of a unit. A share block, an equivalent of cooperative in South 
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apartment whereas the shareholders of a cooperative only have a personal right, a 
“stock interest”.46 Even more importantly, it is more difficult to obtain a mortgage 
loan from financial institutions for a stock interest in a cooperative than it is to obtain 
a mortgage loan to purchase a condominium. Financial institutions are less than 
enthusiastic to provide financing on the basis of a share certificate offered as security. 
Quite simply, it is much easier for a would-be condominium purchaser to obtain a 
loan, since a condominium development has a genuine fee simple title for each and 
every one of its apartments.47 
2 4 THE OBJECTS OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP 
2 4 1 Introduction  
Both the STA and the UCIOA have designed and brought forward a new composite 
entity, namely condominium ownership. Condominium ownership involves a 
combination of two distinct forms of real property interest: individual ownership and 
undivided joint ownership. A clear distinction between the property subject to 
individual ownership and the common property is needed because firstly, a 
condominium owner has an exclusive freehold ownership with regard to his/her unit, 
whereas the right to use and enjoy the property held in common must be reasonable 
and is subject to restrictions. 48  Secondly, the clear demarcation between the 
                                                                                                                                                               
African law, consists of a block of shares in a limited liability company granting the shareholder a 
personal right to occupy a particular part of a building owned or leased by the company. See s 1 of the 
Share Blocks Control Act 59 of 1980 s v “share block scheme”. 
46 Freedman & Alter The Law of Condominia and Property Owners’ Associations 22. 
47 Kane “The Financing of Cooperatives and Condominiums: A Retrospective” 1999 (73) St John’s L 
Rev 116-117; Berger “Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation” 1963 (63) Colum L Rev 
997-1001. 
48 Van der Merwe “A Comparative Study of the Distribution of Ownership Rights in Property in an 
Apartment or Condominium Scheme in Common Law, Civil Law and Mixed Law Systems” 2002 (31) 
Ga J Int’l & Comp L 101-102. 
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individual unit and the common property is necessary to determine the owner’s rights 
and obligations with regard to the common property. When property is identified as 
common property, the responsibility for its maintenance and management must be 
borne by the management body. The responsibility and cost of maintaining an 
apartment rests with the owner. 49  When a construction defect arises, the 
responsibility of repairing and maintaining such part depends on whether it has 
occurred on the common property or not. Thirdly, the floor area of an apartment can 
be principally used to determine the participation quota of the unit owner as is the 
case in South Africa and China.50 In order to ascertain the precise floor area of each 
apartment, it is crucial to know whether certain parts of a property belong to a 
particular apartment or to the property held in common by all owners. Fourthly, when 
an apartment owner procures individual insurance for his/her apartment, it is 
important to determine what is covered by the insurance.51 
 In view of the above, it is imperative that people have a proper understanding of 
condominium ownership. Although the primary emphasis of this section falls on an 
exposition and analysis of the conceptual side of condominium ownership, practical 
questions are also considered. Therefore, this section examines the definition and 
legal nature of the unit and the common property. It also singles out the designation of 
parking space, a dispute-prone aspect of the condominium project, as a practical 
example to illustrate the manner in which the unit and the common property are 
properly defined and differentiated. 
                                                        
49  Christudason “Common Property in Strata Titled Developments in Singapore: Common 
Misconceptions” 2004 (22) Property Management 27; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-4. 
50 See STA s 32(2); art 76 (2) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007; art 10 (2) of the Property 
Management Regulation of 2003. 
51 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-5. 
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2 4 2 Unit  
2 4 2 1 Statutory Definition 
In both the American and South African contexts, the “unit” is statutorily defined. In 
the UCIOA, the statutory definition of a unit reads: 
 
“unit means a physical portion of the condominium designated for separate ownership 
or occupancy, the boundaries of which are described pursuant to section 2-105(a)(5).”52  
 
The South African STA formally distinguishes “section” from “unit”. Under the 
STA, “section” means “a section shown on a sectional plan”. Essentially, this refers to 
the apartment itself. “Unit” means a section together with its undivided share in 
common property.53 To avoid confusion and in the interest of simplicity, the term 
“unit” is used in this thesis in place of “section” except where the context demands 
otherwise. Although neither the American nor South African statutes provide a 
detailed definition of a unit, a condominium unit can be defined in the light of other 
statutory provisions as the part of real property which forms a clearly demarcated part 
of a building that is described in the declaration or sectional plan as well as in other 
building registration documents.54  
2 4 2 2 Boundaries 
Since the UCIOA defines the common property in an exclusive way, namely the 
portions of a condominium scheme other than the units, it contains more details on the 
                                                        
52 UCIOA § 1-103 (31). Moreover, section 2-105(a) (5) requires that the boundaries of each unit 
created by the declaration be identified. 
53 STA s 1 (1) s v “section” read with s 5 and r 5 of the Sectional Titles Regulations. 
54 The condominium project document is referred to a declaration in the UCIOA while it is called a 
sectional plan in the STA.  
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boundaries and components of a unit.55 This Act provides a great deal of freedom and 
discretion for developers to ascertain the boundaries of a unit in project documents, 
namely the declaration, by-laws, and plats and plans. 56  Normally, two main 
alternatives can be adopted by developers, either the planes of the inner surfaces of 
the unfinished walls, ceilings and floors or the median line of the walls, ceilings and 
floors of an apartment.57 UCIOA section 2-102 (1) implies that if the declaration does 
not provide otherwise, the planes of the inner surfaces of the unfinished walls, ceilings 
and floors should be considered to be the boundaries of an apartment.58 The provision 
of this section can be varied, to the extent that the declarant wishes to modify the 
details for a particular condominium. As such, under UCIOA, a unit is usually 
regarded as an area or space enclosed by the boundaries together with all material 
parts in the area or space.59 In addition, although the developer has complete freedom 
to incorporate any part of the building as part of a unit, UCIOA ensures that certain 
indispensable parts of the project should not be designated as parts of a unit, such as a 
chute, a flue, wire, a conduit, a bearing wall, and a bearing column.60 If any portion 
of such item serves only that unit, it is a limited common element allocated solely to 
that unit; if any portion thereof serves more than one unit or any portion of the 
common elements it is part of the common elements.61 Moreover, if indicated on the 
                                                        
55 UCIOA § 1-103 (4). 
56 UCIOA § 2-102 . 
57 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 48. 
58 UCIOA § 2-102 (1) regulates that “[i]f walls, floors or ceilings are designated as boundaries of a 
unit, all lath, furring, wallboard, plasterboard, plaster, paneling, tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring, 
and any other materials constituting any part of the finished surfaces thereof are a part of the unit, and 
all other portions of the walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of the common elements.” 
59 UCIOA § 2-102 (3) stipulates that “subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), all spaces, interior 
partitions, and other fixtures and improvements within the boundaries of a unit are a part of the unit.” 
60 UCIOA § 2-102 (2). 
61 UCIOA § 2-102 (2) comment 2 states that the rationale for inserting this provision is to alleviate 
disputes in condominium administration with respect to liability for repair of pipes and other 
components of the building which unit owners may expect the association to pay for and which the 
association may wish to have repaired by unit owners. 
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project document, the unit may comprise two or more areas of the condominium land 
scheme which need not be contiguous.62 Under UCIOA, unit boundaries need not 
correspond to physical boundaries. Units may thus be created where no physical 
boundaries exist so long as the survey plans show the location of boundary lines.63 
  Under South African legislation, each section must be defined on a plan to be 
approved by the surveyor-general in relation to a scheme for the purpose of 
registration, namely the sectional plan.64 The boundary floors, walls and ceilings of 
each section must be shown and each section must be distinguished by a separate 
number on the sectional plan.65 The sectional plan must also demarcate the floor area 
of each section to the median line of its boundary walls.66 The common boundary 
between any two sections or between a section and the common property shall be the 
median line of the dividing floor, wall or ceiling, as the case may be.67 As in the 
UCIOA, a unit can include parts of the building or buildings which are not contiguous 
to the main component of the section.68 The STA provides that a section can consist 
of the main set of rooms, together with certain contiguous parts like a balcony and 
also non-contiguous parts like a storage room in the basement of the building.69 
Accordingly, in South Africa, the boundaries of a section are identified by physical 
features, such as walls, ceilings and floors shown on the sectional plan rather than by 
the airspace enclosed by such boundaries.70 
  In China, while there is no special condominium statute, there are fragmented 
administrative and departmental rules which are related to certain features of 
                                                        
62 UCIOA § 2-109 (b) (9) regulates “[e]ach plat must show…the distance between non-contiguous 
parcels of real estate comprising the condominium.” 
63 UCIOA § 2-109. 
64 STA s 1 (1) s v “section plan”. 
65 STA s 5 (3) (d) and s 5 (5). 
66 STA s 5 (3) (e). 
67 STA s 5 (4). 
68 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-9. 
69 STA s 5 (6). 
70 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-6. 
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condominium ownership.71 One departmental rule, namely the Provisional Measures 
on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of Commercial 
Housing, provides that a unit consists of three elements: cubic space, floor area of unit 
walls, and balcony floor area.72 It further explains that there are two categories for 
unit walls. One is the interior wall within the boundaries of a unit which is for the unit 
owner’s exclusive use and does not function as the bearing wall. The other is called a 
boundary wall which includes the common wall between adjacent units as well as the 
boundary wall between a unit and the common property. The common property 
includes staircases, corridors, and the outer wall. Whether a boundary wall is between 
units or between a unit and the common property or an outer wall, half of its projected 
floor space is counted as a part of the unit’s floor area.73 Another departmental rule 
stipulates that only half of the projected floor space of a balcony, whether enclosed or 
open, is counted as a part of the floor area of a unit.74 This provision can be compared 
to the South African Act that states an adjoining balcony, terraced veranda, atrium or 
projection can be counted as a part of a unit if it is shown as a part of the section on 
the sectional plan.75 It can be inferred that in China, the horizontal boundaries of an 
apartment are the surface of the unfinished drop ceiling and the unfinished concrete 
floor slab while the vertical boundaries are the planes formed by the median lines of 
the boundary walls. 
  To summarize, the Chinese provisions on unit boundaries are different from but still 
make use of some of the concepts of the American and South African models. The 
                                                        
71 Chen & Mostert “The Unavoidable Necessity of Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China: A 
Pilot Study” 2007 (2) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 71. 
72 Art 6 of the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing, issued by the Ministry of Construction on 8 September 1995. 
73 Art 7 of the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing, issued by the Ministry of Construction on 8 September 1995. 
74 S 3.0.18 of the Measures Governing the Calculation of Floor Areas of Construction Buildings, 
issued by the Ministry of Construction on 15 April 2005. 
75 STA s 5 (5) (b). 
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UCIOA is flexible about unit boundaries. There are two options unless the declaration 
makes an alternative arrangement. Boundaries are made up either of the inner surface 
of floors, ceilings and walls or the median line of unfinished floors, ceilings and walls 
of an apartment.76 The UCIOA does not use the distinction between the vertical 
boundaries and horizontal boundaries unless the declaration provides otherwise. As 
for the vertical boundaries of a unit, the Chinese provisions have the same regulations 
as the STA’s: the median lines of the boundary walls are the dividing lines of the unit. 
However China has adopted a different measure than South Africa on the horizontal 
boundaries of a unit. The horizontal boundaries of an apartment in China are the 
surface of the unfinished drop ceiling and the unfinished concrete floor slab. Still, the 
Chinese approach is not immune from criticism. When the boundaries of an apartment 
are the median line of the boundary walls between adjacent units, such walls become 
co-owned property only for two neighboring unit owners. This leads to the odd 
situation that it is the apartment owners rather than the management body who are 
responsible for repairs and maintenance of the walls. The question arises as to 
whether or not it makes a difference if the dividing walls are also the structural walls. 
This is quite often the case on a building plan. Even if it is not a bearing wall, when 
inspecting, renewing, or repairing water pipes, electric wires, TV cables and ducts 
which are for common use in such walls, it would be troublesome and not practical to 
require each unit owner to allow for this kind of “common use” work in their “unit”. 
According to other departmental rules, however, such pipes, wires, cables and ducts 
for common use are classified as common property, and the responsibility is vested in 
the management body for their repair and maintenance. 77  Some argue that 
                                                        
76 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 48. 
77  Both art 4 (3) of the Interim Measures Governing Maintenance and Management of the 
Post-privatized Public Housing issued by the Ministry of Construction on 15 June 1992 and art 3 (2) of 
the Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings in Housing Common 
Areas issued by the Ministry of Construction and Ministry of Finance stipulate that water pipes, heating 
pipes, electricity wires and the like are fixtures for common use and therefore common property. 
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co-ownership between owners of adjoining boundary walls based on median line 
division simplifies the demarcation between individual property and common 
property.78 However, serious errors will be made with oversimplification. Although 
the abovementioned departmental rules provide a useful reference to establish the 
boundaries of an apartment unit, they are outdated and needs to be redesigned and 
formalized. They were designed to implement the housing privatization policy in the 
1990s and do not provide explicit and systematic provisions.79 Different departmental 
rules causing legal uncertainty and inconsistency render it necessary to clarify the 
legal nature of unit boundaries.80 
2 4 2 3 Legal Nature 
In summary, a unit consists of the space enclosed by the boundary surveyed and listed 
on the project document, declaration or sectional plan. All fittings and fixtures 
installed within the boundary are for the exclusive use of the unit. The unit may 
include an adjoining porch, balcony or projection and a non-contiguous parcel of the 
building such as a parking space and underground storage room or garage. After 
examining the UCIOA and the STA provisions, one can conclude that a unit has two 
basic elements. First, a unit is a part of the property intended for any type of 
independent use. Second, a unit needs structural and mechanical independence 
recorded or registered on a declaration or a sectional plan.  
  Four very different theories deal with a unit’s boundaries. The first theory, the air 
space theory, maintains that the boundaries of a unit are the inner surfaces of the walls, 
                                                        
78 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 66. 
79 For example, the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989 (as 
amended in 2001) issued by the Ministry of Construction. See n 27 supra. 
80 The inconsistency can be seen in art 9 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban 
Adjacent Housing of 1989 (as amended in 2001). It provides that a type of co-ownership is presumed to 
exist between adjacent owners of the non-bearing boundary walls. This provision is inconsistent with 
the provisions presented in n 77 supra. 
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ceilings and floors, which defines a unit as an enclosed air space.81 This theory is 
outdated and problematic in practice. With this theory the unit owner cannot construct 
a niche or even hammer a nail on any boundary wall nor can he tile or pitch the floor 
in his own apartment. The second theory, the median line theory, maintains that the 
unit’s boundaries should be the median lines of walls, ceilings and floors, as stipulated 
in South Africa.82 The median line theory is also problematic as the status of service 
items such as wires and a pipe supplying all individual units is difficult to pinpoint.83 
The third one, the unfinished surface theory, holds that materials constituting any part 
of the finished surface of walls, ceilings and floors such as lath, paneling, tiles, 
wallpaper and paint as well as other fixtures and improvements and interior partitions 
outside of the unfinished surface, amount to a part of the unit.84 This theory seems to 
rectify the difficulties caused by the air space theory since the unit owner can change 
certain things on the painted surfaces of walls, ceilings, and floors. However, the 
pitfall of this theory is that it is difficult to reconcile people’s activities with the 
common business practice which regards the median line as dividing lines of the 
property.85 This is striking when it contradicts the departmental rule which explicitly 
states that the unit should include the half floor area of the boundary walls. The fourth 
one is the one implicitly adopted in China. It utilizes both the median line theory 
along with the unfinished surface theory. This means that the unit boundaries are the 
                                                        
81 See n 7 supra. 
82 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-7. 
83 The STA partially resolves this problem by introducing implied reciprocal servitudes of lateral and 
subjacent support. These servitudes imply that service items are part of the common property. 
Therefore, the owners are granted the right, to be exercised by the body corporate, to entry every 
section from time to time during reasonable hours in order to maintain or repair any part of the building, 
or any pipes, wires, cables or ducts therein, or for making emergency repairs inside the section which 
are necessary to prevent damage to the common property or any other section. For more detail see Van 
der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-9 & 8-10 and n 94 infra. 
84 See n 58 supra. 
85 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 42. 
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unfinished surfaces of floors and ceilings and the median line between walls. This 
theory is eclectic rather than innovative since it is based on the former three theories.  
  In view of the growing importance of condominiums in the Far East, an additional 
new theory has been developed. It holds that the boundaries of a unit can be perceived 
differently in practice contingent on whether the demarcation is subject to the internal 
administration of the condominium or external affairs.86 The unfinished surface 
theory applies when the internal affairs, its management and maintenance is the 
governing factor. Consequently, common walls are regarded as common property and 
therefore management and maintenance is the responsibility of the management body. 
When reselling, insurance and tax-paying of a unit are involved, condominium 
external affairs, the boundaries are set as the unfinished surfaces of floors and ceilings 
and the median line between walls. In essence, with title registration, a unit 
encompasses half the floor space of the dividing walls provided the walls are not 
bearing walls. This echoes the median line theory. Only with day-to-day management 
decisions the common boundary walls are maintained and managed by the 
management body not adjacent owners.87 Such kinds of regulations can be written 
into the by-laws or even the subdivision plan. This common sense way of dealing with 
a thorny issue has recently been vigorously supported by scholars in China, Taiwan 
and Japan.88 While this new approach is easily operational in everyday practice it 
differs little from a proprietary right perspective. 
                                                        
86 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 106-107. 
87 In South Africa, Van der Merwe argues that the duty to maintain the features lending structural 
support should be placed on individual unit owners by virtue of the prescribed management rule 70. 
See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-11. However, Maree disagrees this by arguing that it is equitable 
that the maintenance duty of the “quasi-common property” rests with the body corporate rather than 
unit owners. See Maree “Quasi-common Property in Sectional Title Schemes” 2006 (10 2) Lexisnexis 
Butterworths Property Law Digest 12-13. It seems that this disagreement can be reconciled by this new 
approach.  
88 Wen Fengwen “On the Individual Property of the Condominium” 1991 (42 7) The Law Monthly 
16-20; Wang Tez-chien Law of Things 251-252. (Chinese version)   
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2 4 3 Common Property 
2 4 3 1 Statutory Definition 
Both the UCIOA and STA employ an exclusive approach to statutorily define the 
common property. They define common property as all parts or portions of a 
condominium project other than the apartments (units).89 Under the UCIOA, common 
elements mean all portions of the common interest community other than the units. It 
also includes any other interests in real estate that benefit the unit owners and which 
are subject to the declaration. The 1994 amendments to the UCIOA provide that    
(1) common element(s) may include easements, including easements for the benefit of 
unit owners, and (2) real estate that may be owned or leased by the association and not 
subject to the declaration. 90  The STA also adopts the exclusive technique by 
providing that common property comprises: (1) the land included in the scheme;    
(2) all parts of the building or buildings not included in a section; and (3) the added 
land where the scheme has been extended under section 26.91 
  Another alternative for defining the common property is to follow the inclusive 
approach that is found in most European legislation by providing a detailed list of 
common property components.92 The first generation United States’ condominium 
statutes based on the Model Statute of the Federal Housing Administration followed 
the inclusive approach by providing a list of such components.93 The disadvantages 
of the inclusive approach are that compliance with the statutory definition may 
impose limitations on architectural design and can make the boundaries between units 
                                                        
89 UCIOA § 1-103 (4); STA s 1 (1) s v “common property”. 
90 The prefatory note 1 of the UCIOA.  
91 STA s 1 (1) s v “common property”. S 26 deals with the extension of a condominium scheme by the 
addition of land to the common property. The aim of the addition is primarily to provide additional 
amenities and facilities to the members of the scheme. 
92 Art 1117 of Italian CC and art 577 (11) of Belgian CC. 
93  § 2 of the Model Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership of the Federal Housing 
Administration of 1962 (Form 3285). 
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and common property vague.94 In addition, as modern architectural design and 
technology develops, it is questionable whether the inclusive approach can include an 
exhaustive list of the common property components.  
The rigidity of the inclusive approach is not suitable for China with its 
fast-developing condominium industry. The simpler and logical exclusive approach 
should therefore be adopted.95 However, a future Chinese statute should enumerate 
the principal common property components along with an exclusive definition.96 This 
needs to be done all the while being acutely aware of the criticisms leveled against the 
inclusive approach for its failure to specify the components that make up the common 
elements.97 Since condominium law is still a novelty in China, this will help many 
apartment owners to be well aware of the demarcation between the unit and the 
common property. A yet to be written Chinese statute may provide that common 
property be defined as all the parts of the condominium project other than the parts 
registered as units. Unless otherwise described in a project plan, the common property 
includes the land, building foundations, outer walls, columns, beams, roofs, staircases, 
corridors, entrances and exits of the building, central and appurtenant installations for 
services such as power, light, gas, hot and cold water, heating, air-conditioning, 
internet broadband, and the fixtures, the assets for property management by a 
                                                        
94 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-11. 
95 Van der Merwe points out that the possible objection to an exclusive approach is that certain parts 
of the building for common interest, such as plumbing ducts and ventilation shafts, could not be 
included in the common property on the basis of the median line boundary theory. He suggests 
resolving this problem with implied reciprocal servitudes. See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-11. In 
China, as explained above, such kind of problems could be resolved by putting into practice the new 
“internal and external affairs” theory. 
96 UCIOA contains a special supplementary provision: § 2-102 (1) “[e]xcept as provided by the 
declaration: if walls, floors or ceilings are designated as boundaries of a unit, all lath, furring, wallboard, 
plasterboard, plaster, paneling, tiles, wallpaper, paint, finished flooring, and any other materials 
constituting any part of the finished surfaces thereof are a part of the unit, and all other portions of the 
walls, floors, or ceilings are a part of the common elements.” 
97 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 45-11. 
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management body.98 Hence, a balance is struck between the flexibility and discretion 
a developer would like to have in designating common property with the statutory 
certainty as to what exactly constitutes common property. If neither the statute nor the 
subdivision plan is perfectly clear as to whether a particular property is part of the 
common property or part of a unit, this can easily become a question for the courts.99  
2 4 3 2 Categories of Common Property 
The unit owners obtain an undivided interest in the common elements. This interest is 
defined as an undivided share in the common property apportioned to a unit in 
accordance with the unit’s quota.100  Particularly important is that the common 
property cannot be dealt with separately from the unit that is attached to it.101 If a 
building or any part of a building including the parcel of land upon which it is situated 
has not been identified on a declaration or subdivision plan as being a part of a unit, it 
is common property. Common property can be categorized into three types: 
mandatory and permissive common property, general and limited common property, 
and the common property for a multi-building scheme and the common property for a 
single building. 
2 4 3 2 1 Mandatory and Permissive Common property  
Some civil law statutes distinguish between mandatory common property and 
permissive common property on the basis of whether the nature of common areas is 
                                                        
98 Art 20 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004 enacted by the Standing 
Committee of Shanghai People’s Congress on 19 August 2004. It provides a list of fixtures or assets as 
common property for the purpose of property management. It includes: (1) rooms for property 
management; (2) rooms for a porter, security guard, telephone, vestibules and corridors; (3) garage 
designated by the project plan for non-motorized vehicles; (4) green spaces, roads and grounds (5) 
other common parts of the condominium declared as such by the developer in a deed of sale or other 
written agreement; (6) other common property designated by statutes. 
99 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 45-12.  
100 STA s 1 (1) s v “unit” and UCIOA § 1-103 (2). 
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independent structurally or their use is independent of the use made of the 
condominium unit.102 The common areas can thus never be a component of a 
particular unit but are necessary for a building’s structural existence and stability. 
These areas are regarded as mandatory common property, the land, foundations, 
pillars, staircases and building exits and entrances. On the other hand, the common 
areas that may be designated as components of a unit are defined as permissive 
common property. They include gardens, outdoor parking spaces, garages, and rooms 
used by security guards and porters. However, since both the UCIOA and the STA 
allow developers a great deal of discretion to designate most components of common 
property as part of a unit in the declaration or sectional plan, these statutes do not 
make use of the division between mandatory and permissive common property. For 
China, there are also no provisions on a division between mandatory and permissible 
common property.103 However, as a civil-law influenced country, such a distinction is 
still helpful. Specifically, the common areas discussed earlier that are specially 
delineated by statute can be considered as mandatory common property while any 
other common areas designated by the developer or the by-laws in the project 
document are permissive common property.  
2 4 3 2 2 General and Limited Common Property 
Although a condominium’s common property is jointly owned by all the unit owners, 
portions of it may have been designated for the use of less than all of the owners. 
Common property that is limited in this way is referred to as limited common 
property as opposed to general common property which all the unit owners can use. 
Examples include balconies, parking spaces and roof gardens allocated for the 
exclusive use of one owner. Although the limited common property does not 
                                                                                                                                                               
101 See n 37 supra.  
102 See art 5 (2) of Gesetz über das Wohnungseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht of 1951, Germany; 
art 4 (1) of the Japanese Condominium Act of 1962. 
103 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 64. 
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necessarily alter the participation quota, one function of the employment of limited 
common property is to achieve a more equitable division of maintenance costs for the 
actual users.104 
  The UCIOA contains two special provisions on limited common property.105 The 
first is that any portion of a chute, flue, duct, wire, conduit, bearing wall, bearing 
column, or any other fixture which lies partially within and partially outside the 
designated boundaries of a unit and serves only that unit is limited common property 
allocated solely to that unit. Any portion of the above that serves more than one unit 
or any portion of the common property is a part of the common property. In addition, 
any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, patios, 
and exterior doors and windows or other fixtures designed to serve a single unit, but 
located outside the unit’s boundaries, is limited common property allocated 
exclusively to that unit.  
  The STA makes no distinction between limited common property and general 
common property since the term limited common property is not mentioned in the Act. 
However, the term exclusive use area is analogous to limited common property under 
the UCIOA. An exclusive use area is a part or parts of the common property 
designated for the exclusive use by the owner or owners of one or more sections.106 
Although it is argued that an exclusive use area differs from a limited common 
property on technical grounds,107 both of them share the same legal nature and 
characteristics. That is, they are not part of units and reserved for the use and 
                                                        
104 Van der Merwe & Butler Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-sharing 51; Rosenstein 
“Inadequacies of Current Condominium Legislation–A Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Unit Property 
Act” 1974 (47) Temp L Q 655-696. 
105 UCIOA § 2-102 (2) & (4). 
106 STA s 1 (1) s v “exclusive use area”. 
107 Van der Merwe argues that limited common property in some foreign statutes is distinguished 
from exclusive use areas in South African context mainly because it is set aside for the use and 
enjoyment of two or more of the unit owners while the exclusive use areas may be reserved for only 
one or more unit owners. See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-14. 
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enjoyment of less than all the unit owners. The Sectional Titles Act of 1971 did not 
provide for the concept of exclusive use areas but the Sectional Titles Act of 1986 
provides the stringent rules for the registration of exclusive use areas. 108 China 
should make provisions about exclusive use areas to tackle one of the vexing areas of 
dispute in condominium management. 
  The main difference between the South African exclusive use area and the United 
States limited common property is in the way it is created. Under the UCIOA, limited 
common property can only be created by a declaration or the two special provisions 
mentioned above.109 The use of common elements may also be subject to restricted 
use on the basis of association assignments without them becoming limited common 
elements.110 In other words, an association’s designation is not regarded as creating a 
limited common element. In the STA, an exclusive use area can either be an 
independent real right by registration111 or a mere personal right that is included in 
the rules of sectional title scheme.112 As independent real rights, exclusive use areas 
can either be created by the developer when the sectional plan is registered113 or they 
can be created by a unanimous resolution of a body corporate.114 This type of 
exclusive use areas is also called genuine exclusive use areas.115 Unlike genuine 
exclusive use areas, the non-genuine areas of exclusive use are created by special 
rules of the sectional title scheme. A non-genuine right of exclusive use is not a real 
right and thus is incapable of being mortgaged as a loan security. This non-genuine 
                                                        
108 Van der Merwe “The Establishment of Exclusive Use Areas in terms of the Sectional Titles Act by 
means of Management Rules” 1997 (60) THRHR 365-367. 
109 UCIOA §1-103 (19). 
110 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 45-13. 
111 STA s 27 (1). 
112 STA s 27 A. 
113 STA s 27 (1) (a) & s 27 (1A). 
114 STA s 27 (2) & (3). 
115 Mostert “The Regulation of Exclusive Use Areas in terms of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986: 
An Evaluation of the Existing Position and Suggested Alternatives” 1997 (3) Stell L R 326–330. See 
also Body Corporate of the Solidatus Scheme No SS23/90 v De Waal [1997] 3 All SA 91 (T) 95h-j. 
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exclusive use right is simply a contractual right enforceable only between the 
sectional owners concerned and the body corporate.116   
  The Chinese condominium statute should follow South African experience in such 
a way that exclusive use areas can be created by the developer in the project document 
or by with the unanimous consent of the management body. To ease the practical 
problems of dealing with the distinction between genuine and non-genuine exclusive 
use areas, the Chinese statute should regard the right of exclusive use as a real right. 
Then whether it is created by the project document or by the unanimous resolution of 
the management body, the right is registered in the deed registry. For exclusive use 
areas the developer creates on the project document, this real right on the exclusive 
use areas can be registered together with a unit’s registration. When the management 
body creates exclusive use areas, the real right can subsequently be recorded on the 
previously issued certificate of unit title. It is not necessary to have a separate 
certificate for a real right for exclusive use areas. In China it is highly unlikely that a 
management body would be able to create exclusive use areas by amending the 
project document since most Chinese condominium schemes encompass many units 
and a large number of unit owners. It is difficult to achieve unanimity on exclusive 
use area issues. Nonetheless, the most popular method in China to create exclusive 
use areas is for the management body by a special resolution to grant unit owners an 
exclusive use right for a limited term. An example might be a unit owner having an 
exclusive use right to a garden patch for ten years or as long as the person is a 
member of the management body.  
  Whether this granted exclusive use right is a real right or a personal right needs 
further analysis. First, a closer examination shows that whether the right is assignable 
does not always fit perfectly with proprietary status. On the one hand, some real rights 
are not assignable, such as rights of way, which are attached to specific land and 
cannot be alienated separately from the land. On the other hand, that a right can be 
                                                        
116 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 11-24. 
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assigned does not mean that it is proprietary.117 Although it is exceptional for 
personal rights to bind third parties on account of the privity principle, it is common 
for the benefit of such rights to be assigned to third parties who are then able to sue to 
enforce them.118 For instance, A contracts with B to provide watering services for B’s 
garden for ten years and then A could assign the benefit of this contract to C, so that C 
could sue B to enforce the contract. In this scenario, it does not give C a proprietary 
right in B’s garden. Therefore the assignability of a benefit cannot be used to prove 
that a right is proprietary or not. Secondly, unlike the exclusive use areas created by a 
project document or a management body’s unanimous resolution, most exclusive 
limited term use areas created by a management body depend largely on convenience 
and an owner’s personal reputation. The exclusive use right for a limited term is 
understandably granted to a “good neighbor” owner. Thirdly, the alienation of 
condominium units more frequently occurs in China than in the United States or 
South Africa. This is because the condominium is the predominant housing in China 
and people have few other housing options. When a well-off family wants to improve 
their housing, they purchase a larger and more luxurious condominium rather than 
purchasing a house or duplex which are available in the United States and South 
Africa. The social mobility within condominiums means the members of the 
management body may change quite often, especially in a large multi-building 
condominium complex. Against this background, it is more appropriate to treat the 
exclusive use areas for a limited duration created by a special resolution by the 
management body as a personal or contractual right.  
  In summary, for China it is proposed that limited common property means common 
property designated for the specific use by the owners of one or more units. This 
limited common property can be designated either in the project document or by a 
management body’s unanimous resolution filed at the deed registry office. In addition, 
                                                        
117 Smith Property Law 13. 
118 See n 117 supra.  
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the management body has the power to enter into a limited term exclusive use 
arrangement for the common property with the owners. Such a granted right is not 
regarded as a real right but a personal right.  
2 4 3 2 3 Common Property for a Multi-building Scheme and Common Property 
for a Single Building  
There is another legal distinction between the common property for a multi-building 
condominium and the common property for a single condominium building. This is 
because in China it is common to have a condominium scheme comprising many 
high-rise buildings. In other words, there is a general management body for a 
multi-building condominium scheme developed by a single developer and usually 
operated and administered by a single managing agent.119 Here, the common property 
for the whole block refers to common elements designed for all the high-rise buildings 
such as their boundary fences and the main gate as well as the central service 
installations such as power, light, gas, air-conditioning, reservoirs, water tanks and 
pumps. The common property for a single building is easily understood under the 
conventional “one building one condominium” model popularly adopted in South 
Africa and the United States. It refers to the common elements designed solely for a 
specific building’s use, such as its elevator, the staircase and the roof of the building. 
In practice, it is very contentious to distinguish the two in order to clearly demarcate 
the common expenses for different buildings and different unit owners.120 But it is 
necessary since unit owners' contributions should be limited to expenses associated 
with the operation and maintenance of the condominium in which they have an 
ownership interest. Thus, to ascertain the equitable common expenses of a 
multi-building condominium the subdivision plan must be drafted carefully, otherwise 
                                                        
119 Art 9 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 issued by the State Council provides that 
one property managing area should establish one management body. 
120 Hu Zhigang New Discourse on Real Property 238. 
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many disputes will arise. 
  A multi-building condominium scheme consists of a number of adjoining but 
separately constituted condominiums. The multi-building condominium is usually 
created to limit the size of the common estate in order to better use scarce land 
resources. As explained above, some common elements are designed for whole block 
use and some common elements only for single building use. Although neither the 
UCIOA nor the STA provide direct references, a Chinese condominium statute should 
contain provisions on the management of common property in a multi-building 
condominium. One option is for each condominium building in a block to be operated 
by a separate management body, or one association should operate all of the 
condominiums.121 However, it is more effective to establish a two-tier management 
system to administer the management and maintenance of common property in a 
multi-building scheme or a mixed-use condominium scheme. 122  A two-tier 
management body has a main or master management body at the first-tier and one or 
more subsidiary management bodies at the second-tier. Every two-tier management 
body has at least one subsidiary management body representing the interest of a 
particular group of owners having a common interest, such as a group living in the 
same building. The two-tier management body system will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Six. 
2 4 4 Parking Space 
Parking space is a key issue for condominium developers and unit owners. It is a 
vexing issue in practice.123 It is singled out here because it exemplifies the impact of 
the definition and delimitation of core elements of condominium ownership. Parking 
                                                        
121 Poliakoff Florida Condominium Law and Practice § 11.7. 
122 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 67. 
123 The issue of parking spaces is currently the subject of extensive debate in condominium practice 
and therefore was a very debatable issue when the draft of the Chinese Property Code was under 
deliberation. See Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 68. 
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space can be designated in many ways, either as a component of a unit, as common 
property, as exclusive use areas, or merely by license. 
  In principle, condominium ownership includes such joint interest areas as parking 
spaces. Regardless of the method, initial parking decisions are made by the developer. 
Once a management body is established, it may be given the power to designate 
parking spaces.124 Usually the developers meet the parking need of the unit owners 
by designating parking lots on the subdivision plan.125 Ideally, the developer should 
designate at least one parking space for each unit. But in day to day practice, the 
location, use, and purpose of a particular scheme may render parking less urgent or 
even impossible. When condominiums are located in a congested city centers with 
excellent public transport, or where zoning by-laws do not permit a parking space for 
each unit owner, alternative arrangements are made.126 Now parking spaces in China 
usually are bought or rented from developers.127 Parking space costs may then burden 
the condominium owner, depending on the area in which the condominium is situated 
and the availability of parking. The parking spaces issue has led to many disputes in 
China between real estate developers and condominium owners.128 This is mainly 
because the Chinese developers are not liable to draw up a constitutive project 
document to designate the parking space.  
Problems with the allocation of parking spaces are common in undeveloped 
condominium law. In South Africa, for instance, the first generation condominium 
legislation, the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1971, did not regulate parking spaces or 
                                                        
124 Freedman & Alter The Law of Condominia and Property Owners’ Associations 118. 
125 Art 74 (1) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007; STA s 25 (2) (a) (v); UCIOA § 2-109 (b) (10) 
and § 2-102 (2) & (4). 
126 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 68. 
127 Art 74 (2) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007 stipulates that parking spaces located in the 
planned condominium scheme can be settled by agreement in ways of separate purchase or inclusion of 
apartment sale or lease. 
128 Wang Liming “Ownership of Garages in the Property Code and Its Relevant Problems” 2006 (5) 
Modern Law Science 76. (Chinese version) 
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other common areas maintained by the developer. This resulted in malpractices by 
unscrupulous developers, such as selling or letting parking spaces to outside 
persons.129 This seriously impaired the functioning of sectional title schemes, since 
harmony within the sectional title communities was jeopardized. It is clear that many 
of these problems could have been avoided had there been legislative provisions to 
deal with the issue of parking. The situation was rectified in the second round of 
legislation with the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 which has since been revised 
several times by means of legislative amendment. Now the South African sectional 
title law no longer permits developers or any sectional owners to alienate exclusive 
use areas such as parking spaces to outsiders.130  
Even though regulating parking is contingent upon the many factors and therefore 
needs to be flexible, there are ways to draft provisions that ensure fair dealing with 
condominium parking space. In the simplest case, one in which there are sufficient 
parking spaces, the developer can set up parking spaces as individual units or as 
common property for exclusive use by some or all of the owners. Otherwise, parking 
spaces can be in an area of the common property, meaning the management body 
retains the right to specify which unit owners can park on which part of the common 
property. Large mixed-use condominiums without sufficient parking spaces for either 
each residential condominium owner or a commercial unit owner are more complex. 
In this case parking spaces can be structured around "parking licenses". This means 
that the residential unit owners use the parking spaces overnight whereas the 
commercial owners can use them during the day. 131  Where parking space is 
inadequate, such as in congested urban areas, the situation is problematic unless good 
public transport renders parking less important.132 
                                                        
129 Xu Shanghao & Wang Yangguang “On the Ownership of Condominium Parking Space” 2007 (1) 
Legal Forum 26. (Chinese version) 
130 STA s 27 (1) (a), (3) & (4) (a). 
131 Baker Condominium Law in Ontario: A Practical Guide 96. 
132 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 69. 
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  In summary, the prospective Chinese condominium statute should require 
disclosure of all relevant information including parking space designation to 
prospective buyers in the public statement provided by developers. The existing 
practice under which developers make unconscionable profit by selling off or leasing 
the parking spaces should be strictly forbidden. The reason for this is obvious. Parking 
space is located either on the ground in the scheme, or at underground level of the 
building or at the roof level of the building. Regardless of where the parking space is 
situated, it falls within the scope of the land or building in the scheme. The land or the 
land use right in Chinese context is classified as common property. Therefore, the 
developer cannot charge the unit owners extra money for parking space since it is 
either part of common property or as part of individual unit, as the case may be.  
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CHAPTER 3  
CREATION 
 
3 1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the requirements for land intended for subdivision and 
the buildings that comprise a condominium project. Both the UCIOA and the STA 
require formal project documents and registration (recordation) for the creation of a 
condominium.1 The creation of a condominium in China falls within a variety of 
statutes and regulations, inter alia the Law of Urban Real Estate Development 
Administration, the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in 
Urban Areas, and the Building Construction Law. 2  Like South Africa, the 
development of a condominium project in China is very similar to subdividing a piece 
of land for a freestanding townhouse.3 Generally, the relevant provisions for the 
creation of condominium buildings in China are similar to provisions in the UCIOA 
and the STA in many respects. But there is one major difference: there is no 
counterpart in Chinese law to a constitutive document for the creation of a 
condominium, namely, a declaration or a sectional plan. All of this will be explained 
in more detail.  
  Moreover, it is necessary to discuss the relevant Chinese law on the subdivision of 
                                                        
1 Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in the Light of the Uniform Condominium Act” 1987 (20) 
CILSA 8-9. 
2 The Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of the PRC of 1994 (as amended in 
August 2007) issued by the National People’s Congress of PRC; the Regulation Governing Real Estate 
Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 1998 issued by the State Council; the Building 
Construction Law of 1997 issued by the National People’s Congress of PRC. 
3 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-3. 
 50
land because it is unique in light of public landownership. Therefore this chapter 
refers to the UCIOA and the STA to explain the steps and the process to be followed 
from land subdivision to the final registration of a condominium title. 
3 2 LAND SUBDIVISION 
3 2 1 Condominium Feasibility Plan 
In China, the initial step for a developer to create a condominium is to draft a 
condominium feasibility plan. This plan comprises three components, namely, a 
market demand study, a building techniques study, and a financing study.4  
Basically, the feasibility plan includes 1) title pages, which means the name of the 
project, the location plan, and the site plan; 2) a market potential analysis; 3) an 
estimate of the building materials to be used and the qualifications of the prospective 
builders; 4) a floor area plan of the proposed development, the development’s 
proposed capitalization and the relevant building parameters; 5) the start and finish 
construction schedule; 6) an estimate of the project’s operating budget; 7) a financial 
assessment, which includes the net income from the sale of apartments, the tax to be 
levied and the potential profit; 8) a risk analysis, such as the possible change in 
statutes and relevant policies, market demand risk, and the changeable price of 
building materials; 9) a national economic evaluation; and 10) a conclusion.5 
The local land authority examines the project’s feasibility plan, together with the 
land-use right application.6 After obtaining the preliminary approval, the feasibility 
plan becomes the project plan. Then the developer proceeds to seek final approval 
                                                        
4 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 176.  
5 See n 4 supra.  
6 Art 4, 5 & 7 of the Measures Governing the Preliminary Approval of Land Use for Construction 
Projects of 2001 (as amended in 2004) issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources and art 4 of the 
Measures on Examination and Approval of Land Use for Construction Purpose of 1999 by the Ministry 
of Land and Resources. 
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from the local planning authority and the local housing authority or local construction 
commission.7 The feasibility plan’s final approval largely depends on whether the 
proposed plan is in accordance with the comprehensive land-use planning,8 annual 
national land-use planning for construction purposes,9 urban zoning planning, and 
annual real estate development planning.10 A feasibility plan dealing with large 
and/or important projects needs to be approved by the relevant Development and 
Reform Commission. The Development and Reform Commission Agency is in charge 
of regulating operation of the macro-economy and guiding the economic reform in 
China. 
3 2 2 Obtaining a Land-use Right  
After a condominium feasibility plan is approved by the relevant authorities, the 
developer should acquire a land-use right on the land on which the condominium 
building or buildings are to be erected.11  
The UCIOA expressly provides that the condominium project can be developed not 
only on land held in fee simple but on certain forms of leasehold land.12 At common 
                                                        
7 Art 12 of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 
1998. 
8 Chapter 3 of the Land Administration Law of the PRC of 1986 (as amended in 1998) requires every 
local government at the city or county level to prepare a comprehensive land-use plan; also see art 3 of 
the Law of Urban Planning of 1989. The main objective of planning and land-use control is to ensure 
that land as a limited resource, is put to the best use for the public good.  
9 See the Provisions on Management of Annual Land-use Plan of 1999 issued by the Ministry of Land 
and Resources. This is to ensure that construction sites are located in the planned areas to protect arable 
land from being exploited for urbanization. 
10 Art 10 of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 
1998.  
11 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 179; Randolph & Lou 
Chinese Real Estate Law 141. 
12 UCIOA § 2-106. In addition, § 1-103 (26) states that “real estate means any leasehold or other 
estate or interest in, over, or under land, including structures, fixtures, and other improvements and 
interests …”   
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law the freehold or fee simple absolute in possession means an estate of intrinsically 
unlimited duration which connotes the virtual reality.13 The leasehold means a right 
of exclusive possession of land for a period of pre-arranged duration conferred by the 
lessor (or landlord) on the lessee (or tenant).14 However, the STA provides that a 
sectional title scheme can be developed only on land that is registered in the name of 
the developer.15 The development of sectional title schemes on leasehold land is not 
allowed.16 In order to create a condominium project in China, the developer needs to 
acquire a land-use right rather than landownership on account of the public 
landownership issue. Chinese law differs from South Africa with its Roman-Dutch 
law tradition 17  since it considers a building as immovable property that is 
independent of land.18 The Constitution provides that a person or a legal entity is 
allowed to use state-owned land for a period of time, usually on payment of rent or 
hire charges.19 Once the transfer of land-use rights was recognized, China developed 
rules on leasing, mortgaging, selling, and inheriting land.20 According to current land 
law, a “granted land-use right” is given for a period of 70 years for residential housing 
in urban areas.21 The new Property Code provides that the urban building land-use 
right can be obtained by government allocation or in the market by a granting 
contract.22 The granted land-use right certificate is obtained by registering the granted 
                                                        
13 Gray & Gray Land Law 144. 
14 Gray & Gray Land Law 156. 
15 STA s 1 (1) s v “developer”. 
16 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-31. 
17 In South African law, immovable is land and everything that is attached to land by natural or 
artificial means (“aard- of nagel-vast”). See Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property 147. 
18 Note that Chinese property law has a tradition of separating landownership and buildings. See 
Riasanovsky The Modern Civil Law of China 75-80. 
19 Art 10 of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 (as amended in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004). 
20 Randolph “Joint Congressional Executive Committee on the China Property Rights Roundtable” 
available online at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/020303/randolph.php [15.10.2007] 
21 Art 12 of the Law of Land Administration of the PRC of 1986 (as amended in 1998). 
22 Art 137 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
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land-use contract at the local land administration agency.23 The land-use right is 
similar to the long-term ground lease that is common in America to develop 
commercial sites and the long lease system in South Africa.24 But the main difference 
is that the Chinese right is obtained from the government rather than from a private 
owner. Before the enactment of the Property Code, Chinese law did not provide 
whether the holder of land-use rights must pay increased charges based on the value 
of the land at the time of renewal, or whether the renewed term would be at least as 
long as the original term. To reduce uncertainty and risk, the Property Code now 
ensures that the state confirms a holder’s right of automatic renewal without charge 
for private ownership of residential buildings,25 except when it is in the public 
interest to reclaim the land.26 This is welcome to boost the condominium construction 
industry.  
Both the STA and UCIOA allow the condominium project to be developed on 
separate plots of contiguous or even non-contiguous land.27 In South Africa, if a 
scheme is to be developed on two or more pieces of land, the developer must apply 
for a certificate of consolidated title in favour of the same developer before 
registration of the sectional plan if the pieces are not already notarially tied.28 
However, the Chinese law contains no explicit provisions as to whether condominium 
buildings can be developed on separate plots of land or whether these plots must first 
be consolidated. Statutorily, a real estate development based on a land-use right must 
conform to the contract granting land-use right.29 It would seem that as long as a 
                                                        
23 Art 27 & 29 of the Measures on Land Registration of 2007 issued by the Ministry of Land and 
Resources; art 15 of the Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994 (as amended in 
August 2007). 
24 Randolph & Lou Chinese Real Estate Law 125-126; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 430. 
25 Art 149 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
26 Art 148 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
27 UCIOA § 2-109 (b) (9); STA S 5 (6). 
28 STA s 4 (2); also see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-29. 
29 Art 26 of the Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994 and art 15 of the 
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granting contract does not provide otherwise, it would be possible to develop a 
condominium project on separate parcels of land. However, a condominium project 
can only be established when two or more such contiguous pieces of land are 
registered in the name of one person. This is because the granted land-use right 
severely restricts its use and the period for such use.30 A land-use right for a different 
parcel of land may have both a different use and different terms. Therefore, it is not 
feasible to develop a condominium project on separate parcels of land with different 
uses or with different terms. In short, if a condominium project comprises more than 
one parcel of land with different uses, such parcels must be consolidated by 
registration at a land-administration authority.  
3 3 APPROVAL BY PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
In general, a developer must ensure that project plans are not in conflict with any 
applicable planning statutes and must obtain a building permit. Both the STA and the 
UCIOA expressly require the relevant public authority to approve a condominium 
scheme.31 Chinese law is not an exception. However, since these administrative 
interventions are primarily regulated outside of a condominium statute, they are only 
briefly explained.  
Upon obtaining a land-use right certificate, the developer first receives a Real 
Estate Development Project Manual and is then required to record the major 
development updates at the real estate authority from time to time. 32  If the 
condominium project requires the demolition and redevelopment of an older 
residential area, the developer needs to apply for a Housing Demolition and Removal 
                                                                                                                                                               
Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 1998. 
30 Art 12 of the Law on Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994 (as amended in 
August 2007). 
31 STA s 4; UCIOA § 1-106. 
32 Art 19 of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 
1998. 
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Permit from the local real estate authority.33 This is to ensure the developer is legally 
entitled to deal with every homestead concerning their compensation for having their 
dwelling demolished and having to move. Subsequently, two permits need to be 
obtained from the local planning authority in order to commence construction. But to 
obtain these permits the proposed condominium project cannot contravene any local 
real estate development plans, zoning ordinances, land-use by-laws, or any previous 
permits issued for the scheme.34 The Land Use Planning Permit allows the developer 
to initiate a plat of the project survey35 while the Building Permit allows the 
developers to commence construction by contracting and sub-contracting with the 
builders.36 It is notable that the Chinese law gives preferential treatment to developers 
to encourage residential condominium developments. This includes: first, granting a 
tax deduction or even an exemption for a housing development project; second, 
providing a low interest loan for the project; and third, granting a land-use right at a 
lower price than for ordinary land-use transfers.37 
3 4 BUILDING 
Although the physical quality and types of buildings are specifically regulated in 
building and planning legislation, both UCIOA and STA contain building provisions. 
UCIOA prohibits local lawmakers from discriminating against condominiums by 
means of a discriminatory building code. 38  For example, if a building code 
requirement imposing a minimum fire-wall rating between apartments does not 
prevent a rental apartment building from being built, this act would override any 
                                                        
33 Art 7 of Measures Governing Demolition and Redevelopment of Urban Housing of 2001 issued by 
the State Council. 
34 Art 25 of the Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994. 
35 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 180. 
36 Art 7 of the Building Construction Law of 1997. 
37 Art 29 of the Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994. 
38 UCIOA § 1-106 (a). 
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requirement imposing a higher fire wall rating between apartments merely because the 
same building was a condominium.39 In addition, the UCIOA defines “real estate” to 
include “parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces that may be 
filled with air or water.40 This allows trailer park projects, mooring sites at marinas 
and airspace pockets to be organized as a condominium.41 These are examples of bare 
land condominium schemes without buildings. The South African Act does not allow 
the creation of bare land condominiums.42 The Chinese statute should follow the 
South African model and prohibit bare land condominium schemes because of the 
scarcity of urban land in China. 
Furthermore, the South African statute provides expressly that sectional title 
buildings must be of a permanent nature.43 Thus temporary structures such as 
caravans, carports, and a mobile timber house not affixed to the ground, and 
prefabricated buildings cannot become a condominium scheme since they do not 
comply with the statute.44 However, the STA does allow a scheme to include one or 
more buildings. 45  Although UCIOA does not provide direct reference to a 
multi-building project, the provisions for a master association imply that it is possible 
to allow more than one building in a scheme.46 In China, since it is popular to 
develop multi-building schemes, the statute should allow a condominium complex to 
encompass more than one building. 
Finally, most state rental buildings in China were sold to private citizens under the 
                                                        
39 UCIOA § 1-106 comment 2. 
40 UCIOA § 1-103 (26). 
41 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 31. 
42 Van der Merwe & Rossouw “Dockominiums or Sectionalized Mooring Spaces in terms of the 
Sectional Titles Act” 1994 TSAR 72. 
43 STA s 1 (1) s v “buildings”. 
44 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-32. 
45 STA s 4 (2). 
46 UCIOA § 2-120; also see Lundquist “Mixed Use Condominiums under the Minnesota Uniform 
Condominium Act” 1984 (10) Wm Mitchell L Rev 97-114. 
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housing privatization policy in the 1990’s.47 However, with this policy, some of the 
units in a building could be sold to private individuals while the remaining units could 
remain under state ownership. The question is whether such a partial private-owned 
building is subject to apartment ownership. In America, although various 
condominium schemes can be organized into a master or umbrella association which 
provides management services or has decision-making functions,48 condominium 
schemes under UCIOA, in principle, must be subject in their entirety to the 
condominium regime.49 Having only some units subject to the condominium regime 
can bring intractable management and maintenance difficulties. Chinese local 
governments need to avoid allowing partial-building privatization to take place. A 
better solution is to disallow a partial condominium scheme in any building in China. 
3 5 CREATION AND REGISTRATION 
3 5 1 UCIOA 
3 5 1 1 Creation  
Like any other freehold estate, UCIOA requires registration of the declaration and 
accompanying project documents for the creation of a condominium scheme.50 Under 
UCIOA three basic documents are involved in the creation of a condominium, namely, 
a declaration or a master deed,51 a set of by-laws and an individual unit deed.  
The declaration must be recorded in the name of the owners’ association and in the 
                                                        
47 Randolph “Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Property Rights and Land Reform in 
the PRC”, online: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/020303/randolph.php [15 January 2008]. 
48 UCIOA § 2-120 (a) & (b). 
49 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 31. 
50 UCIOA § 2-101 (a). 
51 The term “master deed” is not often used but it is descriptive of the document’s effect. This 
document serves as a form of basic conveyance. See Johnson “Condominium: The Theory and North 
Dakota Practice” 1967 (44) N D L Rev 347. 
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name of each person executing the declaration.52 The declaration is the governing or 
constitutive document of the condominium development. 53  The condominium 
scheme is created by registration of the declaration. Provisions in the declaration have 
been described in American cases as being similar to a “covenant running with the 
land”.54 The declaration statement circumscribes and defines the limits of absolute 
ownership which a purchaser obtains on purchasing a unit. The declaration defines the 
very nature of the condominium and must include: the name of the condominium 
project, the name of the county in which it is situated, the legal description of the real 
estate included in the project, a statement on the maximum number of units to be 
created, a description of the boundaries of each unit, a description of any limited 
common elements and any real estate which may be allocated subsequently as limited 
common elements. The declaration also includes a description of any development 
rights reserved by the declarant along with their conditions or limitations, a statement 
regulating the boundaries of different parcels of real estate and the exercise of a 
development right in the case of a phased development, a statement about allocating 
the proportions of the common interests, restrictions on partitioning the condominium 
project and the alienation of the units. Finally there needs to be a record of the 
easements and licenses reserved in the declaration.55 The declaration may contain any 
other matters the declarant considers appropriate, including any restrictions on a unit’s 
usage or the number of persons or other factors involved in who may occupy the 
units.56 UCIOA also has a special requirement when the condominium is on leasehold 
property. For example, if the expiration of a lease terminates or reduces the size of the 
                                                        
52 UCIOA § 2-101(a). This includes the name of the lessor if the condominium is on leased property. 
See UCIOA § 1-103 comment 13 and § 2-106. 
53 UCIOA § 1-103 (13) holds that declaration means any instrument, however denominated, that 
creates a common interest community, including its amendments. 
54 UCIOA § 1-103 comment 14. For more detail on the law governing the running of covenants with 
freehold land, see Gray & Gray Land Law 423-426. 
55 UCIOA § 2-105 (a). 
56 UCIOA § 2-105 (b).  
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condominium scheme, the landlord must sign the declaration.57 Moreover, a unit 
owner's leasehold interest in a condominium is not affected by failure of other unit 
owners to pay rent or fulfill any other covenant.58  
Plats and plans are part of the declaration and must be filed for registration.59 
Essentially, the plats refer to a land and apartment survey of the entire condominium 
project. The plans are a boundary survey of each unit.60 The plats and plans are used 
along with the declaration to clearly determine the boundaries of the units. They are 
also employed to determine the respective duties and responsibilities of the 
condominium association and the unit owner on maintenance and repair issues. 
The second basic document needed to create a condominium is the by-laws of the 
condominium association. These by-laws are subordinate to the declaration.61 In fact, 
UCIOA does not require the recordation of the by-laws and therefore they may be 
unrecorded.62 Nevertheless, UCIOA requires six indispensable components for a 
condominium association’s by-laws. They are 1) the number of members of the 
executive board and the titles of the association’s officers; (2) the election by the 
executive board of a president, treasurer, secretary, and any other officers of the 
association that the by-laws specify; (3) the qualifications, powers and duties, terms of 
office, and methods of electing and removing executive board members and offices 
and filling vacancies; (4) which, if any, of its powers the executive board or officers 
may delegate to other persons or to a managing agent; (5) which of its officers may 
                                                        
57 UCIOA § 2-106 (a).  
58 UCIOA § 2-106 (b).  
59 UCIOA § 2-109 (a).  
60 UCIOA § 2-109 comment 2. It states that under this Act, it is important to recognize that a “plat” 
need not mean a “survey” of the project’s entire land area at the time the initial plat is recorded. 
However, as the development proceeds, amendments to the plat are made so the plat eventually 
becomes a survey of the whole project. 
61 UCIOA § 2 -103 (c) provides that in the event of a conflict between the provisions of the 
declaration and the by-laws, the declaration prevails except to the extent the declaration is inconsistent 
with this Act.  
62 UCIOA § 3-106 comment 1. 
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prepare, execute, certify, and record amendments to the declaration on the 
association’s behalf; and (6) a method for amending the by-laws.63 Subject to the 
provisions of the declaration, the by-laws may provide for other matters the 
association deems necessary and appropriate.64 
  The third basic document is the individual unit deed. It must generally be tendered 
together with the declaration at the land registry for recordation.65 The deed usually 
contains a description of the land, the unit’s description as presented in the declaration, 
a statement on use restrictions, and the unit entitlement or the portion of undivided 
interest in the common elements of each unit. 66  UCIOA contains no detailed 
provisions about the requirements necessary for a title deed since the Model Statute of 
the Federal Housing Administration adequately addressed this issue.67  
3 5 1 2 Recordation 
UCIOA was not designed to provide a uniform registration procedure.68 Rather, it 
leaves room for each state to accommodate its own state administrative procedural 
act.69 According to UCIOA, the registration of a condominium development is only 
required for a residential scheme since commercial and industrial common interest 
communities are exempt from registration.70 Hence, the registration of a residential 
condominium is done as long as the administrative agency, usually the Land Registrar, 
is satisfied with the documents submitted.71 However, fees and taxes are usually 
                                                        
63 UCIOA § 3-106 (a). 
64 UCIOA § 3-106 (b). 
65 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 38. 
66 Johnson “Condominium: The Theory and North Dakota Practice” 349. 
67 The Model Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership of the Federal Housing Administration of 
the United States of 1962 (Form 3285) § 12. 
68 In fact, the UCIOA Section 5 “Administration and Registration of Common Interest Communities” 
is an optional clause. 
69 UCIOA § 5-101 comment 3. 
70 UCIOA § 5-102 comment 1. 
71 UCIOA § 5-104 (a) (2). 
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required when lodging an application for registration.72 UCIOA does not let a 
declaration, or its amendment, be recorded unless all of the buildings’ structural 
components and mechanical systems are substantially completed in accordance with 
the plans.73 
3 5 2 STA 
3 5 2 1 Creation      
In South Africa, the developer must first ensure that his proposed project complies 
with the statutory requirements pertaining to land and buildings. 74  Next, the 
developer should contemplate the financing of the proposed scheme and whether it is 
feasible to develop the project in phases.75 Then the developer invites an architect or 
a land surveyor to prepare a draft sectional plan. This plan is drawn up in conformity 
with the requirements of section 5 of the STA.76 Since a sectional title certificate is 
issued on the basis of the registered sectional plan, this plan has to be prepared as 
accurately as possible.77 Although there is no need for a local authority to approve a 
sectional title scheme, the local authority can still be called upon to condone certain 
planning and building infringements.78 If it is found that there are inconsistencies or 
irregularities in the draft plan with relevant town planning schemes and building 
by-laws, the developer must lodge an application to the local authority for a waiver.79 
The local authority has the authority to condone non-compliance by issuing a 
                                                        
72 UCIOA § 5-103 (a); Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 39. 
73 UCIOA § 2-101 (b). 
74 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-6. 
75 Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles 
(Strata) Act” 1999 (3) Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 136. 
76 STA s 5. 
77 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 5-5. 
78 STA s 4 (5) (b). 
79 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-5. 
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certificate of condonation to the developer.80 Once the legal requirements have been 
complied with or non-compliances have been waived by the local authority, the draft 
sectional plan is then submitted to the Surveyor-General for approval.81 The Sectional 
Titles Amendment Act of 1997 streamlines the process of establishing a sectional title 
scheme in order to save administrative costs and to avoid red tape.82 The role played 
by the local authority in establishing a sectional title scheme is therefore reduced.83   
A sectional plan is neither an architectural masterpiece nor as detailed as a building 
plan.84 Instead, it resembles a general plan of a township. Usually, a draft sectional 
plan contains five basic components, namely, a title page; the block plan or site plan;85 
the floor plan or section plan;86 the cross-section plan;87 and the participation quota 
schedule.88 The sectional plan demarcates the boundaries of units, the common 
property and any exclusive use area. It shows the floor areas of a section by laying out 
both its vertical and horizontal boundaries.89 In addition, it identifies which part of 
                                                        
80 STA s 4 (5). 
81 STA s 4 (1). 
82 The Sectional Titles Amendment Act 44 of 1997 s 2 & s 3; see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-3. 
83 It is suggested by some that the role of local authorities as custodians of the public interests should 
have been enhanced rather than diminished. See Cowen “From Sectional to Airspace Title” (1985) Acta 
Juridica 333; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-15. However, this issue is debatable since one can 
argue that saving administrative costs and avoiding red tape are certainly in the public interest. 
84 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 5-9. 
85 The block plan is designed to show ground level details of the land and buildings included in the 
scheme. The content of the block plan has to comply with the Sectional Titles Regulations r 5 (2) (b) 
which supplements STA s 5 (3) (a).  
86 The floor plan indicates how the floors of the building(s) included in the scheme are divided into 
sections and common property and exclusive use areas. This is subject to r 5 (2) (c) of the Sectional 
Titles Regulations which supplements STA s 5 (3) (c) & (d). 
87 The cross-section plan is designed to illustrate precisely the boundaries between sections and 
boundaries between sections and the common property. With the new amended Sectional Titles 
Regulations, it is no longer necessary to have a cross-section plan in every sectional plan. Only when 
ambiguity arises about the boundaries, is a cross-section plan required. This is subject to r 5 (3) of the 
Sectional Titles Regulations. 
88 The Sectional Titles Regulations r 5 (2). 
89 The Sectional Titles Regulations r 5 (2) (c) (i). 
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the building is common property.90 More importantly, the sectional plan provides the 
participation quota of each section that was filed with and accepted by the 
Surveyor-General.91  
Besides the sectional plan, the rules of the scheme under the STA, which are 
equivalent to the by-laws under the UCIOA, are very important for creating the 
sectional titles scheme. Under the STA, a distinction is made between registered rights 
and conditions imposed by the developer and the rules governing the management of 
the scheme and the conduct of the owners in the scheme.92 The conditions imposed 
by the developer have to be certified by a conveyancer and filed on a schedule with 
the sectional plan.93 By contrast, a conveyancer must certify whether the model rules 
of Annexure 8 and 9 of the Sectional Titles Regulations will apply to the scheme or 
whether the developer has amended or replaced some of these rules. After registration 
these rules are filed in the deeds office.94Annexures 8 and 9 contains two types of 
model rules, namely, Management Rules and Conduct Rules. Management Rules deal 
primarily with the administration and management of the scheme while Conduct 
Rules regulate a sectional owner’s use and enjoyment of his or her section and 
common property.95 These model rules apply by default when developers do not file 
their own set of rules.     
3 5 2 2 Registration  
Once the Surveyor-General approves a draft sectional plan, it forms the legal 
foundation of the sectional title scheme and becomes a sectional plan. Thereafter, the 
developer submits the sectional plan to the Deeds Registry for the opening of a 
                                                        
90 The Sectional Titles Regulations r 5 (2) (c) (ii). 
91 The Sectional Titles Regulations r 5 (2) (e) (2) read with STA s 5 (3) (g). 
92 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-3. 
93 STA s 11 (3) (b). 
94 STA s 11 (3) (e). 
95 STA s 1 (1) s v “rules” read with s 35 (2). 
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sectional title register and to register the sectional plan.96 When a sectional plan is 
registered for a building or buildings, the land is subject to the provisions of the 
STA.97 The developer is no longer the owner of the land and the building or buildings, 
but the owner of all the individual units.98  In addition, upon registration, the 
schedules of servitudes and conditions imposed by the developer and certified by the 
conveyancer become a part of the sectional title deed.99 This shows that upon 
registration, the servitudes and conditions shown on the sectional plan have become 
registered real rights. Another effect of registration is that any mortgage bond, lease, 
other real right or condition registered against or affecting the land shown on the 
sectional plan, is converted into a bond, lease, other real right or condition registered 
against or affecting the sections and common property shown on the sectional plan.100  
Once the sectional plan is registered, the Deeds Registry issues the developer with a 
certificate of a registered sectional title for each section and its undivided share in the 
common property, subject to any mortgage bond registered against the land’s title 
deed.101 Moreover, the Deeds Registry issues a certificate of a real right for any 
reservation made by the developer in a phased development scheme 102  and a 
certificate of a real right for a right of exclusive use subject to any mortgage bond 
registered against the land’s title deed.103 Under the STA, a sectional title register 
operates like a conventional township register.104  
                                                        
96 STA s 11 (1) and Form B in Annexure 1 of the Sectional Titles Regulations. 
97 STA s 13 (1). 
98 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-25; see also Eden Villiage (Meadowbrook) (Pty) Ltd v Edwards 
1995 4 SA 31 (A) at 41G. In this case, it was held that the units are registrable from the date of the 
opening of a sectional title register, and thus can be transferred.  
99 STA s 13 (2). 
100 STA s 13 (3). 
101 STA s 12 (1) (d). 
102 STA s 12 (1) (e). 
103 STA s (1) (f). 
104 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-26. 
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3 5 3 Registration in China  
Prior to commencing construction, the developer must register the land-use right at 
the relevant land administration agency where a subdivision plan is needed. The 
subdivision plan provides particulars of the scheme, including its name, the location 
of the building, the number of units, and whether it is intended for residential or 
non-residential use. It also identifies the building and shows how it is divided into 
individual units and the common property.105 The subdivision plan must be drawn up 
and presented for examination by the local construction authority for approval with its 
official stamp.106 The mandatory recording of the subdivision plan precedes the 
registration of the scheme.107 It must precisely set out the units and common property 
and accurately demarcate each of the areas where the buildings are to be located. 
Chinese law attempts to ensure that the buildings be constructed exactly in accordance 
with the subdivision plan.108  
  Unlike UCIOA and STA, both of which require the declarant/developer to register 
or record a declaration or sectional plan, the condominium in China occurs 
automatically without a duly registered constitutive document. Apartment ownership 
in China is created as soon as an apartment in a building is acquired from a developer 
by registering a contract of sale. The subdivision plan is a part of the project 
documents but by nature it is only a building plan. It is not a registered constitutive 
document. It is just recorded for the purpose of obtaining the Building Permit.109 
Another major difference between the subdivision plan in China and the sectional 
                                                        
105 S 2.1 & 2.2 of the Detailed Rules on Designing Building Plan of 2003 issued by the Ministry of 
Construction. 
106 Art 13 of the Measures Governing the Examination and Administration on Building Plan Designs 
of Housing Buildings and Municipal Basic Infrastructure of 2004 issued by the Ministry of 
Construction. 
107 Art 11 (2) of the Provisions on Construction Quality Administration of 2000 issued by the State 
Council. 
108 Art 16 & 29 of the Provisions on Construction Quality Administration of 2000. 
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plan or declaration is that the subdivision plan does not dictate a participation quota 
for each unit. A Chinese unit owner’s title in a unit is indissolubly bound with an 
undivided share in the common property.110 This is often referred to as a participation 
quota. The basis of the allocation of the participation quota is absent in the 
subdivision plan. This allocation of participation quota is not at the discretion of the 
developer. There is a default rule in regulating the pre-allocated share that is found in 
the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing.111 However, this administrative rule only denotes 
the owner’s share interest in the common property. It is silent on other important 
issues such as the calculation of owners’ contributions to common expenses and 
owners’ voting rights. 
Consequently, the creation and registration of a condominium scheme in China can 
be described as a “contract approach”. From acquiring a land-use right to the final 
registration of the individual unit’s title, many different contracts are involved. In 
order to obtain the deed title for an individual unit, the contract of sale, a kind of 
contract with real effect,112 must be registered.113 Chinese law provides that the 
unit’s ownership is not effective without registration. The certificate of registration is 
                                                                                                                                                               
109 Art 8 of the Building Construction Law of 1997. 
110 Art 70 of Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
111 The Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of 
Commercial Housing issued by the Ministry of Construction on 08 September 1995. On the basis of 
this provision, many local governments issue local rules providing the detail on the calculation of 
common property, among others, the Rule on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Housing in Hunan Province, issued by the Department of Construction on 10 November 
2004; the Rule on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of Housing in 
Shanghai, issued by the Land Resources and Housing Administration Bureau of Shanghai on 2 April 
2003. The method on how to calculate the common property is discussed in Chapter 4 Participation 
Quota. 
112 Liang Huixing Commentary on Chinese Property Law Draft 113 (Chinese version); Gao Fuping & 
Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 75. 
113 Art 17 of the Measures Governing Urban Housing Entitlement Registration of 1997 (as amended 
on 15 August 2001) issued by the Ministry of Construction. 
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the only legal evidence of ownership. The Chinese registration regulation purports to 
promote security of titles. This is analogous to relevant German law.114 However, a 
major difference with the German procedure is that any contract during the 
condominium creation and registration process in China does not require the notary’s 
involvement. Simply put, in China there is not a notarial deed containing the division 
of the building into apartments. In addition, Chinese law requires that initial 
registration of new buildings must begin within three months after completion of 
construction.115 The registration of transaction contracts or deeds of sale of individual 
units can only occur after the developer’s initial registration of the whole scheme is 
completed.116 
The basic principle is that the registration of a unit title deed marks the end of the 
creation process. It is notable that the owner has to register with two different 
authorities in order to obtain two different entitlement certificates, namely, a 
certificate of housing ownership with a housing authority and a certificate for a 
land-use right with the state land administration authority.117 This can cause a 
problem when a unit owner registers apartment ownership but fails to register 
concurrently an interest in the land-use right for the land on which the building is 
situated.118 Although some major cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing 
have consolidated the two separate registrations into a single certificate, 119 most 
Chinese cities still employ the dual registration system.  
                                                        
114  Smith “Apartment Ownership–German Style” 2007 (May/June) Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 205-206; Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act and the 
Wohnungseigentumsgesetz” 1974 (7) CILSA 165-167. 
115 S 16 (1) of the Measures Governing Urban Housing Entitlement Registration of 1997. 
116 Art 38 (2) of the Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994. 
117 Chen Lei “The New Chinese Property Code: A Giant Step Forward?” 2007 (11) Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, online: http://www.ejcl.org/112/art112-2.pdf [10 January 2008]. 
118 Randolph & Lou Chinese Real Estate Law 170. 
119 For those cities that implement the single registration certificates, the example is art 17 of 
Shanghai Real Estate Registration Rule of 31 October 2002 (as amended on 14 April 2004); also see 
Randolph & Lou Chinese Real Estate Law 170. 
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3 6 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RELATED 
TO CONDOMINIUM CREATION   
3 6 1 Declarant/ Developer 
The UCIOA uses the term declarant in three contexts. If a condominium has already 
been established, the UCIOA uses declarant as any person who executes a declaration, 
or any person who has succeeded in gaining special declarant rights. 120  If a 
condominium is not yet established, a declarant is any person who disposes or offers 
to dispose of a unit which has not previously been disposed of.121 If a trustee of a land 
trust executes a declaration the beneficiary of the trust is a declarant.122 The UCIOA 
excludes a declarant from holding an interest in real estate solely as security for an 
obligation. These would-be holders of pre-existing liens and in the case of a leasehold 
condominium, a ground lessor, possess no special declarant rights and are not an 
affiliate of a declarant.123 The definition also excludes someone whose real estate 
interest will not be conveyed to the unit owners, such as a real estate broker.124 
Similarly, unit owners reselling their units are not considered to be declarants because 
their units have been previously disposed of when originally conveyed.125 UCIOA 
also employs the terms “affiliate of a declarant” and “special declarant rights”. The 
affiliate of a declarant is any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with a declarant.126 Basically, the affiliate of a declarant is the 
                                                        
120 UCIOA § 1-103 (12). 
121 See n 120 supra.  
122 Cohen, Goldberg & Mulvaney “Condominium Law: A Comparison of the Uniform Act with the 
Illinois Act” 1980 (14) J Marshall L Rev 393. 
123 UCIOA § 1-103 comment 13. 
124 See n 123 supra.  
125 UCIOA § 1-103 (12) (i).  
126 UCIOA § 1-103 (1) states that a person “controls” a declarant if the person (i) is a general partner, 
officer, director, or employer of the declarant, (ii) directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or 
more other persons, or through one or more subsidiaries, owns, controls, holds with power to vote, or 
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declarant’s employer or partner, or person who controls with votes, and/or finances, or 
own a number of a declarant’s shares. With this definition, an association may, in 
some instances, be a declarant.127 Special declarant rights are rights reserved for the 
benefit of a declarant128 and his/her transferees or successors.129 Any person who 
possesses a special declarant right is a “declarant”. 130  The concept of special 
declarant rights triggers an obligation on those who possess such rights. By 
interlocking definitions of “declarant”, “special declarant rights”, and “affiliates of a 
declarant” the courts are freed under certain conditions from having to identify 
responsibilities, duties, and obligations of unit owners. As an example, the court is 
absolved of responsibility if a unit owner asserts that he/ she is entitled to relief 
against a declarant or certain defined affiliates or successors of the declarant under the 
UCIOA, or under constituent documents which create the condominium.131   
The STA uses the term developer instead of declarant. A developer is defined as “a 
person who is the registered land owner of land situated within the area of jurisdiction 
of a local authority, on which is situated or to be erected a building or buildings which 
he or she has divided or proposes to divide into two or more sections in terms of a 
                                                                                                                                                               
holds proxies representing, more than 20 per cent of the voting interest in the declarant, (iii) controls in 
any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the declarant, or (iv) has contributed more than 
20 per cent of the capital of the declarant. 
127 UCIOA § 1-103 comment 2. 
128 The following are examples of some special declarant rights: to (i) “complete improvements 
indicated on plats and plans filed with the declaration; (ii) exercise any development right; (iii) 
maintain sales offices, management offices, signs advertising the condominium community, and models; 
(iv) use easements through the common elements for the purpose of making improvements within the 
condominium community or within real estate which may be added to the condominium community; (v) 
make the condominium community subject to a master association; (vi) merge or consolidate a 
condominium community with another condominium community of the same form of ownership; or 
(vii) appoint or remove any officer of the association or any master association or any executive board 
member during any period of declarant control.” see UCIOA § 1-103 (29). 
129 UCIOA § 3-104. 
130 UCIOA § 1-103 comment 24. 
131 Cohen, Goldberg & Mulvaney “Condominium Law: A Comparison of the Uniform Act with the 
Illinois Act” 394.  
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scheme.” It further includes the holder of a right to extend an existing scheme as well 
as the successor-in-title of the latter.132 Thus the developer must first be the registered 
owner of the land on which the proposed project is to be built. Neither perpetual 
quitrent nor a 99-year lease nor any other limited real right other than land ownership 
enables a person to qualify as a developer.133 Second, the term “developer” also 
includes an agent of the developer, or a successor-in-title of the developer, or any 
other person acting on a developer’s behalf. This provision is analogous to what is 
found in the UCIOA. Third, a body corporate can qualify as a developer when a 
building is deemed to be destroyed and a unanimous resolution to reconstruct has 
been adopted by the body corporate.134 The South African Act does not specifically 
define the “affiliate of a declarant” or “special declarant rights” but incorporates both 
terms into one streamlined definition of “developer”. 
  The Chinese condominium statute needs to follow the South African approach. 
First, the concept of developer is already widely used in the Chinese real estate 
profession. The term declarant is a somewhat unusual concept that does not easily fit 
into the Chinese legal language system. Second, the definition of declarant is not very 
appropriate since the creation of a condominium in China does not require the 
registration of a constitutive document, i.e. a declaration or sectional plan. Therefore, 
it is illogical to use the term declarant without also using the term declaration. Third, 
as long as a developer’s affiliates or a developer’s special rights are clearly spelled out 
in the statute, as is the case in the STA, there is no need to have two more separate 
definitions to complicate the statute. 
3 6 2 The Constitutive Document 
The UCIOA and the STA lay out the requirements for the establishment of a 
                                                        
132 STA s 1 (1) s v “developer”.  
133 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-19. 
134 STA s 48 (1) (b). 
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condominium. Both Acts provide that a declarant/developer must register or record a 
declaration or sectional plan to establish a condominium.135 Under the UCIOA, upon 
recording the declaration, a property is subject to the Act, with all units owned in fee 
simple. Consequently, they may be conveyed, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise dealt 
with in the same manner as other real property.136  
The declaration or sectional plan is described as a governing document that is quite 
important. It is the foundation and the charter of all rights, privileges and obligations 
of each owner for each unit.137 Any person taking title does so subject to its terms. 
Unlike a condominium’s by-laws or rules, which may be made and changed by a 
resolution of the unit owners, the declaration can only be changed under very limited 
circumstances set out in the Act.138 Under the UCIOA, with certain exceptions, a 
residential common interest community may only amend the declaration by at least a 
two-thirds vote. 139  Under the STA, the Surveyor-General must initiate any 
amendment to a registered sectional plan and must also approve and review the 
governing document.140 The body corporate may recover the costs incurred from the 
pertinent developer, land surveyor or architect as a result of an alteration or 
amendment to a sectional plan.141 
                                                        
135 See n 50 and n 76 supra.  
136 Laundry “Two Aspects of the Illinois Condominium Property Act – the Condominium Survey and 
Full Disclosure Provisions” 1974 (7) J Marshall J Prac & Proc 239. 
137 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 3-5. 
138 See UCIOA § 2-117; STA s 14. 
139 UCIOA § 2-117 (a). The exceptions include: (1) reallocation of interests occur automatically in the 
case of eminent domain; (2) certain unit boundary changes can occur upon the consent of the affected 
owners; (3) no amendment may create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, 
or the allocated interests of a unit, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners; (4) the time 
limit specified in the declaration for reserved development rights may be extended by 80% of the vote 
including 80 per cent of the votes allocated to units not owned by the declarant; (5) an amendment to 
the declaration prohibiting or materially restricting the permitted use or behavior in a unit or other 
qualifications of persons who may occupy the unit, requires 80% approval; (6) communities that are 
not residential may require a lower percentage to amend the declaration.  
140 STA s 14 (1). 
141 STA s 14 (2). 
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As explained earlier, the subdivision plan in China is a very different kind of 
document. It is similar to the UCIOA’s survey plat customarily referred to as a vertical 
survey, which includes a survey of both the land and all of the building units 
constructed on it. Chinese law does not require the developer to formalize a 
constitutive project document containing much the same information which the 
UCIOA and the STA require in a declaration or sectional plan. Before construction 
begins, the developer prepares a subdivision plan in order to obtain the Building 
Permit.142  
Being non-governing, the subdivision plan amendment is solely at the discretion of 
the pertinent public authority. If the plan’s amendment is not approved by the 
pertinent public authority, the developer cannot obtain a “Completed Building 
Inspection Certificate” after its completion.143 Without this certificate, the developer 
is not entitled to transfer the units to future purchasers at the land register.144  
If a case involving a subdivision plan amendment is presented to a court in China, 
there would be an easy and uncomplicated decision if the court relied on the 
developer’s statement that there was an error. In Chinese law a public authority must 
first approve such a developer’s statement. If the court finds that an amendment is not 
approved and recorded by the public authority, although the amendment is necessary 
to correct an error, presumably, it is unlikely the court would issue an order to correct 
the error.  
To summarize, a condominium development in China is very much government 
supervised. Many different kinds of public authorities are actively involved in the 
process of creation and registration. But is this all-encompassing involvement a good 
thing for the condominium movement? The answer is that it is quite clear that the 
                                                        
142 See n 109 supra.  
143 Art 18 (1) of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas 
of 1998. 
144 Art 17 (1) of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas 
of 1998. 
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future condominium statute in China should reduce the government’s administrative 
activism. A fundamental characteristic of condominium creation under both the 
UCIOA and STA is a full and adequate disclosure to purchasers.145 This provides a 
viable alternative to governmental supervision and involvement. There are three basic 
advantages to this approach. First, the government can save administrative costs and 
improve efficiency by reducing unnecessary red tape and bureaucracy. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the local governments are uninvolved in condominium 
creation. On the contrary, the local governments are still the protector of the public 
interest and guardians accountable for taxpayers’ money. In areas such as planning, 
construction defects, and the developer’s liability to manage before the first general 
meeting of the management body, the local government’s role should be enhanced 
rather than diminished. Second, the developers are granted greater freedoms to create 
condominium schemes to meet fast-changing market conditions. Third, developers are 
bound by representations and statements made in the constitutive document and are 
held to statutory limitations and standards to protect consumers. Accordingly, one can 
argue that the Chinese condominium statute should borrow the constitutive document 
approach from the South African and UCIOA experiences. The developers are 
required to prepare a constitutive document, a condominium plan, rather than a simple 
subdivision plan and then submit it to the Deeds Registry for registration. This could 
require major statutory surgery since all of the relevant statutory documents would 
also need to be changed. But it is worthwhile since the absence of a constitutive 
document is the root cause for many subsequent problems with management and 
administration practices. Without the registration of a constitutive document, the time 
of creation of the management body and whether it is a new legal entity are open to 
question. Although the new Chinese Property Code implicitly allows a condominium 
community to be sued,146 the community has no authority to prevent unit owners 
                                                        
145 See n 137 supra. 
146 Art 78 (2) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007 states that where the decision made by the 
community general meeting or the executive committee infringe the unit owners’ interests, the affected 
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from suing each other for violation of condominium rules. As a consequence, unit 
owners are not dependent on the management board to protect their rights and thus 
cause many unnecessary disputes and lawsuits. In the long run, a constitutive project 
document is indispensable for the creation of condominiums. 
3 6 3 Pre-sale of Apartment 
Under the UCIOA, a declaration may not be registered unless all the condominium 
buildings’ structural components and mechanical systems are substantially completed 
in accordance with the plans.147 It is sometimes argued that laws requiring substantial 
completion of a building prior to a declaration’s recordation complicate condominium 
financing.148 While this requirement has merit, it is often criticized when lenders are 
involved in the total financing of a building. In order to define and protect lenders’ 
property rights in case of foreclosure, mortgage liens must be in place prior to the 
commencement of construction. Institutional lenders want this protection early in a 
condominium’s planning process. In the United States, the institutional banks make 
construction loans to developers although they impose rigid pre-sale conditions to the 
loans.149 These loans would be paid off with sales proceeds when the condominium 
units are sold.150 To boost sales a developer may misinform and intentionally confuse 
the purchaser by for example underestimating the monthly contributions and costs.151 
Oftentimes, a developer may insert a provision on the declaration prohibiting pets, but 
                                                                                                                                                               
owner may request the court to cancel such decision. 
147 See n 73 supra.  
148 Burton “Reflections on the Minnesota Uniform Condominium Act” 1984 (10) Wm Mitchell L   
Rev 7.  
149 It was not uncommon in most construction loans for lenders to require that the developer pre-sell 
fifty to seventy-five per cent of the residential units before the lender would fund the first dollar of the 
construction loan. See Kane “The Financing of Cooperatives and Condominiums: A Retrospective” 
1999 (73) St John’s L Rev 108. 
150 Rohan Real Estate Financing (1998) § 15.09[4] [a]. 
151 Blackburn & Melia “Ohio Condominium Law Reform: A Comparative Critique” 1978 (29) Case 
W Res L Rev 152. 
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during the marketing phase, if the project is slow in selling, it is not uncommon for 
sale agents to stop asking whether or not a potential buyer has a pet.152 Particularly 
important is that failure by a purchaser to obtain information about any recorded 
restrictions, even with a statutorily mandated disclosure, does not invalidate the 
restrictions.153 Thus, prospective purchasers may be misled about the nature of the 
interest they are buying. For this reason, the UCIOA provides that any declarant or 
dealer who offers a unit to a purchaser is required to prepare and deliver a public 
offering statement.154 The preparer of the public offering statement is liable for any 
misrepresentations and material omissions in it. The caveat to this is that a person who 
delivers a prepared public offering statement is responsible for deficiencies and errors 
only to the extent that he or she reasonably should have known of them.155 This 
disclosure provision requires the declarant to provide a prospective purchaser with a 
written statement with information that is both comprehensive and as accurate as 
possible.156 The Act further provides purchasers with cancellation rights and imposes 
civil penalties upon declarants who do not comply with public offering statement 
requirements of the Act.157 Finally, the UCIOA provides that a deposit made in 
connection with the purchase or reservation of a unit from a prospective purchaser 
must be placed in escrow.158 Whether the escrow agent must deposit the funds in an 
insured institution, or in a particular type of account, depends on the state law or the 
parties’ agreement.159  
  Under the South African Act, the provision that a land surveyor or architect 
                                                        
152  Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-16; Chateau Village North 
Condominium Association v Jordan 643 P2d 791 (Colorado Court of Appeal 1982). 
153 Hidden Harbor Estates Inc v Basso 393 So 2d 637 (Florida 4th District Court of Appeal 1981). 
154 UCIOA § 4-102 (a) & (c). 
155 UCIOA § 4-102 comment. 
156 UCIOA § 4-103. 
157 UCIOA § 4-108. 
158 UCIOA § 4-110. 
159 UCIOA § 4-110 comment 2. 
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prepares the draft sectional plan from actual measurements implies that the building(s) 
must be substantially completed before the application for the unit’s registration can 
be made.160 But this does not mean that the building must be ready to be occupied161 
nor does it mean that developers are prevented from pre-selling units before a 
proposed scheme’s sectional title register has been opened or even before the building 
has been erected.162  Additionally, the Sectional Titles Amendment Act of 1997 
repealed section 9 of the older Act which prohibited a developer from pre-selling units 
in a building constructed before 25 February 1981. Hence, the pre-sale of units 
became possible in South Africa. However, South African law is very pro-purchaser 
and prevents financial malpractices by developers. This is seen in an examination of 
section 26 of the Alienation of Land Act.163 This section prohibits a developer from 
receiving any portion of the purchase price of a pre-sold unit before a sectional title 
register is opened for it. Should a developer encounter financial problems and be 
unable to complete the project, purchasers run no risk of losing their deposit or 
purchase price.164 If the developer or any subsequent seller or the sales agent 
becomes insolvent before the unit becomes registrable, the amount held in trust for the 
benefit of the seller immediately becomes payable to the purchaser by the attorney, 
estate agent, or relevant financial institution.165 The same protection is provided to 
the installment sale purchaser of a unit.166 When a unit in a proposed building is sold, 
disclosure is required, which means the building to be erected needs to be adequately 
described in the sales contract. The description should include a copy of the part of 
                                                        
160 See Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in the Light of the Uniform Condominium Act” 10. 
161 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 5-7. 
162 Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles 
(Strata) Act” 137. 
163 The Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (as amended by s 12 of Act 51 of 1983). 
164 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 7-4. 
165 The Alienation of Land Act s 26 (4). 
166 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 7-5. 
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the draft sectional plan on which the unit is demarcated.167 If such a plan is 
unavailable, a three-dimensional description and complete particulars about the height, 
floor space and external features need to be disclosed.168 In some instances, a 
developer is allowed even to pre-sell off the building plans.169 Moreover, in order to 
tackle a developer’s unreasonable delay in completing a building, the purchaser 
should be granted an additional statutory right of cancellation if the building is not 
ready for occupation as promised or if the register is not opened within a prescribed 
period of time.170   
Since there is no requirement for opening a register for a constitutive document 
such as a declaration or sectional plan, Chinese law allows the sale of apartments 
before the buildings are substantially completed.171 In other words, the substantial 
completion of construction is not a prerequisite for being able to sell individual units. 
In the case of a presale of an apartment, the developer must first apply at the pertinent 
public authority for an Apartment Pre-sale Permit to sell proposed apartments.172 
After obtaining the Permit, a contract of sale between the developer and the purchaser 
can be concluded on the basis of the subdivision plan before the construction is 
completed.173 The Chinese procedures ensure as much as possible that the state 
examines the developer’s ability to complete a pre-sold building and that the sales 
contract can be enforced administratively.174 But legal problems arise during the 
transitional period between the signing of a contract and the completion of 
                                                        
167 Richtown Development v Dusterwald 1981 3 SA 691 (W). 
168 Botes v Toti Development Co 1978 1 SA 205 (T). 
169 Forsyth v Josi 1982 2 SA 164 (N). 
170 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 7-13. 
171 Art 45 of Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994. 
172 Art 24 of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 
1998. 
173 Art 28 of the Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban Areas of 
1998. 
174 Fu Qilin Study on Pre-sale of Urban Commercial Housing 30-42 (Chinese version); Gao Fuping & 
Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 262. 
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construction. These problems first include whether what apartment purchasers are 
presented with in the registered pre-sale contract corresponds to factual reality. For 
example, there may be a misunderstanding or miscommunication over the numbering 
of units among the subcontractors. Consequently, some of the building’s units 
inadvertently may have been numbered differently or incorrectly from the numbering 
of the parking units. Second, there may be confusion over when management rules are 
applicable to purchasers as well as when the initial general meeting of the 
management body is to be held.  
Furthermore, there is often confusion over whether or not the purchasers become 
members of the condominium management body before the completion of 
construction. Finally, there is an issue as to when the obligations of the developer are 
transferred to the purchasers. Besides the abovementioned management issues, the 
developer’s liability for structural defects in this transitional period can also become 
an issue. 175  Typical Chinese purchasers are unsophisticated about the many 
complicated rules, not to mention that there is not a special condominium statute in 
place. Consequently they are unaware of the potential for abuse by the developer. For 
instance, some developers attempt to use the purchasers’ money deposits towards 
construction costs. Another example is that the purchasers may be unaware that the 
developer has made a “sweetheart contract” with a managing agent who is a close 
associate, before unit owners move in. Two main approaches can be borrowed from 
the UCIOA and the South African legislative experience to deal with all these 
potential problems. First, developers should be required to provide full disclosure 
about each and every individual unit. As explained above, Chinese law does not 
require the registration of a condominium plan. But this does not affect the 
implementation of a full disclosure principle. Before applying for the Apartment 
Pre-sale Certificate, the developer could be made to present a disclosure statement 
like the UCIOA one with accurate and detailed information about the units for 
                                                        
175 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 42. 
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prospective purchasers. Since any change in the provisions of the disclosure statement 
must be disclosed to prospective purchasers, this enables them to rescind their 
purchase agreement. Consequently, the developer must carefully plan the provisions 
of the disclosure statement and to be on the safe side, make it a part of the sales 
contract. For instance, the designation of a parking space would be clearly described 
in this disclosure statement. South African law provides a very good disclosure model 
with all the necessary detail. For example, it provides a three-dimensional description 
and all of the particulars about height, floor space and external features.176 The 
Chinese statute should adopt this approach.  
Moreover, the future statute must flesh out the relevant consumer protection 
provisions. It is quite common for condominium purchasers who have signed 
contracts for unfinished units to lose their deposits simply because there is no 
requirement that the developers hold them in escrow. Following the UCIOA approach, 
any prospective purchaser who puts down a deposit or pays part of the unit purchasing 
price must be protected. The developer is required to put the deposit in escrow rather 
than to hold it in his or her own account. Although Chinese law does hold that when a 
purchaser pays a deposit with a pre-sales contract it should be used exclusively for 
building construction,177 Chinese law specifies neither how the money is to be 
withdrawn, nor the malpractice penalty a developer incurs when playing loose with 
the law. In practice, Chinese developers commonly withdraw the pre-sale money to 
finance a construction project. 178  In China it is estimated that proceeds of apartment 
pre-sales account for 50% of the total construction costs.179 If a developer does not 
comply with the disclosure statement, Chinese law necessarily should grant the 
purchaser the right of cancellation and require the developer to pay damages as well 
as a hefty penalty. The reason to have sharp teeth in place for a developer’s breach of 
                                                        
176 See n 167, 168 & 169 supra. 
177 Art 45 (3) of Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994. 
178 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang New Discourse on Real Estate Law 266. 
179 Fu Qilin Study on Pre-sale of Urban Commercial Housing 41. 
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a disclosure statement is that in China the pre-sale practice was designed to ensure a 
project's success, but now a developer’s financing is fraught with difficulties.  
The Chinese private real estate market has been booming in the light of land 
scarcity and growing urbanization as well as the realization that now individuals can 
own real property. Consequently, real estate prices have been rising dramatically. 
Having pre-sold almost all of the units in a project, developers find that they could 
sell at an even higher price than the pre-sold price once a building is completed. Thus, 
some dishonest developers intentionally breach the pre-sale contract and only return 
the amount received and only a smidgen of money for damages by using the contract 
law. They know that their newly raised price can easily cover the amount they have 
paid out. To counter this devious practice by some developers, the new Property Code 
makes provision for the notice registration system with regard to the pre-sale 
contract.180 A notice registration is registered to secure a claim for the establishment 
or the transfer of the property or any real right in real estate before the certificate of 
deeds is issued. However, the protection provided by the notice registration system is 
time-limited. The Property Code holds that upon the notice registration, if a purchaser 
fails to apply for the registration of the deed title within three months from the date on 
which the building is completed for registration, the provisional notice registration 
lapses and becomes invalid.181 In brief, the purchaser can obtain a documented 
protection from the land register before the building is completed. Although the new 
Property Code provides an effective legal weapon for this developer’s practice, a 
compulsory consumer protection clause still needs to be drawn up for the future 
condominium statute that is almost certainly to be drafted. Developers know exactly 
when the sale contract becomes registrable for it can only be done after obtaining a 
Completed Building Inspection Certificate. If a developer does not intend to notify the 
purchasers about registration, the three months registration requirement soon lapses. 
                                                        
180 Art 20 (1) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
181 Art 20 (2) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
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Hence, based on the UCIOA and South African experiences, the Chinese statute 
should give purchasers the power to effectively tackle the developers’ malpractices. A 
purchaser using an installment plan also needs to be entitled to such protection. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PARTICIPATION QUOTA 
 
4 1 INTRODUCTION  
Apartment ownership is a threefold unity. It links individual unit ownership with joint 
ownership of the common property and with membership in a management body. 
Each apartment owner owns a share in the common property. This requires the 
apartment owners to share rights and responsibilities with other owners and to 
participate in collective decision-making.1  For this a formula is designed as a 
participation quota to allocate the common rights and obligations among the 
apartment owners. Under the UCIOA, the declaration describes the participation 
quota designed as share value as a fraction or percentage of undivided interests in the 
condominium common elements and in the association’s common expenses. As well, 
the participation quota gives each and every owner a portion of the votes in the 
condominium association.2 Under the STA, the participation quota is first of all a 
percentage of a sectional owner’s share in the common property. But it also 
determines an owner’s weighted say in the condominium management and the basis 
for each unit owner’s contribution for common expenses for the management and 
maintenance of the common property.3   
  An equitable and well thought-out formula is crucial to ensure the success of a 
condominium scheme. From the apartment owners’ side, before purchasing a unit, the 
buyer should carefully examine the participation quota. Not only does it dictate the 
                                                        
1 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 57. 
2 UCIOA § 2-107 (a) (i). 
3 STA s 1 (1) s v “participation quota” read with s 32 & s 37 (1) (b). 
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share of ownership in the common property, but it determines on a proportional basis 
the monthly contribution to the property maintenance. In addition, the weight of 
voting rights at meetings may also be determined on the basis of a quota. Hence, the 
allocation of rights and obligations by way of the participation quota needs to be 
addressed in the Chinese condominium statute.  
  This chapter demonstrates the significance of the participation quota and analyzes 
the advantages and disadvantages of different methods for calculating the 
participation quota. Finally a comparative evaluation is made for the makers of a 
Chinese condominium statute. 
4 2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION QUOTA 
Both the UCIOA and the STA allocate an apartment owner’s interest in the following 
matters in accordance with a participation quota: (1) the share of ownership in the 
common property; (2) the proportional contribution to the common expenses and the 
share of any common profits; and (3) the value of a condominium owner’s vote.4 The 
UCIOA also provides that the participation quota plays a significant role should the 
condominium be terminated.5 Moreover, the participation quota is significant in the 
distribution of compensation received in the event that the property is expropriated or 
in the division of insurance money should the building be destroyed.6 In brief, the 
participation quota arises whenever the allocation of rights to and responsibilities for 
the common property is involved. 
4 2 1 Shares in the Common Property and Rights on Termination 
Condominium ownership includes an exclusive individual ownership of the unit and 
an undivided interest in the common property. All apartment owners are entitled to 
                                                        
4 UCIOA § 2-107 and STA s 32 (3). 
5 UCIOA § 2-118 (a). 
 84
use the common property. It is therefore imperative to regulate the allocation of the 
interests in the condominium’s common property during the life of the project and on 
its termination.  
Under the UCIOA, the goal to allocate the interests in the common property is not 
only to establish a clear, easily determinable and constant ownership share, but also to 
ensure the value of the apartment owners’ interests in the common property if the 
owner’s unit is sold or the condominium complex is terminated. 7  Particularly 
important is that the declarant has unfettered discretion in choosing a basis for 
allocating the interests in the common property.8 Thus, a share of ownership in 
common property may be allocated equally among all units, or in proportion to the 
relative size of each unit, or on the basis of any other formula the declarant may select. 
So an allocation may be on any basis the declarant chooses, and none of the 
allocations need to be tied to any other allocation.9 Should units be added or 
withdrawn from the condominium development, the declaration must state the 
formulas to be used to reallocate the interests among all units. 10  When a 
condominium unit is taken or partially taken by eminent domain, the UCIOA provides 
for a recalculation of the allocated interests of all units. Moreover, the interest of the 
condominium unit that has been taken out by eminent domain is automatically 
reallocated to the remaining units.11  
The UCIOA also recognizes that the original allocation of quotas may on 
termination bear little resemblance to the actual value of the apartments since some of 
                                                                                                                                                               
6 UCIOA § 1-107 and STA s 48. 
7 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 1978 (13) Real Prop Prob & Tr J 
449; Note “Common Rights and Obligations among Unit Owners under the Minnesota Uniform 
Condominium Act” 1984 (10) Wm Mitchell L Rev 174. 
8 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 444. 
9 UCIOA § 2-107 Comment 2. 
10 UCIOA § 2-107 (c). 
11 UCIOA § 1-107 (a). 
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them may have been substantially remodeled and upgraded.12 Consequently, the 
UCIOA requires when a condominium project is terminated, co-ownership shares by 
tenants in common in the project must be allocated13 and sale proceeds of the project 
distributed according to the fair market value of all units.14 The UCIOA uses different 
measures to separate the rights of unit owners upon termination from the allocation of 
shares in the common property.15 
  The South African Sectional Title Act makes it explicit that the participation quota 
of a section determines the section’s undivided share in the common property.16 In the 
old 1971 Sectional Titles Act the participation quota was solely based on the floor area 
of a section in proportion to the aggregate floor areas of all the sections in a scheme.17 
The old Act had a very rigid allocation provision, namely, a single basis for allocating 
all the interests including share in the common property, contribution to common 
expenses and sectional owner voting rights in the body corporate.18 It has sometimes 
been argued that this allocation has little significance to an owner’s use and 
enjoyment of the common property.19 This is because any owner may use and enjoy 
the common property reasonably to the extent of not interfering with lawful rights of 
the other owners.20 The 1986 Sectional Titles Act draws a distinction between 
residential and non-residential schemes in calculating the participation quota. The 
1986 Act retains the allocation based on the floor areas of a development only for 
residential schemes21 and leaves the calculation of quotas for non-residential schemes 
                                                        
12 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 66. 
13 UCIOA § 2 -118 (f). 
14 UCIOA § 2-118 (j). 
15 Rohan “Condominium Housing: A Purchaser’s Perspective” 1965 (17) Stan L Rev 845. 
16 STA s 32 (3) (b). 
17 S 24 (2) (b) of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971.  
18 Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 44; Van der Merwe “The Allocation of Quotas in a 
Sectional–Title Scheme” 1987 (104) SALJ 75. 
19 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-9. 
20 STA s 44 (1) (d). 
21 STA s 32 (1). 
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to the developers.22 It is worth noting that the allocation based on floor area is very 
relevant when distributing profits from common property transactions such as when 
the roof of a building is leased for advertising use.23 This participation quota also 
determines a sectional owner’s share in the land if a whole sectional title scheme is 
dissolved.24 It also determines an owner’s share in the compensation paid by an 
expropriating authority,25 the insurance money paid out when a building is destroyed 
and any surplus funds left when a scheme is terminated.26  
  Without a special Chinese condominium statute, allocating interests in common 
property is determined by a departmental rule, namely the Provisional Measures on 
Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of Commercial 
Housing.27 Developers have no say on the issue of common property under this legal 
mechanism. Nonetheless, this allocation method was designed for the Housing 
Privatization policy in the 1990s to foster the selling of former public apartments to 
individuals. It was for this reason that no thought was given to the allocation of shares 
in the common property as might be done in a condominium statute.28 This allocation 
method is neither well thought-out nor meets the needs of condominium owners. 
Therefore, when drafting a Chinese statute, thought should be given to following the 
UCIOA approach by separating the rights of unit owners upon termination from the 
allocation of shares in the common property. 
                                                        
22 STA s 32 (2). 
23 See n 19 supra. 
24 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10. 
25 STA s 19 (2). 
26 STA s 48. 
27 The Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of 
Commercial Housing, issued by the Ministry of Construction on 8 September 1995. 
28 Wei Yaorong “The Discussion on the System of Condominium Ownership” 2007 (1) Modern 
Property Management 32-37. (Chinese version) 
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4 2 2 Contribution to Common Expenses and Share in the Common 
Profits 
The most important function of the participation quota is the allocation of owners’ 
contributions to the maintenance and administration of the condominium and the right 
to share in common profits as well as the responsibility to assume a proportional share 
of the management body’s debts. 29  Thus a prospective purchaser should pay 
particular attention to a development’s common expenses. It affects the amount a unit 
owner is required to pay for sound maintenance and administration of the 
condominium. Financially, the entitlement to an undivided share in the common 
property and voting rights are less significant than contributions to common expenses 
and sharing in the common profits. Some unit owners rarely attend the general 
meetings and seldom authorize their voting rights by proxy. This is particularly true in 
China. Hence, a fair and equitable allocation of common expenses and a share of the 
common profits are sensitive and need to be carefully designed. 
Here it is necessary to clarify common expenses. Under the UCIOA, common 
expenses mean an association’s expenditures, and its financial liabilities together with 
any allocations to reserves.30 Each condominium owner pays a monthly or yearly 
contribution to maintain the common property and to keep the management body 
functioning. Common expenses are divided into two types, maintenance fees and 
administrative charges. Maintenance fees relate to maintenance expenses and are the 
principal sources of the management body’s maintenance fund. Maintenance fees 
mainly, but not exclusively include repairs and renovation to the land and common 
parts of the building as well as to common installations and fixtures; common 
property maintenance such as a swimming pool cleaning fee; insurance premiums; 
                                                        
29 Van der Merwe “The Allocation of Quotas in a Sectional-title Scheme” 81. 
30 UCIOA § 1-103 (5). 
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snow removal, and grass trimming.31 Condominium administrative charges refer to 
such costs as the salary of the manager and members of management body’s executive 
council, the cost of convening the general meetings, the cost of employing a managing 
agent, utility fees and taxes and miscellaneous public authority fees.32  
The United States UCIOA has an open-ended allocation provision for contributions 
to common expenses and sharing common profits. Under the UCIOA, the declaration 
lays out the proportional formula for allocation of common expenses for the 
condominium units.33 This gives the declarant discretion in choosing a basis for the 
allocation of common expenses.34 The UCIOA expressly states that a declarant may 
allocate common expense contributions on a different basis than that used for a share 
in the common property.35 Moreover, the developer can employ more than one 
formula to allocate common expenses.36 For example, the share in the cost of the 
maintenance of entrances, lobbies and garden areas may be based on the floor area of 
each apartment whereas the cost of recreational facilities such as a swimming pool on 
the number of occupants and the cost of electricity and water may have separate meter 
readings.37 The factors that can be considered by a declarant in choosing a basis for 
allocating common expenses are far more numerous and complex than those involved 
in allocating interests in the common property. Additionally, the UCIOA does not 
provide for allocating common profits apart from common expenses.38  This is 
implied in Section 3-114, which states that surplus funds remaining after payment of 
                                                        
31 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 64. 
32 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10; Van der Merwe divides the common expenses into three types, 
namely, maintenance charges, administration charges and additional charges. Additional charges 
include such common services as heating, lifts, the swimming pool, electricity, water and garbage 
collection. 
33 UCIOA § 2-107 (a) (i). 
34 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 455. 
35 UCIOA § 2-107 (d) (i). 
36 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 5. 
37 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 67.  
38 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 456. 
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common expenses and reserves must be paid to unit owners in proportion to their 
common expenses liability as allocated in the declaration or credited to them to set off 
their future contributions to common expenses.39 Moreover, the UCIOA states that in 
a mixed-use condominium consisting of both residential and commercial units, 
commercial unit owners pay a larger share than their proportion of the total units for 
matters concerning ratification of the common expense budget.40   
  In the old South African Sectional Titles Act, a sectional owner’s contribution to 
common expenses was calculated on the same basis as the share in the common 
property interests.41 That is to say the contribution to common expenses was related 
to a section’s floor area. The new Sectional Titles Act gives similar freedom as the 
UCIOA to the South African developers.42 According to Section 32 (4) of the Act, a 
developer may ask when registering a sectional title to use a different basis for the 
purpose of determining the amount of money necessary for common expenses by way 
of submitting a special rule.43 However, the developer is forbidden to modify the 
calculation of the floor area for residential schemes since an owner’s common 
property is pre-determined by the Act.44 There is some argument as to whether more 
than one basis may be chosen to determine a particular interest.45 As an example, can 
one choose more methods to determine the contribution to common expenses? 
Moreover, the Sectional Titles Act does not specify how to distribute the common 
profits46 but does discuss the allocation of expropriation’s compensation.47 Section 
19 (2) provides that compensation money be paid to the owners in accordance with 
                                                        
39 UCIOA § 3-114. 
40 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 7. 
41 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-12. 
42 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-13. 
43 STA s 32 (4). 
44 Van der Merwe “The Allocation of Quotas in a Sectional-title Scheme” 16. 
45 See n 41 supra. 
46 Van der Merwe and Butler Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-sharing 260. 
47 STA s 19 (2). 
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their participation quotas after they have received written notice of the distribution.  
  Profits can occur in many instances during the life of a sectional titles scheme, such 
as the proceeds from renting a roof space for an advertisement board or following the 
unanimous resolution of the management body to sell some part of the common 
property. However, the model Management Rules affixed to the Sectional Titles Act 
anticipated such issues by providing that a body corporate of a scheme could not 
distribute capital profits it might make to any sectional owners, unless the building 
was destroyed or was deemed to be destroyed.48 This South African approach on the 
distribution of profits is unclear as to whether expenses and profits are calculated on 
the same basis nor does it specify whether profits are credited to a maintenance fund 
or reserve fund for future use.  
In China, the utility fees, including charges for electricity, water, central heating 
and internet use do not fall within common expenses. Separate meters have been 
installed to determine the actual use of water and electricity.49 Internet usage is 
charged separately by a telecommunication company at a flat rate.50 In another 
instance, the most popular way to measure the central heating system is on the basis 
of the floor area of each unit.51 Central heating fees are charged at a square meter rate. 
Therefore, the frequency of use of common facilities can be easily ascertained and not 
fall within common expenses. The managing agent, however, can collect utilities fees 
from unit owners without service charges.52 In addition, the UCIOA approach to 
allocate common expenses and profits on the same basis is appropriate and equitable. 
                                                        
48 Annexure 8 r 45 (2) of the Sectional Titles Regulations. 
49 Art 45 (1) of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007) issued by the 
State Council; art 40 of the Measures to Enforce “Property Management Regulation” of Weihai 
Municipality issued by the Standing Committee of People’s Congress of Weihai City on 15 February 
2007. 
50 Art 17 of the Measures Governing the Property Management Fee’s Collection of 2003 issued 
jointly by the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Construction on 13 
November 2003. 
51 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 303-304. 
52 Art 45(2) of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007). 
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This needs to be adopted in a future Chinese statute. A Chinese condominium statute 
could further provide that any common profits either be paid to the unit owners 
directly or credited to a maintenance fund or reserve fund for future spending in 
proportion to their common expenses. If unit owners remain in a condominium 
development for a long term, there is no significant difference between obtaining a 
proportion of common profits directly and crediting it to offset future contributions. 
However, the increasing social mobility in China as well as within the condominium 
market has led to more and more condominium owners selling their apartments and 
terminating their membership of the management body. When this occurs, there is no 
need to credit their proportion of common profits for future spending. This is 
especially necessary since Chinese law does not allow excess contributions to be 
refunded when unit owners sell their apartments.53 Therefore, unit owners leaving the 
condominium complex should be paid their share of common profits immediately.  
In summary, when drafting a Chinese condominium statute, a well-planned method 
to calculate the contributions to common expenses first should accurately reflect a 
common property’s utility.54 Second, it should appear equitable. Although absolute 
equity cannot be achieved, this means that at least unit owners are confident that it is 
fairly equitable and accept it.55 Third, the formula should be clear and easy to apply. 
This means that the formula needs to be uncomplicated and easily applicable.56 This 
requires an objective and easily definable formula. 57  Therefore, one cannot 
overemphasize the equity of the formula. A balance needs to be struck between 
formula and application. Fourth, the formula should be cost-saving. This means that it 
needs to avoid either periodic recalculation or the need to employ outside services to 
                                                        
53 Art 13 of the Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings of 
Apartment Common Areas of 1998, issued jointly by the Ministry of Construction and Ministry of 
Finance on 16 December 1998. 
54 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-21. 
55 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 461. 
56 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-22. 
57 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 462. 
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work it out. It cannot be forgotten that the fundamental task of designing an 
appropriate formula is to allocate contributions to common expenses. Any formula 
that causes an undue financial burden for unit owners is untenable and unacceptable. 
4 2 3 Voting Rights 
Under the UCIOA, voting rights are not necessarily related to each apartment’s 
quota.58  The declaration may provide: (1) that unit owners be given different 
allocations of votes on particular matters specified in the declaration; (2) for 
cumulative voting only to elect members of the executive board; and (3) for class 
voting on issues affecting a class if necessary to protect its interests.59 There may be 
certain instances in which class voting in the association would be desirable. For 
example, in a mixed-use planned community or condominium consisting of both 
residential and commercial units, the residential or commercial unit owners could 
constitute a special class giving a special voice on certain issues. However, the 
UCIOA states that apartments owned by a developer do not constitute a class.60 
Moreover, the developer is barred from utilizing cumulative or class voting to evade 
and avoid any limitations imposed on developers.61 The UCIOA permits declarants to 
allocate votes in the unit owners’ association equally or in proportion based on 
common expenses liability or based on common property interests.62 In the “first 
generation” condominium statutes in the United States, the usual rule is that a single 
vote is allocated to each unit, and that there is a single vote for all matters on which 
there is voting. The UCIOA recognizes that the increasingly complex nature of some 
                                                        
58 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 67. 
59 UCIOA § 2-107 (d). 
60 See n 59 supra.  
61 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 7 & 8; Reichman “Residential Private Governments–An Introductory 
Survey” 1976 (43) U Chi L Rev 253. 
62 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 465. 
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projects requires different allocations on certain issues.63 For example, in a mixed-use 
condominium consisting of both residential and commercial units, the declaration may 
provide that each unit owner has an equal vote for the election of the executive board. 
However, on budget matters dealing with common expenses, the commercial unit 
owners who pay a much larger share than their proportion of the total units might 
have their votes increased so that they eventually might exceed the number of 
residential owner votes.64  
  The Sectional Titles Act has also adopted a hybrid system for the allocation of 
voting rights.65 The allocation of voting rights determines the role played by a 
sectional owner in the administration of a sectional title scheme. At general meetings 
voting on a resolution is carried out with a show of hands unless a person entitled to 
vote at the meeting demands that a poll be held.66 On a show of hands the owners or 
their proxy have one vote for each section owned.67 However, weighted voting rights 
based on a quota can be reintroduced at any general meeting by a demand for a poll.68 
Therefore, the voting right of owners is based on either equality or a quota allotted by 
the developer. One might argue that weighted voting militates not only against the 
goal of establishing an efficient method for counting votes, but also against the 
democratic and social interest in preserving a harmonious community of unit 
owners.69 It has been also suggested that the South African Sectional Titles Act should 
recognize that different allocations of votes are a function of the nature of the issues.70 
For example, the weighted voting allocated on the basis of a section’s floor area is 
useful to vote on an issue such as the budget for a maintenance fund. However, most 
                                                        
63 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 7. 
64 See n 39 supra. 
65 See n 21 supra. 
66 Annexure 8 r 60 (1). 
67 Annexure 8 r 62. 
68 Annexure 8 r 63. 
69 Van der Merwe “The Allocation of Quotas in a Sectional-title Scheme” 86. 
70 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-19. 
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issues can best be decided on the basis of one vote per apartment.  
  For a Chinese statute, voting rights are not necessarily related to a quota 
determining either a share in the common property or contributions to common 
expenses. In deciding an appropriate method for voting rights, there are three goals. 
First, the voting method should be efficient, clear and easy to conduct.71 Second, 
minority interests, those whose views are marginalized in the democratic process, 
must be protected.72 Third, the condominium owners should perceive the method as 
being seen as equitable.73  
4 3 CALCULATING FORMULAS  
Various methods can be employed to calculate a participation quota.74 They include: 
(1) equality; (2) unit floor area; (3) par value75 or (4) market value.76 In addition, 
there are instances when developers are allowed to take into account such factors as 
the intensity of usage and the number of occupants in an apartment. However, in most 
cases the four methods mentioned above are the most widely used in the United States 
and South Africa. These are methods analyzed and discussed in order to provide a 
useful reference for a Chinese condominium statute.  
                                                        
71 Chen & Mostert “The Unavoidable Necessity of Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China: A 
Pilot Study” 2007 (2) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 86; Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium 
Act: Selected Key Issues” 466; 
72 Ellickson “Cities and Homeowner’s Associations” 1982 (130) U Pa L Rev 1519; Sterk “Minority 
Protection in Residential Private Governments” 1997 (77) B U L Rev 273. 
73 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 466; Van der Merwe Sectional 
Titles 4-18. 
74 Benjamin, Rorke & Walwyn The Sectional Titles Act 1971 (1974) 8-9; Cowen “Questions and 
Answers on Sectional Titles” 1974 (6) Planning and Building Developments 44; Van der Merwe “The 
Allocation of Quotas in A Sectional-title Scheme” 73-75. 
75 Par value refers to a calculation based on unit size and all other relevant features such as location, 
designated use, interior and exterior design, proximity to facilities, interior decorations and fittings, and 
the availability of parking space.  
76 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 441.  
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4 3 1 Equality  
An equality formula is a method to allocate each unit a share equally, regardless of the 
floor area or location, use and value of the unit. Each owner has one vote in the 
management body, has an equal share of the common property, is given an equal 
amount of the common profits and every owner makes the same payment for common 
expenses. This is the simplest formula. A few older United States statutes adopted this 
formula by providing that the apartment owners own the common areas as equal share 
tenants in common unless the condominium documents state otherwise.77 Although 
this formula simplifies the calculation and is easy to conduct, the formula only works 
when the units are substantially similar in use, size and value.78 Otherwise, it will not 
fairly reflect a proper apportionment of each and every unit’s value. The equality 
approach unsatisfactorily preserves the proportionate unit owners’ interests. Therefore, 
the equality formula is not suitable to determine a unit’s share in the common property 
or to determine contributions to common expenses and gains from common profits. 
However, for voting rights, the equality approach can be employed in a future Chinese 
statute.79  
  A comparative examination of laws shows that there are two main voting methods 
adopted by most condominium statutes. Decisions are made either on the basis of 
"one unit one vote" or on the basis of a participation quota for each unit. Both 
methods have advantages and disadvantages. The “one unit one vote” rule is 
democratic and easy to conduct and control, but it does not always achieve an 
equitable representation of the various stakeholders’ property interests.80 A weighted 
                                                        
77 The first generation California statute, for instance, gave the unit owners equal rights in the 
common elements and they share equally in making contributions to common expenses, unless there 
was an agreement to the contrary. See Gregory “The California Condominium Bill” 1963 (14) Hastings 
L J 201; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 59. 
78 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-3. 
79 See n 98 infra.  
80 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-18 & 4-19. 
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vote rule is more equitable and fairer in terms of each owner’s property interests, 
provided that the standard used to determine the respective owners' participation 
quota is equitable.81 Functionally, it appears that a vote based on a participation quota 
is usually the better mechanism for decision-making by the condominium 
management body.82  
  One can argue that it is unfair that the owner of a larger apartment has the same 
vote as an owner of a small-sized one, since the value of each unit is different.83 
However, under the UCIOA, voting rights are allocated on different bases not 
necessarily related to the quota of each unit.84 In South Africa, it has been argued that 
the “one unit one vote system” should be adopted as the basic rule for allocating 
voting rights in residential schemes.85 In China, the dictates of local authorities and 
socio-cultural values might render "one unit one vote" the better option.86 The 
reasons are threefold. First, very often the public sector in some municipalities still 
retains ownership of the larger sized condominiums.87 Here the state may opt for 
private ownership if the participation-quota voting system is employed. In order to 
level the playing field between the public sector and private owners and to ensure 
absolute equality of owners' rights and obligations as well as to protect private 
interests, the “one unit one vote” approach is the better option. Second, in order to 
protect minority owners’ vital interests, to provide a larger voice in votes may be a 
right choice.88 If voting rights are allocated on the basis of a unit’s floor area, the 
                                                        
81 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 85; Judy & Wittie “Uniform 
Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 472. 
82 Khublall Strata Titles 208. 
83 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 86. 
84 UCIOA § 2-107. 
85 See n 69 supra. 
86 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 96. 
87 This is especially true in old welfare condominium buildings where some small-sized condominium 
units are privately commercialized by virtue of the Housing Reform Policy and other units remain 
social housing, i.e. the residents pay a relatively low rent to the local government.  
88 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 466-469. 
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owners of larger units can cast a majority of the votes to protect their particular 
interests.89 When the richer owners of larger and more valuable apartments desire to 
convert a piece of grassland into a tennis court, the owners of the smaller units may 
find it financially burdensome to contribute to the maintenance of the tennis court. 
One Chinese local property management rule meets such a concern by providing that 
a single owner cannot hold more than 30% of the total voting quota at the first general 
meeting regardless of the floor area size of his or her property. 90  This is a 
well-conceived provision to cap the voting right of a single owner. Doing this may 
avoid an abusive developer or investor-owners who buy many units but who do not 
have a genuine and long-term management stake in the community. However, this 
local norm does not mention whether capping votes applies to subsequent annual 
general meetings. Perhaps capping should apply subsequently during the life of the 
project. Third, since private condominium ownership is still a novel idea for many 
apartment owners, there is still a great deal of misunderstanding. Management skills 
that are required are much ignored. At this point in the development of Chinese 
condominium law, it might be advisable to implement a voting procedure that can be 
carried out and enforced with relative ease.91  
However, some hyper-egalitarian commentators prefer a conventional liberal 
democracy in the condominium world. This means that voting by unit owners is based 
on the principle of one resident, one vote.92 This approach is derived from the private 
government theory.93 Since the condominium community is regarded somewhat as a 
private government, every occupant, whether owner or not, should have one vote in 
much the same way a citizen has a vote in a national or local election.94 A voting 
                                                        
89 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 467. 
90 Art 9 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004.  
91 See n 81 supra.  
92 Walter “Condominium Government: How Should the Laws Be Changed?” 1975 (4) Real Estate L J 
145. 
93 Liebmann The Little Platoons: Sub-local Governments in Modern History 382-383. 
94  Mckenzie Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private    
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right based on property ownership is described as a “plutocracy”, a regime inherently 
offensive in a liberal democracy.95 However, in view of the ownership interests 
involved in a condominium community, a truly democratic formula based on a one 
resident, one vote rule is unacceptable.96 More importantly, some Chinese local 
norms have already embraced the idea that one unit, one vote is suitable for residential 
apartments whereas for non-residential condominiums the floor area formula should 
determine the weight of each and every vote.97 Accordingly, the “one unit one vote” 
rule is preferable in China, provided that non-residential projects and residential 
projects very diverse in size are able to adopt alternative and innovative participation 
quotas.98   
For a mixed development with commercial property owners and residential 
property owners, the pitfalls of the “one unit one vote” rule are obvious, especially if 
the owners contributing more financially do not have more say in management and 
financial issues. The voting right should mirror the value of the property as well as the 
maintenance costs and therefore a vote by participation quota should apply. 
Fortunately, in China the vast majority of condominium developments are exclusive 
residential ones; second, in a large number of these residential condominium 
developments, the difference in size and value within one condominium building is 
small. This is especially true in former welfare housing that was provided by working 
units before the implementation of the housing privatization policy. Thus, in order to 
encourage unwary and untrained owners to become involved in the management 
issues, at this point, the principle of one unit one vote would be more workable.99 
                                                                                                                                                               
Government 21. 
95 Frug “Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply” 1982 (130) U Pa L Rev 1592-1596. 
96 Ellickson “Cities and Homeowner’s Associations” 1547-1554; Foldvary Public Goods and Private 
Communities: the Market Provision of Social Services 25-43; 
97 Art 9 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004; art 10 of the Measures to Enforce 
‘Property Management Regulation’ of Weihai Municipality of 2007.  
98 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 85-86.  
99 It is notable that the provision as to the adoption of voting rights can be conceived and settled 
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However, when framing a uniform condominium statute, alternative voting 
procedures still need to be provided for condominium complexes that have 
dramatically different sizes or mixed-use condominiums where commercial and 
residential interests have to be balanced. 
4 3 2 Floor Area 
The floor area formula is employed by the Sectional Titles Act to determine the 
participation quotas of the sections in a residential scheme.100 Under this formula in 
the STA, the participation quota is calculated on the basis of a unit’s size rounded to 
the nearest square meter in proportion to the aggregate size of all the sections. The 
result is expressed as a percentage expressed to four decimal places.101 If, for 
example, the total floor area of all the sections is 1000 square meters, and the floor 
area of one section is 111 square meters, the participation quota of the section is 
0.1110. The UCIOA gives developers a great deal of freedom to choose the basis for 
the participation quota.102 It does not require that the declarant’s formula be justified, 
but it does require that the formula be explained.103 The sole restriction on the 
formulas to be used is that they neither favour units owned by a declarant nor ones 
owned by a declarant’s affiliate.104 
  At first glance it seems that basing a formula on floor area may be more equitable 
for allocating shares for the common property than basing a formula on a simple 
equality rule. However, there are still many difficulties that arise in deciding how the 
size of a unit should be calculated. First, the floor area formula takes into account not 
only a condominium’s enclosed parts but also includes the floor area of a contiguous 
                                                                                                                                                               
differently in the declaration or sectional plan by developers under different circumstances. 
100 See n 21 supra. 
101 STA s 32 (1). 
102 UCIOA § 2-107 (a). 
103 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 2 par 2.  
104 UCIOA § 2-107 (b). 
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balcony and/or such non-contiguous parts as a garage or storeroom. The problem 
arises when only some units have additions where others do not. Units with additions 
will have quite large participation quotas. This is inequitable since a unit’s value does 
not always increase proportionally with the increase in the floor area of its additional 
amenities.105 In brief, additional space in a unit’s main part may be more valuable 
than a balcony or a storeroom of similar size. For this reason, a more equitable 
solution might be to count only a percentage, perhaps half of the floor area of 
balconies and storerooms in calculating the participation quota.106 In China, half of 
the floor area of the balcony or storeroom is currently counted into a unit’s floor 
area.107 However, a problem still persists when a developer sells a parking space to 
the units separately. Some unit owners have purchased their parking space while 
others have not.108 Then the unit owners with a parking space will have a larger 
participation quota. Another criticism leveled against the floor area formula is that it 
does not reflect the cubic space of the unit. This is to say that only the floor area of a 
unit is taken into account with no consideration given to the volume of air space 
within the unit’s boundaries. For example, in mixed-use developments, the cubic 
space of the shops is often larger than an apartment with the same floor area. Even in 
exclusive residential condominiums, the cubic space of a top-floor penthouse unit is 
larger than the cubic space of a unit with the same floor area but a low ceiling. An 
example is a high-rise building containing eight floors of equal floor footage and 
having four units per floor, except the top floor, where there is a single penthouse unit. 
                                                        
105 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-11. 
106 Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act and Israeli Condominium Legislation” 
1981 CILSA 144. 
107 § 3.0.18 of the Measures Governing the Calculation of Floor Areas of Construction Buildings, 
issued by the Ministry of Construction on 15 April 2005. 
108 According to the Chinese departmental rule, the parking space purchased from developers is 
regarded as part of the individual property and not counted into the common property for the purpose 
of calculating a unit owner’s interest in the common property. See art 9 of the Provisional Measures on 
Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of Commercial Housing of 1995. 
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On the basis of the floor area formula, an equal share of the common expenses is 
allocated to all the units, including the penthouse unit that is three times the cubic size 
of the other units on the lower floors. With this allocation, the penthouse unit pays a 
1/29 share of all the common expenses. This appears to be inequitable since the floor 
area formula allocates only 1/3 of the cost for the penthouse unit despite its larger 
volume size. Therefore, it can be argued that when calculating a participation quota 
based on a unit’s size, not only the floor area, but also cubic space should be taken 
into account. Thirdly, the most significant criticism against employing a floor area 
formula is its inability to account for other factors. No account is taken of whether the 
same-sized apartment faces a factory or the sea or whether the same-sized unit is a 
warehouse or a ground floor storage room.109 Same-sized apartments may differ 
greatly in different locations. Finally, a major objection to a single method based on a 
unit’s floor area is that it is inflexible and rigid.110 This is because not only do 
different types of development need different approaches to obtain an equitable 
allocation of participation quotas, but three divergent and unrelated interests, namely, 
the share of the common property, the contributions to common expenses and voting 
rights, also need different formulas to take various factors into account.111 
  The relative floor area formula is mechanical. Nonetheless, despite the foregoing 
criticisms, the formula has advantages. First, it provides certainty and clarity being 
simple and easy to apply. In addition, the floor area formula does not need a periodic 
reappraisal of the participation quota as is the case with the value-based quota. 
Moreover, it somewhat approximates the relative value of the units. At the same time 
it avoids the complications arising from a value-based approach such as a periodic 
                                                        
109 Isakow “Legislation: Some Comments on the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971” 1972 (89)    
SALJ 126. 
110 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-12. 
111 Risk “Condominiums and Canada” 1968 (18) University of Toronto Law Journal 26; Schreiber 
“The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association” 1969 (117) U Pa L 
Rev 1145. 
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reappraisal. Finally, the floor area approach has been used in China in residential 
condominium developments for years. At the maturation stage of condominium 
development, the floor area approach should be retained in order not to confuse 
apartment owners with any other complicated methods. 
It may seem that a unit owner’s proportional ownership in the common property is 
insignificant given that the amount of common property ownership does not imply a 
greater or lesser use of the common property. Irrespective of the quota allocated in the 
common property, the owner of each unit is entitled to use all of the common property 
provided that the use is reasonable and does not interfere with other’s right to use.112 
However, when the cost of a share of common property is broken out and itemized 
when a purchaser is buying an apartment, then the method the quota is arrived at 
becomes both relevant and important.  
In China, the purchase price of an apartment is based on square meters. The floor 
area of an apartment that is for sale includes the enclosed unit’s floor area and its 
share of the floor area in the common property.113 The share floor area in the common 
property is calculated on the basis of a coefficient. The coefficient is calculated by 
dividing the common property floor areas by the aggregate of all individual units’ 
floor areas.114 Then the share of the common property floor area for each unit can be 
calculated in a way that the individual unit’s floor area times the uniform 
coefficient.115 This method was designed to implement the housing reform policy for 
the former welfare housing. These condominiums have a common feature, namely the 
floor area of the common property is usually smaller than the aggregate floor area of 
all the individual units. However, in the case of a large modern and/or luxurious 
                                                        
112 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 448. 
113 Art 5 of the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing of 1995. 
114 Art 10 of the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing of 1995. 
115 Art 11 of the Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common 
Property of Commercial Housing of 1995.  
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condominium development with the floor area of the common property larger than of 
all units combined, the coefficient is not a fraction. This leads to an odd consequence 
that the share of the floor area in the common property allocated to each unit will be 
larger than the units themselves. Therefore, the method to calculate a unit’s share in 
the common property in China needs to be reframed. Following the South African 
approach, the quota needs to be calculated by dividing the unit’s floor area in 
proportion to the aggregate size of all the units rather than the whole development’s 
floor area. 
The floor area approach may also be used to determine an owner’s cost for 
common expenses. However, this approach is open to serious criticism. The 
contributions should be a function of the benefit the unit owner derived from each 
amenity as well as the use of it.116 This is particularly true with a swimming pool. 
Unit owners not using a swimming pool may feel they are maltreated since they still 
contribute for the cost of its maintenance. Another example is requiring a childless 
couple to pay for the maintenance of a children crèche on the basis of their unit’s floor 
area.117 And there is dilemma for ground floor unit owners having to pay for elevator 
maintenance. One argument is that the costs for common expenses should directly 
reflect and relate to the degree to which each unit utilizes a common facility.118 
However, it is extremely difficult to calculate individual unit costs on the basis of 
actual use because numerous and complex factors need to be taken into account. The 
major ones are a unit’s location and the number of its occupants. Obviously, a unit 
with five children uses a crèche more than a family with one child. Nonetheless, these 
problems can be alleviated by limiting usage and charging fees for extra use. For 
example, a management body could regulate the reasonable use of a swimming pool 
by restricting each unit’s use to five times a day with the pool manager carefully 
                                                        
116 Khublall Strata Titles 204. 
117 See n 111 supra. 
118 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 457. 
 104
checking usage. Units using the swimming pool more than five times a day would 
have an additional charge imposed. But units using the pool less than five times a day 
do not need to pay charges.  
However, this cannot exonerate these unit owners from paying costs for the 
maintenance of the pool. To effectively carry out such a policy three elements are 
involved. First, the management body would need to determine the daily cost of 
maintaining the pool. Second, the management body would need to work out carefully 
the minimum number of periods of use that would be acceptable to the largest number 
of unit owners. Third, a managing agent would need to be employed to enforce the 
policy. For a small self-managed condominium without a professional managing agent, 
this policy would be unworkable. 
The new Chinese Property Code provides that contributions for common expenses 
should be determined by the unit’s floor area in proportion to the aggregate floor areas 
of the whole building provided there is not an agreement to the contrary.119 Therefore, 
unless the developer proposes an alternative quota, the floor area approach to 
determine an owner’s cost for common expenses is the one that has now gained 
acceptance in China. 
4 3 3 Par Value 
Par value is a value-based calculation that takes into account unit size and such factors 
as location, designated use, interior and exterior design, proximity to facilities, interior 
decorations and fittings, and the availability of parking space.120 The par value is a 
percentage computed by taking as a basis the value of a particular apartment in 
relation to the value of the whole development. The most popular basis to determine a 
condominium’s value is to compare it to the aggregate value of all the units in a 
                                                        
119 Art 80 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
120 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 460. 
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project.121 Although relative value can be calculated in various ways, for example on 
the basis of a unit’s purchase price or the market value of each unit, it is generally 
acknowledged that par value is the most satisfactory basis.122 It is argued that the par 
value approach affords a more equitable basis since it resembles an owner’s 
investment more closely.123 
  Some older statutes of the United States follow Section 6 (a) of the Model Statute 
of 1962 of the Federal Housing Administration by stating that each apartment owner 
is entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities by taking the 
value of an apartment in relation to the value of the whole condominium property.124 
For South Africa, the Memorandum to the Sectional Titles Act of 1986 mentions that 
the developer should utilize par value or a similar criterion to determine the 
participation quota for non-residential sectional title schemes or to amend each 
sectional owner’s proportion for common expenses. However, this has not been 
finally written into the Sectional Titles Act. By leaving the allocation of quotas to the 
discretion of the developer, it was assumed that the developer would apply the par 
value formula for non-residential schemes.125 
  However, the par value formula is not without problems. First, this formula cannot 
provide an objective barometer. When various factors are taken into account for 
allocating quotas on the basis of par value, developers are not bound by objective 
criteria. This could lead to an inaccurate or even more inequitable allocation of 
interests than when the floor area is employed. It is open to question whether a 
developer is able to offer an equitable quota that can be accepted by all unit owners. 
Second, when applying the par value formula, it is usually fixed before the 
                                                        
121 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 58-61. 
122 Schreiber “The Lateral Housing Development: Condominium or Home Owners Association” 1104; 
Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-4. 
123 See n 122 supra. 
124 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 60. 
125 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-17. 
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condominium is registered or a public statement is provided.126 Moreover, the par 
value formula can only be changed at a general meeting by unanimous resolution.127 
In fact an apartment’s par value fluctuates with time and should not be artificially 
fixed. For this reason a par value formula should be periodically reappraised. 
Otherwise, it cannot take into account future changes in the units’ capital values. 
  In summary, by using the par value formula, two irreconcilable assumptions have to 
be reconciled. The first requires that all the interests initially be allocated on a fixed 
value basis. And the second requires an apartment’s real value to reflect the owners’ 
investment. Since reconciliation is impossible, the par value approach is not suitable 
for residential condominiums in China. However, this would not rule out the 
possibility for a developer to use a par value formula before conveying a unit to a 
buyer in a non-residential scheme. 
4 3 4 Market Value  
Market value is the amount a unit would be worth if sold on the market at any given 
time.128 Therefore, an apartment’s market value fluctuates with time. If a participation 
quota is based on a unit’s market value, obviously the quota will vary over time. Thus 
the market value approach is unlikely to be a better measure than unit size or par 
value. 129  Allowing variations in quotas can be financially burdensome and 
changeable. 
  When a condominium owner has significantly improved and renovated the interior 
of a unit, from the real estate investment aspect, it would seem unfair that the unit 
owner’s share in the common property remains unchanged.130 After a condominium 
is registered, in most cases the owner begins a process of investing in upgrading and 
                                                        
126 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 441. 
127 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-4. 
128 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 441. 
129 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 460. 
130 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-16. 
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improving the unit’s interior and fixtures that result in the unit increasing in value. 
Therefore, it is essential that the unit purchaser receives an increasing undivided 
fractional interest in the project approximating the value of the person’s investment.131 
Without this, if the property should be resold, destroyed, expropriated, or terminated 
by the management body’s unanimous resolution, the owner would receive less than 
he/she had invested. It almost always is the case that apartment improvements and 
fixtures generate disputes when there is an apartment resale or when the building is 
destroyed as improvements increase the apartment’s value.132 
  The UCIOA deals with the issue outlined above with a provision that the share of a 
unit owner's interest on termination of the scheme is determined by dividing the fair 
market value of the owner's unit and its allocated interests by the total fair market 
values of all the units.133 One or more independent appraisers selected by the unit 
owner’s association determine the fair market value immediately before the 
termination.134 However, the fair market value rule only applies in case of voluntary 
termination by the unit owners. When a unit or part of the common property has been 
destroyed, an appraisal of the interests of all the unit owners is impossible. The 
UCIOA provides an alternative to the fair market value rule in case of condominium 
termination. If a fair market value appraisal of condominium units prior to termination 
cannot be made, any unit's appropriate share in the overall proceeds will revert to the 
interest in the common elements allocated to each unit.135 The UCIOA approach 
needs to be borrowed for a Chinese condominium statute to have a more equitable 
formula. This is because when condominium owners voluntarily decide to sell, the 
appraisal is necessary. In this case, the appraisal would not be considered as a 
                                                        
131 Rohan “Condominiums and the Consumer: A Checklist for Counseling the Unit Purchaser” 1974 
(48) St John’s L Rev 1041. 
132 Rohan “Condominiums and the Consumer” 1042. 
133 UCIOA § 2-118 (j) (1). 
134 Judy & Wittie “Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues” 446; Van der Merwe “The 
Allocation of Quotas in A Sectional Title Scheme” 80. 
135 UCIOA § 2-118 (j) (2). 
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financial burden since unit owners have a high hope to receive a good return for the 
investment by collective sale.  
4 4 AMENDMENT OF PARTICIPATION QUOTA  
Amendment of a participation quota is allowed either when a quota has been 
mistakenly determined, or when the physical structure of a building is altered causing 
the quota to be incorrect. In the latter case the building could be enlarged, it could be 
somewhat damaged or an apartment could be altered in such a way that a part of it 
becomes a part of the common property.  
The STA allows either the developer initially or the body corporate subsequently to 
amend consequences of the participation quota.136 When a developer submits an 
application to open a sectional title register, the developer may include special rules 
allowing for the modification of an owner’s vote, or an owner’s contributions to 
common expenses or allow for the unpaid debt of the body corporate to be 
modified.137 The body corporate may subsequently adopt a similar amendment by 
special resolution provided that the owners who would be adversely affected by the 
resolution have given their written consent.138 However, the body corporate cannot do 
this until at least 30 per cent of a project’s units have been sold to persons other than 
the developer.139 
  Under the UCIOA, if units are added to or withdrawn from the condominium 
building, the declaration must specify the formulas to reallocate the interests among 
all the condominiums after the addition or withdrawal.140 The purpose of this is to 
disclose advance information to condominium purchasers in the first phase of an 
                                                        
136 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10 (1). 
137 STA s 32 (4). 
138 Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles 
(Strata) Act” 149. 
139 See n 136 supra. 
140 UCIOA § 2-107 (c). 
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expandable condominium project.141 More importantly, the UCIOA provides that in 
general, no amendment can change the allocated interests of a unit without the 
unanimous consent of the units’ owners.142 
  A participation quota’s amendment requirement under the UCIOA is stricter than 
the STA. Under the STA, a special resolution can effect the modification of the 
consequences of quotas while the UCIOA requires the unanimous consent of all the 
unit owners. Quite simply, the UCIOA regards the participation quota as a permanent 
interest inherent in an apartment and in principle unalterable.143   
For China, since the participation quota not only plays a propriety role but also a 
social and economic role within a condominium community, a Chinese condominium 
statute should contain strict requirements on amending a participation quota. In 
addition, if an independent authority is created which examines the proposed 
participation quota, the likelihood of an incorrect amendment being passed is greatly 
diminished. When the physical structure of a building is altered or damaged, the 
participation quota has to be modified. If this situation should occur, it would be best 
that only a special resolution be passed. When a building is physically altered or 
damaged, getting unanimous consent can be quite difficult if not actually impossible. 
Furthermore, it is advised that an independent authority be involved in designing the 
new quota to ensure equity. If there is an objection against a new quota determined by 
the independent authority, the dissenting owners should resort to the court, asking for 
a review of the quota’s legitimacy.  
4 5 COMPARATIVE EVALUATION: QUOTA IN 
DISCRETION OF DEVELOPER 
The UCIOA allows a declarant in the declaration maximum freedom to allocate rights 
                                                        
141 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 6. 
142 UCIOA § 2-117 (d). 
143 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 45-14. 
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and obligations amongst apartment owners.144 The UCIOA does not require that 
formulas used by the declarant be justified, but it does require that the formulas be 
explained.145 The sole restriction on using the formulas is that they may not favor 
units owned by the declarant. Thus, the American developer can allocate quotas 
equally, on relative size or value, a combination of these or on any other basis.146 All 
the developer needs to do is to indicate his or her choice on the declaration and 
explain the chosen formula. 
  The South African STA, however, does not grant the developers as much freedom 
to allocate interests as does the UCIOA. Rather, the STA distinguishes residential 
schemes and non-residential schemes. For residential schemes, the statutory basis of 
allocation is prescribed, namely, relative floor area. However, for non-residential 
sectional titles schemes, a developer has unfettered discretion to determine the 
participation quota of units in non-residential schemes.147 
To sum up, the liberal approach adopted by the UCIOA is not suitable for a Chinese 
condominium statute. First, without an independent oversight authority, a developer’s 
discretion is prone to abuse. Second, not every Chinese developer is capable of and 
experienced enough to determine an equitable quota at the present time. Third, most 
of the residential condominiums in China are former welfare housing and apartments 
of very similar size in a single project.148 This makes the developer’s discretion to 
determine the participation quotas unnecessary. Fourth, the floor area formula now 
being used in residential condominiums is generally accepted by Chinese apartment 
owners.149 Fifth, article 80 of the Chinese Property Code provides that the apartment 
                                                        
144 See n 102 supra.  
145 UCIOA § 2-107 comment 2 par 2. 
146 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 60. 
147 See n 22 supra.  
148 See n 83 supra. 
149 Art 11 of the Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings of 
Apartment Common Areas of 1998 states that the initial maintenance fund is levied on the basis of an 
apartment’s selling price. According to art 5 of this departmental rule, the unit purchaser should pay 
 111
owners’ quota that deals with common expenses liability and share in common profits 
can be decided by agreement. If an agreement cannot be reached, the quota is 
calculated on the basis of the floor area of an individual apartment as a proportion of 
the floor area of the whole building.150 This provision seems to indicate that the floor 
area formula has gained in popularity but it suffers from a fault. The method should be 
corrected so that a unit’s floor area is compared in relation to the aggregate floor area 
of all the units rather than that of the whole building. Developers should not enjoy 
unfettered freedom when developing residential condominiums in China. For 
residential condominiums, the floor area formula should be kept. In brief, it would be 
wise for Chinese lawmakers to take into account the above-mentioned factors when 
framing a future Chinese condominium statute. 
Consequently, it is more suitable for a Chinese condominium statute to adopt the 
South African approach by distinguishing between exclusive residential 
condominiums and non-residential or mixed-use condominiums. The developer’s 
discretion is useful and necessary in non-residential or mixed-use condominiums. 
Unlike exclusive residential condominiums, the mixed-use condominiums vary from 
each other greatly. Some mixed-use projects may be comprised of residential 
apartments for half of the floor area and shops for the other half whereas another 
scheme may allocate 30% of the floor areas for offices and the other 70% for 
apartments. Hence, it is difficult if not impossible to stipulate a uniform yardstick for 
calculating the participation quota for non-residential and mixed-use condominiums. 
In fact, the Chinese Property Code provision leaves the door open for a developer to 
determine the participation quota. This is apparent in the provision that only when 
there is no agreement on quotas, the floor area formula applies.151 This means that 
when there is an agreement on the quota, the agreement controls. The agreement in 
                                                                                                                                                               
2-3% of the selling price extra as the maintenance fund. But when the initial maintenance fund is used 
up, the floor area formula will apply to collect contributions to common expenses from owners. 
150 Art 80 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
151 See n 150 supra. 
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this provision refers to the contract of sale which is drafted by the developers. This 
implies that the developer has the freedom to designate participation quotas subject to 
the consensus of all the purchasers. Moreover, since Chinese law does not expressly 
mention a participation quota for non-residential or mixed-use condominiums, one 
could argue that it is the developer’s duty to deliberate on and prepare a participation 
quota plan for such scheme.152 Therefore, the Chinese condominium statute needs to 
give developers the discretion to design an equitable quota for non-residential and 
mixed-use condominiums. However, it is only sensible to set up an independent 
agency to examine the equity and efficiency of quotas that a developer proposes as is 
done in New Zealand and Singapore.153 The rationale for this is to ensure that 
developers are neither derelict in their duties nor incapable of carrying them out. 
Accordingly, with this suggestion, the developer needs to not only explain the 
proposed quotas but also justify them before an independent authority’s scrutiny.  
 
                                                        
152 Van der Merwe argues that it is a dereliction of duty by developers not to conceive a deliberate 
participation quota. See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-6. 
153 According to s 6 (1) of the New Zealand’s Unit Titles Act 15 of 1972, the Valuer-General or a 
registered real estate valuer has to assign a unit entitlement before a unit plan can be deposited for 
registration. In Singapore, according to S 11 of the Land Titles (Strata) Act, to determine the 
participation quota of each unit, the developer should submit a proposal to the Commissioner of 
Buildings for acceptance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF UNIT 
OWNERS 
 
5 1 INTRODUCTION 
Inherent in the condominium concept is the interdependence of interests among unit 
owners.1 Each condominium owner must give up a certain degree of freedom which 
the person otherwise enjoys in a freestanding property.2 Unit owners need to comply 
with restrictions imposed by legal principles of neighbor law, statutory provisions, the 
declaration and any by-laws or rules set by the management body.3 Although such 
restrictions possibly could be “unduly intrusive and detrimental to” unit owners’ free 
use of their property, they promote a harmonious living environment and ensure that 
unit owners respect each other’s rights.4 Accordingly, a major issue is how to balance 
the protection of individual rights with the collective needs of the condominium 
community.5 For this reason it is essential that the condominium owner’s rights and 
obligations must be addressed when drafting a uniform Chinese condominium statute.  
This chapter focuses on condominium owners’ use and enjoyment of their 
apartments and the common property employing a general UCIOA and STA 
framework. By analyzing the validity and enforcement of these restrictions, it is 
                                                        
1 Di Lorenzo The Law of Condominiums and Cooperatives 6-2. 
2 Nahrstedt v Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc 8 Cal 4th 361, 33 Cal Rptr 2d 63, 878 P2d 
1282.   
3 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 72-81. 
4 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-7. 
5 Seigler “Condominium Transfer Fees Revisited” Nov 7, 2001 New York Law Journal. Online: 
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possible to provide suggestions on the rights and obligations of condominium owners 
for a Chinese condominium statute. Condominium owner’s rights are divided into two 
types, namely, owners' rights relating to their units and their rights relating to the 
common property. In return for these rights, a unit owner has the obligation to comply 
with statutory documents, the declaration, the by-laws and management body 
resolutions that deal with the individual unit and the common property.  
5 2 OWNERS’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN OWNING 
A CONDOMINIUM UNIT 
5 2 1 Rights Regarding A Unit  
A condominium owner has extensive power over his or her unit.6 Theoretically, 
ownership entails mainly but not exclusively, a right to possess, a right to use and 
enjoy, a right to enjoy his or her condominium unit, a right to exclude others from 
using and enjoying the unit, a right to transfer ownership of the unit to others, and to 
grant lesser rights for it to others.7 It seems that a condominium owner may use and 
deal with his or her apartment freely. Without an express provision governing the 
rights of a unit owner, both the UCIOA and the STA maintain implicitly that a unit 
owner has a freehold ownership and exclusive possession of his/her unit with 
extensive powers of use and enjoyment.8 However, since all units are structurally 
interdependent, an owner can use and enjoy the condominium unit only on the 
condition that the owner does not infringe other unit owners’ rights. Both the UCIOA 
and the STA restrict the powers of a unit owner by the statutory provisions, the 
declaration or the sectional plan, and the condominium association’s by-laws or rules. 
                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub243.pdf [2008.03.15]. 
6 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-3. 
7 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 3.  
8 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 5-6; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-4. 
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Similarly, the Chinese Property Code expressly states that an owner is entitled to have 
the rights to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of the individual unit. When exercising 
these rights, an owner may not jeopardize the structural integrity of the building or 
harm the lawful rights of other owners.9 Condominium ownership is best understood 
from an examination of the restrictions imposed on an owner. 
5 2 2 Restrictions on a Unit 
5 2 2 1 Restrictions by General Principles 
A condominium owner’s use and enjoyment of a unit is curtailed by the other owners’ 
rights since everyone lives in close proximity and uses facilities in common.10 The 
unit owners’ obligations and responsibilities emanate from these restrictions. Since 
China is without a special condominium statute, condominium owners’ rights and 
obligations are guided by principles of neighbour law and public policy. 11  A 
condominium owner, in the interest of being a good neighbor, is not entitled to 
exercise rights in a way that would inconvenience other owners or in a way that abuse 
others’ rights.12 For example, an owner cannot use a unit in an unreasonable way that 
would endanger the building’s structural stability.13 The exercise of an owner’s rights 
must be compatible with the collective interests of all of the neighboring owners to 
ensure a harmonious community.14 Under the STA, the common law of nuisance 
                                                        
9 Art 71 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
10 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-5. 
11 Art 5 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989 (as 
amended in 2001); Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 
275-276. 
12 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 72. 
13 Art 12 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989; see also 
Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 78. In this article, a case scenario 
about breaking down a bearing wall inside an apartment by a unit owner is discussed. 
14 Yang Lixin Study on Co-ownership 386. (Chinese version) 
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applies to all condominium owners.15 An injured party can either obtain an interdict 
to stop the nuisance or make a claim for damages.16 In the interest of public policy, an 
owner cannot use a condominium unit for immoral purposes such as running a house 
of prostitution or human trafficking. Neither can an owner use a condominium in such 
a way that the public health would be endangered. China’s general principles of 
neighbor law and public policy impose restrictions very similar to the ones regulated 
under the UCIOA and the STA by their provisions, the declarations, and by-laws or 
rules governing a condominium complex. These are examined in detail in the 
following sections. 
5 2 2 2 Statutory Obligations 
Both the UCIOA and STA contain provisions that lay out condominium owners’ 
obligations and restrictions for their individual condominium. Under the UCIOA, the 
statutory restrictions on an owner’s use and enjoyment of his/her condominium are: (1) 
an owner is responsible for maintaining and repairing the individual unit; (2) a unit 
owner must allow the unit owners’ association reasonable access to the unit in order to 
maintain, repair and replace the common areas and facilities and for emergency 
repairs necessary to prevent damage to the common property or to another unit;17 and 
(3) a unit owner may improve or alter a unit provided that it does not impair the 
structural integrity or mechanical systems or lessen the support of any portion of the 
common property.18 
  Under the STA, an owner has the following obligations: (1) during reasonable 
hours a unit owner has to allow a person authorized by the body corporate by a 
                                                        
15 The nuisance rule is expressly incorporated in the Sectional Titles Act. See n 22 infra; also see Van 
der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles (Strata) 
Act” 151. 
16 Van der Merwe “Sectional Titles” LAWSA XXVII [First Reissue 2001] par 110. 
17 UCIOA § 3-107 (a). 
18 UCIOA § 2-111 (1). 
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written notice to enter and inspect his/her unit or exclusive use area in order to 
maintain, repair or renew pipes, wires, cables and ducts in the unit or those being used 
in connection with other units or common property;19 (2) a unit owner has to do any 
work to the unit that a public or local authority orders and has to pay the requisite 
charges, expenses and assessments;20 (3) a unit owner has to repair and maintain the 
unit and keep it in a state of good repair;21 (4) a unit owner is not permitted to use the 
unit or permit it to be used to cause a nuisance to other unit owners or occupiers;22 (5) 
an owner is not allowed, except with the written consent of all the owners, to use the 
unit for a purpose other than that shown on the registered sectional plan.23 
  Both the UCIOA and the STA have basic restrictions which condominium owners 
are to follow: (1) a condominium unit has to be maintained and kept in a reasonable 
state of repair by its owner; (2) a unit’s owner has to give reasonable access to the 
management body to protect and maintain the condominium’s common interests; and 
(3) a unit owner cannot impair the structural integrity of the condominium building.  
The STA also incorporates the law of nuisance into the Act. The prevention of 
nuisance stems from the principles of neighbour law that one should use one’s own 
property without injuring or damaging others.24 The additional duty imposed on the 
owners is extended to include visitors, other apartment occupants, and lessees. 
Occupants and visitors also have to comply with rules of the condominium scheme. 
This is found in a clause that states “a sectional owner shall not permit the section to 
be used” in such a way as to cause a nuisance to any of the unit’s occupants.25 
Furthermore, the STA ensures that an owner uses his/her unit in accordance with the 
sectional plan. In China, it is not uncommon for some apartment owners to convert 
                                                        
19 STA s 44 (1) (a). 
20 STA s 44 (1) (b). 
21 STA s 44 (1) (c). 
22 STA s 44 (1) (e). 
23 STA s 44 (1) (g). 
24 Milton “Nuisance” LAWSA IXX [First Reissue] par 188; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-8. 
25 See n 22 supra, read with r 10 of Annexure 9 of the Sectional Titles Regulations. 
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their units designated for residential purposes into business offices. 26  Another 
example is a night club with late hour activities or a late night restaurant that is open 
on the lower floors of a residential condominium, and all of which seriously annoy the 
residential owners.27  
 Moreover, the STA in several places implies a legal servitude with condominium 
ownership. One is called a reciprocal servitude for lateral and subjacent structural 
support28 and the other is a reciprocal servitude for the passage of such services as 
water and sewerage through pipes, wires, cables and ducts.29 Thus, owners altering or 
improving their condominium units should ensure that they do not physically weaken 
a building’s load bearing walls, ceilings and floors so as not to put their neighbors at 
risk. Finally, the STA stipulates that a unit owner is responsible for paying the fees 
and expenses charged by public authorities.30 This restriction is analogous to the 
restriction that applies to conventional land ownership.31  
It is clear that the STA statutory provisions on the use restrictions of a unit are more 
detailed than the UCIOA. It would seem a future Chinese condominium statute should 
adopt an equally detailed approach. However, there is one STA technical issue that 
would not be suitable in China. Requiring a condominium management body to give 
prior notice before sending an employee to enter an owner’s unit is a sensible 
provision. However, in China, requiring a management body or its executive council 
always to give written notice before entering a unit is, in practice, much too rigid. In 
practice, a management body can authorize reasonable access by notifying a unit 
                                                        
26 Wei Yaorong “The Discussion on the System of Condominium Ownership” 2007 (1) Modern 
Property Management 22; Li Xiandong The Legal Guide for Resolving the Disputes Resulted from 
Property Management 144. (Chinese version) 
27  Li Xiandong The Legal Guide for Resolving the Disputes Resulted from Property     
Management 50-52. 
28 STA s 28 (1) (a) (i). 
29 STA s 28 (1) (a) (ii) and (b) (ii). 
30 STA s 44 (1) (b). 
31 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-7. 
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owner in advance employing a notice board or by telephone. As long as the unit 
owner and the management body can arrange a mutually convenient time for access, a 
written notice requirement would be redundant. Moreover, since many Chinese 
condominium projects comprise several buildings, a written notice requirement would 
unnecessarily increase the workload of a management body. 
5 2 2 3 Restrictions in Condominium Documents 
In the United States, initially a declaration is essentially a covenant between unit 
owners and the developer and then later it is a covenant between unit owners and the 
condominium association.32 Restrictions in this document are considered covenants 
running with the land.33 The covenants bind not only the current unit owners but also 
any successors.34 Therefore, upon acquiring title to a condominium, unit owners 
create a contractual relationship among themselves concerning their rights and 
obligations.35 The covenants and the conditions not only are binding on the unit 
owner and the management body, but bind all subsequent unit owners.36  
  Under the UCIOA, a declaration should contain restrictions on the transfer of a 
condominium unit from one person to another since imposing these restrictions 
exceeds the powers of the executive boards.37 In addition, the declaration may 
contain restrictions on a unit’s sale price, or on the amount a unit owner receives at the 
time of sale, on condemnation, or on the amount of a unit or the condominium 
                                                        
32 Poliakoff Law of Condominium Operations § 15.31.  
33 Brower “Communities within the Community: Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Features of 
Legal Theory in Residential Associations” 1992 (7) J Land Use & Ennvtl L 215; Reichman 
“Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey” 1976 (43) U Chi L Rev 279; Rohan & 
Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-10 & 44-11. 
34 Natelson “Consent, Coercion, and ‘Reasonableness’ in Private Law: The Special Case of the 
Property Owners Association” 1990 (51) Ohio St L J 47; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-7. 
35 Fennell “Contracting Communities” 2004 U Ill L Rev 835-836. 
36 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-11. 
37 UCIOA § 2-105 (a) (12).  
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community’s casualty loss, or on termination of the condominium project.38 The 
declaration may also deal with any other matter a declarant considers appropriate 
including restrictions on a unit’s use or the number or other qualifications of persons 
who may occupy a condominium unit.39 
  The 1994 UCIOA amendments describe the use and occupancy restrictions that 
must appear in the declaration as well as the procedures that must be used to change 
use and occupancy restrictions. 40  The amendments expressly state that leasing 
restrictions must appear in the declaration.41 In addition, a new distinction is made 
between a use restriction and an occupancy restriction. This distinction emphasizes 
that occupancy focuses on an individual’s characteristics while use focuses on the 
purposes of a space.42 The more important are use restrictions which have to be stated 
in the declaration. Occupancy restrictions are less rigorous and fall under the 
jurisdiction of the executive board which determines such things as the maximum 
number of occupants allowed in a unit and whether there can be pets or not.43 Prior to 
these amendments, occupancy restrictions had to be made in the declaration but now 
the amended UCIOA requires only that alienation conveyance restrictions, including 
those applying to a lease, must be in the declaration. Everything else is permissive. 
More importantly, once the declaration is recorded, use restrictions are presumed to be 
valid.44 Quite simply, American courts assume that a purchaser has full knowledge 
about any use restrictions contained in the recorded declaration when acquiring title.45  
  Under the UCIOA, an association’s by-laws can include any other matter the unit 
                                                        
38 See n 37 supra. 
39 UCIOA § 2-105 (b). 
40 UCIOA § 2-105 comment 13 para 2. 
41 UCIOA § 2-105 comment 13 para 3. 
42 UCIOA § 2-105 comment 13 para 6. 
43 UCIOA prefatory note 3. 
44 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-11 & 44-12. 
45 Grippando “Condominium Rulemaking-Presumptions, Burdens, and Abuses: A Call for Substantive 
Judicial Review in Florida” 1982 (34) U Fla L Rev 219. 
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owners’ association believes is necessary and appropriate.46  The caveat is that 
by-laws and rules cannot exceed the association’s authority.47 The association can 
adopt rules to prevent any behavior that violates the declaration or adversely affects 
the use and enjoyment of other units or the common property. 48  Since the 
association’s by-laws can be unrecorded under the UCIOA, they can only deal with 
matters concerning the internal operations of the association and housekeeping 
matters.49 
  In South Africa, an owner’s use and enjoyment of a condominium unit is limited by 
the existing servitudes, as well as by additional real rights and restrictive conditions 
filed in the sectional plan. 50  Apart from this, more detailed restrictions and 
obligations are further contained in the rules of the scheme. A close examination finds 
that the STA rules of the scheme differ from the UCIOA by-laws. First, rules of a 
scheme need to be lodged with the deeds office while by-laws do not need to be 
recorded. The STA rules of the scheme are in a certificate prepared by a conveyancer 
that is needed to open a sectional title register. This certificate is lodged together with 
the sectional plan for registration.51 Second, the STA rules of the scheme contained in 
Annexures 8 and 9 of the Sectional Titles Regulations are in a prescribed form. In 
other words, the “default” is a model set of provisions for a sectional title scheme 
although a developer may substitute or amend these rules to fit a particular sectional 
title development. The rules regulate the control, management, administration, use 
and enjoyment of the units and common property when any person other than the 
developer becomes the owner of a unit.52 Model management rules are found in 
Annexure 8 of the Regulation and include the following restrictions: 1) an owner shall 
                                                        
46 UCIOA § 3-106 (b). 
47 UCIOA § 3-102 (a). 
48 UCIOA § 3-102 (c) (1) & (2). 
49 UCIOA § 3-106 comment 1.  
50 STA s 11 (3) (b). 
51 STA s 11 (3) (e). 
52 STA s 1 (1) s v “rules” read with s 35 (1) & s 36 (1). 
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not use his or her section, exclusive use area or any part of the common property, or 
permit it to be used to damage the reputation of the building;53 2) an owner shall not 
breach any law, by-law, ordinance, proclamation or statutory regulation, or the 
conditions of any licence relating to the scheme’s living, or running a business in the 
building, or breach the conditions of title regarding his or her section, any other 
section, exclusive use area, or any other exclusive use area;54 3) an owner shall not 
make alterations which are likely to endanger the building’s stability or influence the 
use and enjoyment of other sections, the common property or any exclusive use 
area;55 4) an owner is not allowed to do anything to his or her section or exclusive use 
area which is likely to impair the building’s harmonious appearance.56 
  Apart from the restrictions in the model management rules, the model conduct rules 
in Annexure 9 further curtail an owner’s use and enjoyment of his or her section: 1) an 
owner or occupier of a unit shall not, without the consent in writing of the trustees, 
keep any animal, reptile or bird in a unit;57 2) an owner or occupier of a unit shall 
maintain a receptacle for refuse in a hygienic and dry condition within his unit;58    
3) an owner or occupier of a unit used for residential purposes shall not place or do 
anything on any part of the common property, including balconies, patios, steps, and 
gardens which, in the discretion of the trustees, is aesthetically displeasing or 
undesirable when viewed from the outside of the unit;59 4) no owner or occupier of a 
unit, without the written consent of the trustees shall place any sign, notice, billboard 
or advertisement of any kind whatsoever on any part of his or her residential unit so as 
to be visible from outside the unit;60 5) an owner or occupier shall not store any 
                                                        
53 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (i). 
54 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (ii). 
55 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (iii). 
56 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (iv). 
57 Annexure 9 r 1 (1). 
58 Annexure 9 r 2 (1) (a). 
59 Annexure 9 r 5. 
60 Annexure 9 r 6. 
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inflammable material or do or permit or allow any other dangerous act in his or her 
unit;61 6) an owner is obliged to eradicate pests in his or her unit.62  
  Practical experience under the UCIOA and the STA demonstrates that some rules 
are particularly contentious. One instance is whether there should be an absolute 
prohibition of pets. Two contrasting cases in the United States and South Africa 
illustrate how the courts in different jurisdictions have dealt with a pet restriction. This 
examination is worthwhile to put the pet issue in perspective for a Chinese statute. 
The South African case of Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme v Dorse dealt 
with an unreasonable application of a pet restriction rule of a sectional title scheme.63 
Under the model rules, the trustees, who correspond to the executive board members 
under the UCIOA, had the discretion to decide whether pets could be kept in the units 
or on the common property.64 They denied permission to an older lady to keep a dog 
in her apartment on the grounds of public policy and the fear of creating a precedent.65 
The court held that precedent was not a relevant consideration but rather keeping an 
animal had to be considered on its own merits, so a decision had to be based on the 
facts and circumstances relevant to that case.66 The pet restriction was designed to 
avoid creating a nuisance for the other inhabitants. In this case, the respondent’s dog 
could never be a nuisance as it did not bark and was not allowed to run on the 
common property.67 The court emphasized that the trustees’ conduct ignored the 
relevant circumstances pertaining to the particular dog and finally found it proper to 
substitute the trustee’ decision with its own and ordered that the lady be allowed to 
keep her dog in her apartment.68 
                                                        
61 Annexure 9 r 9. 
62 Annexure 9 r 11. 
63 See Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme v Dorse No 152/1987 1999 2 SA 512 (D).  
64 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-8. 
65 See n 63 supra. 
66 See n 63 supra at 520 F-H and 520 H-I. 
67 See n 63 supra at 521 F and 522 A-C. 
68 See n 63 supra at 523 E-G. 
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  In the American case of Nahrstedt v Lakeside Village Condo Association,69 a 
woman purchased a unit in a large condominium complex with more than 530 units. 
When she moved into her condominium, she brought along three cats she considered 
to be her family. Shortly after she moved in, an association board member spotted one 
of her cats sunning in her window. Then the association sent a letter to the woman 
demanding that she remove the cats. When she refused, the owners’ association fined 
her, stating that she violated the pet restriction set forth in the declaration. She refused 
to pay and filed a suit alleging that the restriction was unreasonable because her cats 
were always indoors, were “noiseless” and created no nuisance.70 The association did 
not agree and maintained that the pet restriction was enforceable because it furthered 
the “collective health, happiness and peace of mind of those living in the complex.”71 
The trial court supported the association and dismissed the suit. The court of appeal 
reversed the trial court and concluded that a test of reasonableness depended on the 
facts of each case.72 The court then ruled that the cats did not interfere with the 
peaceful enjoyment of other owners, so the restriction was unreasonable. However, 
the dissenting justice criticized the case-by-case assessment and argued that it 
conflicted with the legislative intent to make covenants, conditions and restrictions 
“presumptively enforceable”.73 On review, the California Supreme Court rejected the 
court of appeal’s decision and held that the restrictions were valid and could not be 
challenged.74 The Supreme Court ruled that the covenants, conditions and restrictions 
are enforced in the context of equitable servitude law.75 Under the law of equitable 
servitude a restriction is upheld unless it violates public policy, “bears no relationship 
to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the land in question, or its 
                                                        
69 Nahrstedt v Lakeside Village Condo Ass'n 878 P 2d 1275, 1278 (Cal 1994). 
70 See n 69 supra. 
71 See n 69 supra. 
72 Arabian “Condos, Cats, and CC & Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common” 1995 (23) Pepp L Rev 3. 
73 See n 69 supra. 
74 See n 69 supra at 1275. 
75 See n 69 supra at 1288. 
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harmful effects on land use are so disproportionate to its benefits for the homeowners 
that it should not be enforced.”76 Hence, the covenants, conditions and restrictions of 
the owners’ association were upheld and the woman had to remove her cats. 
  From the above discussion it is clear the South African court has adopted a 
case-by-case approach while the American court first applied and eventually 
discarded it. Note that the American case dealt with a pet restriction set forth on a 
recorded declaration while the South African case dealt with a restriction in the rules 
of a scheme. The American case affirmed the validity of the restrictions on the 
recorded declaration, but at the same time questioned whether a case-by-case 
approach could be applied to examine the by-laws restrictions. One dissenting Justice 
of the California Supreme Court in Nahrstedt argued for a case-by-case analysis and 
commented that the majority decision sacrificed freedom and self-determination for 
“the tyranny of the commonality.”77 In his view, the case-by-case approach is more 
equitable since the court can take into account different circumstances in different 
cases.78 However, it is argued that a case-by-case approach may lead to excessive 
litigation.79 Here Chinese courts need to be cautious. For a Chinese statute, recorded 
restrictions would be presumed to be valid. In other words, as long as a pet restriction 
is recorded and is disclosed clearly in advance to prospective buyers, whether set forth 
on the declaration or on the recorded model rules, it is to be enforced by the courts 
consistently.  
  Since condominiums are the predominant housing in China, an absolute prohibition 
of pets is inappropriate and unreasonable and it only should be employed on the rarest 
occasions. Otherwise, it would be draconian to forbid people from having pets in their 
apartments. Therefore, unit owners should be entitled to have a reasonable number of 
                                                        
76 See n 69 supra at 1289. 
77 See n 69 supra at 1297. 
78 See n 72 supra at 5-9. 
79 Fowler “Review of Selected 2002 California Legislation: Property: What is Reasonable?” 2003 (34) 
McGeorge L Rev 513. 
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pets unless a non-pet restriction is disclosed to unit purchasers. Surely, such a 
disclosure of the non-pet restriction affects a condominium’s marketability. Generally, 
express language in the governing document a unit purchaser relies on as pre-existing 
rules would provide good evidence of an understanding that the association would not 
later enact restrictions inconsistent with those rules.80 To summarize, without a 
non-pet prohibition in the disclosure, a management body is not allowed to rule or 
resolve that apartment owners be prohibited from having pets.  
The maximum number of pets should be regulated by a condominium association’s 
house rules. House rules may for example, limit the number of pets that can be kept; 
require pets to be leashed on common property; limit the kind of pets that can be kept 
such as no dogs over 50 kilograms; require pets to be registered with the public 
authority and the association’ executive council; prohibit keeping pets for commercial 
purposes; require an owner to remove a pet when other owners reasonably complain 
of the nuisance or inconvenience, and finally require owners to remove any solid pet 
waste immediately. 
5 2 2 4 Restriction on Alienation 
Both the UCIOA and the STA recognize that making separate transactions with 
apartments only or separating apartments from their appurtenant share of the common 
property, would jeopardise the condominium scheme.81 Chinese law has adopted the 
same point of view on indivisibility. If a condominium owner transfers an apartment 
to another, the apartment owner’s share in the common property is simultaneously and 
automatically transferred as well.82  
Restrictions on the sale and transfer of property require that the association 
approves a prospective buyer of a unit and, if the association disapproves it is 
                                                        
80 Sterk “Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments” 1997 (77) B U L Rev 338. 
81 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 9-14.2; STA s 16 (3). 
82 Art 72 (2) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
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responsible to provide an alternative purchaser. In effect, the association has a right of 
first refusal or what is called a legal pre-emptive right.83 In the United States and 
South Africa, there is never an absolute prohibition on a condominium owner selling 
or transferring his or her unit since that would be totally incompatible with the 
concept of property ownership.84  
In the United States, it is generally acknowledged that only unreasonable restraints 
on the sale of property are invalid.85 An association’s most common sales restrictions 
are screening rights and an association’s right of first refusal.86 Under the UCIOA, 
condominium sales restraints can only be in the declaration.87 Although it may seem 
controversial whether or not a right of first refusal violates the rule against 
perpetuities,88 it is generally agreed that such rights merely require that a property be 
offered to a would-be purchaser, but do not bind the unit owner to sell at a 
predetermined price.89 This would be a reasonable restraint and not violate the rule 
against perpetuities.90 Therefore, it has been accepted that when there is a transfer of 
condominium units reasonable restrictions are necessary both for the condominium 
complex operations and for the protection of the condominium owners.91 There are 
                                                        
83 Schiller “Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium Rules” 1993 (22) Stetson L Rev 1157. 
84 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-34.1; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 
10-16. 
85 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 86; Browder “Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium 
Units” 1970 U Ill L F 231.  
86 Rubens “Right of First Refusal and Waiver of the Right of Judicial Partition” 1962 (14) Hastings L 
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87 UCIOA § 2-105 (a) (12). 
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created. See Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 1331. 
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“Condominium – A Survey of Legal Problems and Proposed Legislation” 1962 (17) U Miami L Rev 
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91 Kim “Involuntary Sale: Banishing an Owner from the Condominium Community” 1998 (31) J 
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three principal reasons for this restriction. First, since unit owners are financially 
interdependent for common expenses, excluding people who might be economically 
unreliable would reduce this risk.92 Unit owners desire to ensure that a proposed 
buyer is financially reliable and responsible. Second, from the management’s 
perspective, harmony is promoted in the community since there is the creation of 
interdependence on the part of unit owners. An owner is usually required to give 
timely notice to the management body by serving it with the copy of a bona fide 
offer.93 Third, owners in the condominium complex want to ensure that a prospective 
purchaser is of acceptable character since all owners share the common facilities.94  
  Under the STA, an owner’s right to sell his/her unit is restricted by two sections. 
First, the Registrar is prohibited from registering a transfer of a unit unless the 
conveyancer’s certificate shows that all monies due to the body corporate by the 
person making the transfer have been paid.95 Since the body corporate and the owners 
have significant economic interests at stake, having such a restriction is not 
incompatible with condominium ownership.96 The Registrar is also prohibited from 
registering a transfer of a unit if a developer has failed to disclose in the deed of sale 
that he or she has a reserved right for phased development.97 Second, an owner is 
required by statute to notify the body corporate of any change of ownership of his or 
her unit.98 Still, if an owner is negligent and does not notify the administration, this 
does not make the sale invalid. The body corporate can investigate the identity of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Policy Role for the Judiciary” 1998 (31) J Marshall L Rev 408. 
92 Di Lorenzo The Law of Condominiums and Cooperatives 6-25; Van der Merwe Apartment 
Ownership 87. 
93 Ross “Condominiums and Pre-emptive Options – The Right of First Refusal” 1967 (18) Hastings L 
J 585-612. 
94 Di Lorenzo The Law of Condominiums and Cooperatives 6-26. 
95 STA s 15 B (3) (a) (i) (aa). 
96 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 10-14 (2). 
97 STA s 15B (3) (a) (ii). 
98 STA s 44 (1) (f). 
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purchaser from the deeds register.99 Apart from the above two sections of the STA, a 
final restriction on selling a unit is contained in the Sectional Titles Regulations. The 
regulation states that if there are members of an association whose constitution 
restricts sales, then a restriction may be put into a schedule with the sectional plan that 
restricts the transfer of a unit unless the association gives its consent.100 Where the 
consent of an association is required for transfer of a unit in the scheme, such consent 
must be lodged with the deed of transfer. The South African Act does not provide a 
right of pre-emption or right of first refusal that restricts the sale of a unit. However, it 
is suggested that the management rules can grant a right of pre-emption to the trustees 
or body corporate requiring the prospective seller to offer the unit first to these 
parties.101  
  In China, apartment owners are free to dispose of their apartments along with the 
share in the common property.102 The South African approach is much less rigid than 
the UCIOA one. Therefore, it would seem to be advisable to borrow the South African 
approach for a Chinese statute. There are frequent condominium transactions in China 
because of the increasing social mobility. If transfer restrictions are draconian, there 
are five unfavorable consequences. First, unit owners lose the incentive to maintain 
and improve their units if they lack marketability arising from the restrictions on sales. 
Second, from an economic perspective, the whole property market will rapidly narrow 
since the vast majority of Chinese people live in condominiums. Third, both social 
mobility and urbanization will be severely impaired if there are few if any options to 
purchase property. Fourth, the institutional lenders will also be hampered if judicial 
sale by lenders foreclosing is subject to such rigid restrictions as association screening 
rights and association rights of first refusal. Fifth, with fewer transactions, the market 
value of the condominium will fall and eventually condominium housing could lose 
                                                        
99 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 10-15. 
100 The Sectional Titles Regulations r 30 (2), read with r 16(3) and STA s 11 (3) (b). 
101 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 10-12. 
102 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 109. 
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its popularity. Overall, the justification for not imposing rigid restrictions on the sale 
of a condominium is greater than the arguments against it. The general rule is that 
there should be no unreasonable restraints on the sale of property for restraints can 
hinder the free use and development of property.103 Therefore, the UCIOA type of 
restrictions would not be workable in China. 
 Nonetheless, some restrictions on the sale of a unit under the STA are 
well-conceived and reasonable and need to be borrowed when drafting a Chinese 
condominium statute. According to the STA, the registrar is not allowed to register a 
unit’s transfer unless there is a conveyance’s certificate to the effect that the body 
corporate has confirmed that all monies due to it have been paid.104 However, unlike 
the STA, the UCIOA provides that a purchaser is not liable for an unpaid assessment 
or fee greater than the amount in the association’s certificate.105 In other words, if a 
purchaser receives a resale certificate failing to state the proper amount of the 
previous owner’s unpaid assessments, the purchaser is not liable for anything greater 
than that disclosed in the resale certificate.106 The owners’ association is prohibited 
from later collecting a purchased unit’s undisclosed assessments from the purchaser. 
However, if the owners’ association discloses the unpaid assessments prior to the issue 
of a resale certificate, the new purchaser is liable for the outstanding amount. 
Impliedly, the UCIOA holds the seller and the buyer both jointly and severally liable 
for a sold unit’s debts. Here the Chinese law is silent, so presumably, a unit purchaser 
is not liable for previously accrued debts before moving in. One way of viewing these 
restrictions is that the ones set by the STA are procedural restrictions while those set 
by the UCIOA are substantial restrictions. Therefore, it would seem best to 
incorporate the relevant South African provisions into a Chinese condominium statute.   
                                                        
103 Kerr “Condominium – Statutory Implementation” 1963 (38) St John L Rev 32. 
104 See n 95 supra. 
105 UCIOA § 4-109 (c). 
106 UCIOA § 4-109 comment 3. 
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5 2 2 5 Restrictions on Lease 
Apart from sale restrictions, condominium associations also would like to impose 
restrictions on unit owners leasing their units. Such a restriction is popular in the 
United States.107 Proponents of leasing restrictions maintain that condominiums are 
inherently different from other types of residence. 108  One American court’s 
justification for a leasing restriction is that it achieves a community goal that 
outweighs the social value of giving a unit owner an unqualified right to lease his or 
her unit.109 Others argue that only the resident owners have a real stake in the 
community for lessees neither care about the community interests, nor take the 
community’s rules and by-laws seriously.110 This has led to the belief that the close 
nature of condominium living is such that “individuals ought not to be permitted to 
disrupt the integrity of the common scheme” by being allowed to do what they want 
with their property.111 Nevertheless, under the 1994 UCIOA amendments, a leasing 
restriction is not unlimited, for it has to appear in a declaration.112 This of course 
validates leasing restrictions.113  
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value for all units…Resident owners may value the sense of community that comes with a stable 
neighborhood and may fear that renters – especially short-term renters – will interfere with that sense 
of community.” 
111 Sterling Village Condo Inc v Breitenbach 251 So 2d 685, 688 (Fla Dist Ct App 1971). 
112 UCIOA § 2-105 (a) (12). 
113 See n 41 supra. 
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Under the STA, a sectional owner may register a notarial lease of his/her unit.114 
The registrar then registers a notarial cancellation or modification of a lease by an 
endorsement on the owner’s sectional title deed.115 A notarial sub-lease, modification 
of a sub-lease and a cancellation of the lease are registered by endorsing the lease.116 
Therefore, unlike the UCIOA, the STA allows the sectional owners to lease their 
sections. However, sectional owners do not have unlimited discretion on leasing their 
units for rules of the sectional title scheme may greatly restrict their ability to do so.117 
The caveat to this is that since leasing restrictions limit an owner’s economic 
well-being, only reasonable restrictions on unit leasing are valid. But there is an 
escape hatch here, for an absolute prohibition on leasing is valid if there are very 
special circumstances.118 It is suggested that valid STA restrictions on leasing include 
not allowing the lease of units in a residential project for less than one year.119 
  In China, most condominium owners view leasing restrictions as a direct attack on 
condominium ownership. This point of view is so prevalent that there is not even 
academic literature on this issue in the country. Therefore, a future Chinese 
condominium statute must handle this issue cautiously. Perhaps if a leasing restriction 
is necessary it could be disclosed in a constitutive document or a sales disclosure 
statement. In most instances a management body should not be permitted to impose 
restrictions on leasing. With a tight rental property market in China, a restrictive rental 
policy for condominiums could come under attack. Already many former public rental 
buildings have been converted to condominiums under the housing reform policy, 
which substantially reduced rentals. In addition, the flexibility of condominium 
                                                        
114 STA s 15B (1) (b) & (d). 
115 STA s 15B (1) (b). 
116 See n 115 supra.  
117 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 10-19. The model rules do not provide general restrictions on 
leasing of units, however they do state that all tenants of units as well as other persons granted rights of 
occupancy are obliged to comply with conduct rules. See Annexure 9 r 10. 
118 Van der Mewer Sectional Titles 10-19. 
119 See n 118 supra. 
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owners being able to lease their units may help them to weather a financial crisis, a 
job change, a long-term stay abroad, or a health problem. Harsh restrictions on leasing 
are impractical. On the one hand, from the viewpoint of real estate investment, the 
rental received from leasing units can be used to pay down a mortgage. Someone may 
purchase two apartments in a condominium project, one of which is being paid for 
with a mortgage. The owner may live in one apartment and rent the other to pay the 
mortgage with the rental. This kind of thoughtful investment should not be blocked 
with rigid leasing restrictions. On the other hand, unit tenants often are apathetic about 
engaging the community management and do not respect by-laws or rules. But this 
phenomenon should not be used to justify leasing restrictions. Rather, by statute 
tenants should be involved in management.120 In any future Chinese condominium 
statute it should be very explicit that tenants must comply with all the rules and 
resolutions made by the management body. In return, any tenant with a lease for more 
than three years should have a right to attend management meetings. In addition, a 
tenant with an owner’s letter of attorney can have full voting rights.  
  Nonetheless, this does not mean that leasing restrictions have no place whatsoever 
in China. Reasonable limitations on leasing may be adopted by house rules such as the 
minimum term of the lease and the owner’s duty to notify the leasing to the 
management body. However, frequent shifts in leasing restriction policy should be 
avoided since this would generate disputes between owners and adversely affect the 
condominium market.121 In summary, unit leasing restrictions should be regarded as a 
minor issue in terms of China’s housing policy. 
                                                        
120 Smith “The Purity of Commonholds” 2004 (May/June) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 207. 
Smith maintains that the problems with let units can be mitigated by the “tightening up of the 
management powers of the commonhold association over tenants”. 
121 Shifrin “No-leasing Restrictions on Condominium Owners: the Legal Landscape” 2006 (94) Ill      
B J 81. 
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5 2 2 6 Alterations of Units 
Both the UCIOA and STA allow owners to make alterations to the interior of their 
units. Under the UCIOA, the unit owner can alter the interior provided that what has 
been done does not endanger the building’s structural integrity or mechanical 
systems.122 Under the STA, owners can alter their units as long as the alterations do 
not impair the building’s structural integrity or others’ use and enjoyment of their 
sections, the common property or any exclusive use area.123 Chinese law also allows 
owners to alter a unit’s interior provided that the owner notifies the managing agent 
and the alterations do not affect the building’s architectural appearance, stability or its 
structural integrity or damage other owners.124 
  Second, under the UCIOA a unit owner is not allowed to change the appearance of 
the common elements, or a unit’s exterior appearance or any other part of the 
condominium without permission of the association.125 The STA requires that a 
sectional owner must not act in such a way as to interfere unreasonably with the use 
and enjoyment by other owners or other people lawfully on the premises.126 It would 
be unacceptable for a sectional owner unilaterally to effect alterations to the exterior 
of his or her unit without the trustees’ permission.127 The Management Rules also 
prohibit an owner from doing anything to his/her section or exclusive use area which 
is likely to mar the harmonious appearance of the building. 128  One Chinese 
departmental rule requires a unit owner to gain approval from the local planning 
authority and obtain the unanimous approval of all of the owners to change the 
                                                        
122 UCIOA § 2-111 (1). 
123 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (iii). 
124 Art 53 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007); art 29 of the 
Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004. It is inappropriate to ask the unit owners to notify 
the managing agent instead of the management body.   
125 UCIOA § 2-111 (2). 
126 STA s 44 (1) (d). 
127 Van der Merwe & Butler Sectional Titles, Share Blocks, and Time-sharing 150-151. 
128 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (iv). 
 135
exterior structure or the appearance of a building’s common property.129 However, the 
Chinese law does not require a unit owner to obtain permission from the management 
body to change a unit’s exterior appearance or the exclusive use areas. This would 
seem to be an obvious setback. To remedy this, a future Chinese condominium statute 
should prohibit a unit owner from changing the appearance of the common property, 
the exterior structure, a unit’s appearance, or the exclusive use areas without 
permission of the management body. 
 Third, subject to a declaration provision, the UCIOA permits an owner of two 
adjoining units to remove, or alter the partition between the two or create apertures, 
even if the partition is a common element, if doing so the owner does not adversely 
affect the building’s structural integrity or mechanical systems.130 This provision 
deals in a unique manner to create access between adjoining units owned by the same 
person.131 Nevertheless, while the two adjoining units may be used as one, they 
legally do not become a single unit. 132  This is important when considering 
participation quota issues.133 The subsection provides a specific rule permitting a 
door, stairwell, or removal of a partition wall between units as long as structural 
integrity is not impaired.134 Removal of partitions or creation of apertures is not an 
alteration of boundaries, but would be an exception to the basic rule.135  
In South Africa, the removal of an intervening partition between two units is 
subject to a consolidation provision that comes into play when two or more sections 
are registered in an owner’s name.136 According to the STA, the owner asks the land 
                                                        
129 Art 8 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989.  
130 UCIOA § 2-111 (3). 
131 UCIOA § 2-111 comment 2. 
132 UCIOA § 2-111 comment 4. See Garfinkel “The Uniform Condominium Act” 1982 (28) The 
Practical Lawyer 51-52. 
133 Rosenberry & Sproul “A Comparison of California Common Interest Development Law and the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act” 1998 (38) Santa Clara L Rev 1047. 
134 UCIOA § 2-111 (3) and comment 2. 
135 UCIOA § 2-111 comment 4. 
136 See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-12. 
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surveyor or architect involved to submit a draft sectional plan of consolidation that 
has the consent of the trustees of the body corporate to the Surveyor-General for 
approval.137 In addition, a schedule needs to accompany the draft sectional plan. This 
should state the participation quota of the new section created, being the aggregate of 
the quotas of the sections that are to be consolidated.138 In contrast, the UCIOA is 
silent on the consolidation of units.139 
When Chinese legislators are ready to deal with a condominium statute they should 
adopt the UCIOA approach on removing a partition between two adjoining units 
owned by one person. The UCIOA allows a partition to be removed but it does not by 
statute consolidate the two properties into one. This is sensible because it takes into 
account the participation quota allocating the owner’s contributions. When the 
participation quota is calculated solely on the floor area basis, combining two separate 
quotas for a new consolidated unit is feasible. But when the participation quota is 
calculated employing other formulas, such as par value or market value, working out 
the quota of the new consolidated unit cannot simply be decided as the aggregate of 
two separate unit quotas. In other words, the par value or market value of the new unit 
created is not necessarily the same as the aggregate value of two adjoining ones. The 
downside of following the STA on consolidation with a participation quota for the 
new unit being merely the aggregate quotas of the two adjoining units is that it is 
much too problematic. This is particularly true with commercial and business 
condominiums. The UCIOA approach is easy to work out and with the retention of the 
participation quota certainly will have few problems. Any proposed Chinese statute 
should adopt this approach. 
                                                        
137 STA s 21 (1). 
138 STA s 21 (2) (c). 
139 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 88. 
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5 2 2 7 Evaluation 
In view of the numerous restrictions imposed on the owners of condominium units, 
one may question whether apartment ownership is a genuine ownership of property. 
This question is answered with reference to the characteristic features of apartment 
ownership, namely that the units are not structurally separated but rather structurally 
interdependent.140 Basic to condominium living is that individuals must not be 
permitted to disrupt the integrity of the overall condominium development with the 
unbridled use of their own property. Restricting the use and enjoyment of every 
individual unit effectively protects all of the owners’ common interests. In other 
words, the restrictions are justified because every unit owner benefits in the long run, 
both financially by increasing the condominium’s market value and by preserving a 
stable and orderly community.141 Therefore, condominium ownership still remains a 
genuine ownership despite a number of restrictions.142 This perception is widely held 
in China.143 
Second, the comparative survey of the use restrictions on individual units under the 
UCIOA and the STA indicates that there is a hierarchy among condominium 
documents. Use restrictions emanate from several sources: the general principle, the 
declaration or sectional plan, by-laws of the association or the rules of the sectional 
titles scheme. In America, the Restatement of Property declares all servitudes are 
                                                        
140 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 78. 
141 Some legal academics argue that condominium communities are intrinsically coercive in nature. 
The owners are deprived of a choice because of the dearth of desirable housing alternatives in a tight 
market. See Note “The Rule of Law in Residential Associations” 1985 (99) Harv L Rev 481-482; 
Alexander “Freedom, Coercion and the Law of Servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell L Rev 900-902; However, 
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142 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-15, 8-16 & 8-17. 
143 See art 70 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007; Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium 
Ownership 91; Jin Jian Housing Law of China 138; Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property 
Entitlement & Property Management 31; Hu Zhigang New Discourse on Real Property 236. Xia 
Shansheng Property Management Law 89-90. 
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valid unless they contravene constitutional or statutory rights or violate public 
policy.144 Apart from the general law, the dominant condominium document is the 
declaration. The declaration usually over-rides any conflicting provision in the 
condominium by-laws unless it is inconsistent with the UCIOA.145 In South Africa, 
neither a management rule nor a conduct rule may contradict any provision of the 
STA.146 Moreover, developers are entitled to substitute, add to, amend or repeal any 
model management or conduct rule. However, when a developer establishes a new 
rule, it cannot be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.147 Quite simply, the Act 
is predominant and its provisions prevail over any conflicting provision in either the 
management or conduct rules. Particularly important is that conduct rules are always 
subordinate to management rules.148 Therefore, statutory restrictions predominate 
over restrictions set by the declaration or sectional plan, which in turn predominate 
over any conflicting provision in the condominium’s by-laws and rules. This hierarchy 
is of importance in resolving conflicts among the different documents.149 Therefore, 
when a Chinese condominium statute is drafted it would be worthwhile for the legal 
theoreticians to borrow this hierarchy.  
Third, in the United States, the courts have made a distinction between restrictions 
in the recorded declaration and owners’ association rules. The courts favor restrictions 
contained in a recorded declaration over those that a condominium association has 
established with its members’ vote.150 Recorded rules and covenants are presumed to 
be valid and may have a certain degree of unreasonableness and still be able to 
withstand a court attack. That is unless the rule is shown to be clearly ambiguous, 
                                                        
144 See the American Law Institute United States Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.1 
(1990). 
145 UCIOA § 2-103 (c). 
146 Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 59. 
147 STA s 35 (1). 
148 STA s 35 (2) (b). 
149 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 7-10 & 7-11. 
150 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-12. 
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arbitrary or unreasonable in its application, impinges on public policy or abrogates a 
fundamental constitutional right.151 Therefore, it is worthwhile to state the more 
onerous restrictions in the declaration, presuming of course that they are valid. In 
South Africa, the difference between restrictive conditions and covenants endorsed on 
the sectional plan and rules of the scheme is less significant, or at least not as 
significant as in the United States. The main reason is that the rules of the scheme are 
lodged together with the sectional plan, both of which are read by the prospective 
purchasers in advance.152 Thus prospective buyers have disclosure of rules of the 
scheme just as they do with the restrictive conditions expressed in the sectional plan. 
China would be well advised to follow the South African approach and register the 
condominium model rules together with a constitutive document. At present China 
has no such constitutive document as a declaration or sectional plan. With the real 
estate market is falling, the country is in urgent need of a registration document and 
model rules, particularly when there are sure to be high-level discussions on framing a 
uniform condominium statute. When registering the constitutive document and the 
rules, the prospective buyers will clearly know their rights and obligations in a 
condominium community situation. Since rules lie at the very heart of an efficient 
condominium project from its establishment onwards, they need to be unambiguous 
and detailed enough for unit buyers to avoid uncertainty and disputes at a later stage.  
The UCIOA approach is largely association-oriented since it regards the adoption 
and the amendment of by-laws as integral to the internal governance of the unit 
owners’ association. The by-laws do not have to be recorded. Consequently, the unit 
owners’ association, described as a residential private government, has full and some 
might say almost unlimited jurisdiction to deal with condominium community 
                                                        
151  Kress “Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner 
Association” 1995 (42) UCLA L Rev 861; See also Schmidt v Sherrill 442 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla Dist Ct 
App 1983) (describes a declaration of a condominium as “the condominium’s constitution”). 
152 See n 51 supra. 
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matters.153 An advantage is that a unit owners’ association is able to make by-laws 
tailored to a development’s special character.154 However, a disadvantage of this 
approach is that legal challenges to the by-laws are often made and cause unnecessary 
and expensive lawsuits. There are such challenges against parking restrictions,155 
pets,156 and the minimum age of occupants.157 Sometime the by-laws of a unit 
owners’ association are challenged on the ground that they are inconsistent with other 
Acts or statutory provisions, notably the Fair Housing Act.158 The 1994 UCIOA 
amendment heeded this concern and attempted to minimize unnecessary lawsuits 
brought to contest the validity of the by-laws. The amendment states that use and 
leasing restrictions should be exclusively written into the recorded declaration.159 
These two types of restrictions are now upheld by the courts. For these reasons a 
proposed Chinese condominium statute should have a provision to register the rules. 
Careful advance planning can ward off costly litigation and needless worries for 
condominium owners at a later stage.160  
Fourth, the UCIOA and the STA have very different approaches for regulating 
restrictions. Under the UCIOA, restrictions are largely described in the declaration 
since there is the presumption that they are valid and enforceable. The unit owners’ 
                                                        
153 Note “The Rule of Law in Residential Associations” 1985 (99) Harv L Rev 472.  
154 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-15. 
155 For example, Bernardo Villas Management Corp Number Two v Black 190 Cal App 3d 153, 235 
Cal Rptr 509 (1987); Barclay Square Condominium Owner’ Association v Grenier 153 NH 514, 899 A 
2d 991 (2006). 
156 For example, Nahrstedt v Lakeside Village Condominium Association 8 Cal 4th 361, 33 Cal Rptr 
2d 63 878 P 2d 1275 (1994); Sulaney Towers Maintenance Corp v O’ Brey 46 Md App 464, 418 A 2d 
1233 (1980). 
157 For example, Hill v Fontaine Condominium Association Inc 255 Ga 24, 334 S E 2 d 690 (1985); 
Shadow Lake Village Condominium Association Inc v Zampella 238 NJ Super 132 569 A 2d 288 
(1990). 
158 Napolitano “The Fair Housing Act Amendments and Age Restrictive Covenants in Condominiums 
and Cooperatives”1999 (73) St John’s L Rev 290-293. 
159 UCIOA § 2-105 comment 10. 
160 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-11. 
 141
association stipulates other restrictions with by-laws. However, association by-laws 
and rules must be within the association’s authority and reasonably promote unit 
owners’ “health, happiness and peace of mind”.161 In contrast, the STA has more 
detailed restrictions that are found in the model rules rather than in the sectional plan 
that corresponds to the UCIOA’s declaration. The UCIOA does not have a model set 
of rules but requires that by-laws deal with certain issues not included in the 
declaration.162 In South Africa, the model rules in the Sectional Titles Regulations are 
considered to be of major importance. Not only must the model rules be lodged at the 
deeds office but also all the subsequent amendments have to be so lodged in order to 
be enforceable.163 Specifically, the management rules under Annexure 8 can only be 
amended by a unanimous resolution while the conduct rules under Annexure 9 require 
only a special resolution to be amended.164 
A Chinese condominium statute needs to have model rules with more detail. First, 
the vast majority of Chinese apartment owners are not very knowledgeable about the 
internal governance of a condominium. In addition, the management body is not 
usually very well experienced or capable in making rules. With model rules, 
apartment owners are provided a safety net that enables them to become acquainted 
with their rights and obligations. Furthermore, most Chinese condominium projects 
are conversions from former public housing and therefore are structurally 
homogenous.165 The uniform guidelines provided by the model rules simplify the 
rulemaking process. Moreover, the model rules statutorily present the rights and 
obligations of apartment owners. Since most condominium developments in China are 
                                                        
161  Kress “Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner 
Association” 862; Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-21. 
162 UCIOA § 3-106 (b). 
163 STA s 35 (5) (a) & (c). It is notable that prior to the Sectional Titles Amendment Act of 1997, it was 
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Ltd v Controlling Body, Kennaway Court 1988 2 SA 479 (E).    
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multi-building projects, the time between the settlement of the first owner and the 
convening of the first general meeting can be quite long.166 Consequently, the 
developer prepares provisional rules for the project167 and subsequently, the first 
general meeting establishes the project’s formal rules. 168  The certainty and 
predictability of model rules streamline this process and diminish developers’ possible 
abuse of their rulemaking power. Finally, the setting of model rules is in tune with the 
legislative philosophy and practice in China. In 2004, the Ministry of Construction 
issued the Provisional Model Rules of the Unit Owners to provide guidance for 
developers nationwide.169 Although such model provisional rules have no legal 
binding force,170 it shows that a set of model rules would fit into the Chinese 
legislative environment and is likely to be accepted by the public. 
However, the model rules’ approach is not without shortcomings. It can be argued 
that no uniform set of rules fits all projects. Rules should be tailored to the special 
features of each project: an exclusive residential project, a non-residential one or a 
mixed-use one all differ, condominium size and location differ, and their use for 
special classes of people differs.171 Nonetheless, this concern about a uniform set of 
rules is substantially alleviated if developers have the freedom to substitute, add to, 
and amend a set of model rules early on and then later a general meeting of the 
condominium association can amend the model rules by unanimous or special 
resolutions.  
                                                        
166 In order to better protect apartment owners’ interests, some Chinese local norms set a timetable for 
the first general meeting. For instance, the Shanghai local rule stipulates that the first general meeting 
must be convened either when half of the floor areas of a project’s units are sold and settled by the unit 
owners or two years after the first owner moves in. See art 7 of the Shanghai Property Management 
Regulation of 2004. 
167 Art 22 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007).   
168 Art 76 (1) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
169 The Provisional Model Rules of the Unit Owners issued by the Ministry of Construction on 6 
September 2004. 
170 The supplementary explanation of the Provisional Model Rules of the Unit Owners of 2004. 
171 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-34.  
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Two additional suggestions could help to individualize the rules so as to take into 
consideration the special characteristics of particular developments. First, the 
amendment registration process needs to be simplified. Since the model rules are 
registered at the deeds registry, it is only logical to require the registration of the 
amendments to the model rules. But the registration of the amendments needs to be 
made easier. For example, a form could be provided to every condominium 
management body detailing the entire registration process. The management body 
should know that the registry officers are not required to examine any of the 
amendments but only need to record them. Second, the use and enjoyment of 
individual units can be regulated in greater detail in the house rules. Very simply, the 
creation of house rules and their amendments do not need to be registered or 
recorded.172 House rules are entirely at the discretion of the management body. 
Detailed restrictions and trivial matters should be left to the house rules. Therefore, 
the management body can tailor its special needs in the house rules. In summary, it is 
quite clear that China needs to adopt a model rules approach. 
  Fifth, both the UCIOA and the STA provide that all restrictions must be 
reasonable.173 Surprisingly, the UCIOA does not have a set of standards that can be 
used as a benchmark to review the reasonableness of restrictions.174 The UCIOA does 
give a unit owners’ association the power to adopt and amend by-laws and rules.175 
However, this power to adopt and amend by-laws and rules is not qualified,176 so this 
is left to other areas of law, including the general law of servitudes.177 However, this 
is not a problem for the bulk of American case law develops a “reasonableness” 
                                                        
172 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-31. 
173 STA s 35 (3); UCIOA § 3-102 (d). 
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175 See general UCIOA § 3-102. 
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standard that courts use to review the rulemaking efforts of a unit owners’ 
association.178 This means that if a restriction is reasonable as opposed to arbitrary or 
capricious, it will stand, otherwise it will be invalidated.179 In South Africa, it has 
been argued that some of the wording in the rules of schemes such as “reputation of 
the building” and “harmonious appearance of the building” are somewhat vague and 
not easy to define.180 As a result, this gives the body corporate the discretion to 
interpret the rules as strictly as they were intended to be.181 The keyword here is 
“reasonable”. This is a “most ubiquitous” term182 and tends to be interpreted with a 
wide discretion. Under the STA, the court is obliged to interpret model rules in a way 
that “promotes the spirit, purpose, and object of the Bill of Rights”.183 When applying 
this abstract concept, the courts need to balance the individual rights enshrined in the 
constitution with the collective interest of the condominium community. In China, the 
conflict between private autonomy and the condominium community’s public values 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which use a reasonableness test to determine 
whether restrictions are justified or not. 
5 3 COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS  
5 3 1 Rights Regarding the Common Property  
The UCIOA and the STA as well as the Chinese Property Code stipulate that 
condominium owners own the common property in undivided shares. 184  The 
undivided shares in common property are in accordance with their participation quota. 
                                                        
178 See more detail at Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 44-84.25. 
179 Hidden Harbour Estates Inc v Norman 309 So.2d 180 (Fla. 4th DCA1975). 
180 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-13. 
181 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 13-31. 
182 Ellickson “Cities and Homeowners Association” 1982 (130) U Pa L Rev 1530. 
183 STA s 39 (2). 
184 UCIOA § 1-103 (4); STA s 2(c); art 70 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
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However, it would be unrealistic and would contravene the fundamental feature of 
apartment ownership to divide the use and enjoyment of the land and other common 
property according to the quotas.185 Each owner is thus entitled to substantially the 
same rights of use and enjoyment of the common property, irrespective of a unit’s size 
or its value. A higher participation quota of a unit does not confer the owner greater 
rights of use and enjoyment.186 There is an important general principle which has 
been adopted in the UCIOA, the STA and the Chinese Property Code. That is, an 
owner may freely use and enjoy the common property as long as his or her use and 
enjoyment do not unreasonably interfere with the concurrent rights of other owners 
and occupiers. A unit owner may use exclusively a part of the common property as a 
limited common property. But this power is hedged by restrictions, thus ensuring that 
all the other owners agree. These restrictions reflect the fundamental purpose of the 
condominium concept, namely to enhance congeniality among unit owners.187 Thus, 
an owner needs to tolerate other owners’ conduct that is deemed permissible on the 
common property.  
  UCIOA rules and guidelines have their origin in the United States Federal Housing 
Administration Model Statute. This 1962 legislation allowed each apartment owner in 
a condominium complex to use the condominium common areas and facilities as long 
as the owner did not hinder or encroach upon the lawful rights of the other apartment 
owners.188 The STA rule is virtually the same: an owner can use and enjoy the 
common property but the person cannot unreasonably interfere with its use by other 
owners or others lawfully on the premises.189 A Chinese departmental rule varies 
little from the above two for it stipulates that an owner can use the common property 
but on the condition that the person does not encroach on the lawful rights of other 
                                                        
185 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 78. 
186 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-17. 
187 Poliakoff Law of Condominium Operations § 15.19. 
188 § 6 (d) of the Federal Housing Administration Model Statute of 1962. 
189 STA s 44 (1) (d). 
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owners.190 The Chinese Property Code goes a bit further stating that an apartment 
owner cannot abandon a share in the common property to exonerate him/her from 
fulfilling common property obligations.191  
5 3 2 Common Property Obligations   
5 3 2 1 General Principles 
In South Africa, the abuse of rights doctrine and neighbor law principles play an 
important role in determining an owner’s power to use and enjoy a condominium’s 
common property. The general principles of neighbor law are, first, an owner is not 
allowed to prevent other owners and other lawful occupiers from using the common 
property. 192  For example, a ground floor unit owner cannot block a stairway 
preventing upper floor unit residents from using it.193 Second, an owner may not take 
over a part of the common property permanently for personal use.194 However, under 
the UCIOA, the unit owners under certain circumstances have the right to alter their 
units by appropriating portions of the common area.195 This provision would not be 
suitable for inclusion in a future Chinese condominium statute for this could 
potentially devalue a development through piecemeal appropriation of the common 
area. It would be more preferable for Chinese owners to use the exclusive use area 
approach instead when altering their units. Third, an owner cannot use the common 
property in such a way that other owners’ lawful interests are infringed upon.196 For 
example, a unit owner cannot change the interior layout of his or her apartment by 
tearing out one or more bearing walls. Since a bearing wall supports the entire 
                                                        
190 Art 6 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989. 
191 Art 72 (1) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
192 Gray & Gray Land Law 441-442; Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 79. 
193 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 281-283. 
194 See art 6 of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989.  
195 UCIOA § 2-112. 
196 Art 6 (2) of the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989. 
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building, it is a part of the common property. Fourth, no owner can use common 
property for an abnormal purpose or in an unusual way.197 Quite simply, use of the 
common property needs to conform to its intended purpose.198 For example, using the 
yard for soccer matches or the stairway as a slide for children would constitute an 
abnormal use of the common property.  
A pertinent issue is whether the installation of a radio or television antenna on a 
building’s roof amounts to a reasonable use of the common property. This is important 
for wireless TV that requires an antenna or satellite dish. In the United States, some 
local governments and unit owners’ associations have either prohibited satellite dishes 
or approved them with very strict limitations.199  Their justification is that the 
installation of a satellite dish breaches the harmonious appearance of a building. This 
was an issue that soon involved the American federal government’s Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). The Commission was concerned that 
condominium associations’ restrictions and local rules prevented unit owners from 
watching a variety of television programs. Therefore the FCC issued a rule to 
eliminate excessive restrictions on antenna use and placement.200 However, the rule 
was neither well-received by many local governments nor by many condominium 
associations and so there are still disputes about these restrictions.201 In South Africa, 
the STA does not specifically refer to the satellite television issue. However, it is 
implicitly addressed by the management rule referring to common property 
improvement.202 One idea that has been discussed is for the body corporate to install 
a central satellite receiver to avoid having the building look like a satellite station. But 
this solution creates another problem for some unit owners have no interest in the 
                                                        
197 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-18; Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 90-91  
198 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 97. 
199 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 46-22. 
200 The Federal Communications Commission Over-the-air Reception Devices Rule 47 § 1.4000 
(1996), quoted from Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 46-21. 
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installation of a satellite antenna and do not want to contribute funds for its cost. 
Although in China satellite TV is not as popular as in the United States and South 
Africa, it would be sensible for the Chinese lawmakers to deal with this issue. Perhaps 
legislation could be brought forward to regulate a central satellite receiver for the 
whole complex so that it would be set up either on the building’s roof or on other 
common property the management body might designate. The installation cost of a 
central satellite receiver is borne by the satellite TV service provider. The service 
provider should demarcate a “delineation point” at the central satellite receiver. From 
this point to an apartment, the cable or wire could be categorized as a “home run 
cable” denoting that the management body is responsible for the cable’s maintenance 
and repair. When a cable enters an apartment it could be categorized as a “home 
cable”, denoting that the apartment owner is responsible for its maintenance and repair. 
This regulatory mechanism has several advantages. First, owners who do not want to 
use satellite TV do not need to pay for its installation. Only those using the service 
would pay a monthly utility charge. Second, responsibility for maintenance and repair 
would be made jointly by the apartment owner, the management body and the service 
provider. Third, this kind of system is designed to promote competition between 
service providers and enhance the unit owners’ taste. The service provider is 
responsible for installing a central satellite receiver. Although the Chinese satellite TV 
service market is in an early growth stage, it still needs to be regulated.  
5 3 2 2 Statutory Provisions 
Unit owners’ first statutory obligation is to contribute to the condominium 
association’s expenses. An apartment owner is obliged to contribute funds for the 
management and maintenance of the common property.203 In addition, the UCIOA 
expressly states that an apartment owner may not change the appearance of common 
                                                        
203 UCIOA § 3-102 (2); STA s 37 (1). 
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elements or the building’s exterior without the permission of the management body.204 
This statutory provision is the foundation of neighbor law. In South Africa, the STA 
extensively regulates the owners’ occupation and use of common property. Apart from 
the foregoing obligations, it also deals with the sale and lease of common property,205 
extension of the condominium complex and its units,206 and the establishment of 
exclusive use areas.207 In China, it could be argued that unit owners should respect 
the use for which the common property is designed and intended.208 For example, one 
should not dry laundry in a parking space or throw rubbish down a stairwell. When 
the Property Code was being drawn up, one of the drafts provided that without a 
management body’s resolution, the structure, color, use of the building’s exterior walls, 
roof garden, and air-raid shelter cannot be changed.209 Unfortunately, this provision 
does not appear in the finished Property Code.  
5 3 2 3 Declaration and By-law Provisions  
In step with its policy on unit restrictions, the UCIOA does not provide detailed 
restrictions on common property use. It only states that a declaration and by-laws 
have to contain provisions as to how the common property is to be used.210 The 
UCIOA purpose for this is to provide flexibility to meet individual state regulations 
and the particularities of each unit owners’ association. American states that then 
adopt the UCIOA are able to flesh out the details on restrictions for common property 
use. Under the STA, apart from the restrictions based on the general principles of 
neighbor law, an apartment owner’s use of common property is further restricted by 
                                                        
204 UCIOA § 2-111 (2). 
205 STA s 17. 
206 STA s 24 (3) and s 26 (1). 
207 STA s 27 and s 27 A. 
208 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 144. 
209 Art 94 of the Chinese draft property code by Liang Huixing’s group. See Liang Huixing The 
Chinese Property Code Draft 282. (Chinese version) 
210 UCIOA § 2-105 (b) and § 3-106 (b). 
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servitudes, other real rights and restrictive conditions registered in the sectional 
plan.211 An example here is the pipe servitude for an electric cable that benefits one 
owner but runs through the common wall of the scheme. More importantly and of 
greater significance, an owner’s right of use and enjoyment of common property is 
spelled out extensively in the condominium’s rules. Annexures 8 and 9 contain the 
following regulations: 
 
(1) An owner shall not use any part of the common property, or permit it to be used, in a 
manner or for a purpose to injure the reputation of the building.212 
(2) An owner shall not contravene, or permit the contravention, of any law, by-law, 
ordinance, proclamation or statutory regulation, or the conditions of any license, relating 
to or affecting the occupation of the common property.213 
(3) An owner or occupier shall not, without the consent in writing of the trustees, keep any 
animal, reptile or bird on the common property.214 
(4) An owner or occupier shall maintain a receptacle for refuse in a hygienic and dry 
condition on such part of the common property authorized by the trustees in writing.215 
(5) No owner or occupier shall park or stand any vehicle upon the common property, or 
permit or allow any vehicle to be parked or stood upon the common property without the 
consent of the trustees in writing.216 
(6) An owner or occupier shall not mark, paint, drive nails or screws or the like into, or 
otherwise damage, or alter any part of the common property without first obtaining the 
written consent of the trustees.217 
(7) An owner shall not install any locking device, safety gate, burglar bars or other safety 
                                                        
211 STA s 11 (3) (b).  
212 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (i). 
213 Annexure 8 r 68 (1) (ii). 
214 Annexure 9 r 1 (1). 
215 Annexure 9 r 2 (1) (a). 
216 Annexure 9 r 3 (1). 
217 Annexure 9 r 4 (1). 
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device for the protection of his section; or any screen or other device to prevent the entry 
of animals or insects without the trustees having first approved in writing.218 
(8) An owner shall not place or do anything on any part of the common property, including 
balconies, patios, steps, and gardens which, in the discretion of the trustees, is 
aesthetically displeasing or undesirable when viewed from the outside of the section.219 
(9) An owner shall not place any sign, notice, billboard or advertisement of any kind 
whatsoever on any part of the common property, without the written consent of the 
trustees first having being obtained.220 
(10) An owner or occupier shall not deposit, throw any rubbish, including dirt, cigarette butts, 
food scraps or any other litter whatsoever on the common property.221 
(11) An owner or occupier shall not, without the consent in writing of the trustees, erect his 
own washing lines, nor hang any washing or laundry or any other items on any part of the 
building or the common property so as to be visible from outside the buildings or from 
any other sections.222 
(12) An owner or occupier shall not store any material, nor do any other dangerous act on the 
common property which will or may increase the rate of the premium payable by the 
body corporate on any insurance policy.223 
 
Shown above is the STA’s model set of rules with a very specific list of owner’s rights 
and obligations on the use and enjoyment of the common property. All of the 
obligations in the South African model rules are useful and could be adopted in a 
Chinese condominium statute. Particularly important for any future Chinese statute is 
the last obligation in the South African model rules enumerated above. It should lay 
                                                        
218 Annexure 9 r 4 (2). 
219 Annexure 9 r 5. 
220 Annexure 9 r 6. 
221 Annexure 9 r 7. 
222 Annexure 9 r 8. 
223 Annexure 9 r 9. 
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out and emphasize that those flammable chemicals, liquids, gases and other hazardous 
materials should not be stored on the common property without the permission of the 
management body or its executive council. Moreover, a Chinese statute needs to 
emphasize that a condominium owner must ensure that his or her family, co-owners, 
tenants, and visitors comply with the common property rules and do not disturb other 
residents in the development. Furthermore, in China, a uniform rule is not practical 
that prevents an owner from installing a locking device, burglar bars or other devices 
to protect the apartment. For the condominium community that has hired a guard 
service such a rule should certainly apply. However, for small self-managed 
condominiums restricting anti-burglar devices is inappropriate since unit owners have 
to take responsibility for their own safety.    
  There is yet another issue that has the potential to be contentious with owners and 
tenants’ use of common property. It is the use of the exterior wall when installing an 
outlet of an air conditioner. In theory, the exterior wall is a part of the common 
property, so an individual unit owner cannot drill a hole to install an outlet for an air 
conditioner. However, this is not a rigid rule or otherwise it would prevent people 
from using an air conditioner during a hot summer. This issue is particularly 
significant in south China where an air conditioner is indispensable. A sensible 
solution is needed: one that would have a condominium association making a house 
rule designating an outlet location for an air conditioner so that the noise does not 
interfere with neighboring owners. Moreover, it should harmonize with the exterior 
appearance of the buildings.  
5 3 2 4 Alienation and Lease of Common Property  
Allowing the transaction or lease of a portion of the common property provides a 
condominium project with financial flexibility. Condominium owners may want to 
sell or lease a portion of the unused or seldom used common property to subsidize the 
cost of a condominium project’s repairs and maintenance. Moreover, in growing 
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urban areas there is an increasing scarcity of land, so the alienation and/or leasing of a 
portion of the condominium’s common property may help to make better use of the 
land and ever so briefly slow the eating away of urban open space.  
The UCIOA permits the management body to sell or transfer portions of the 
common property with the approval of 80 per cent of the non-declarant unit 
owners.224 Some years after a condominium community comes into being, the unit 
owners may decide to rid themselves of a portion of a barely used open space which 
has been reserved as a common area.225 Apart from the 80 per cent majority 
requirement, the owners to whom limited common elements are allocated must 
approve or then convey the agreed upon limited common area.226  
Under the STA section 17, sectional owners may, by unanimous resolution, direct 
the body corporate on their behalf to sell or let by notarial lease any part of the 
common property.227 But the STA also provides a unanimous resolution loophole. 
The common property can be sold or leased if at least 80% of the members are 
reckoned in number and value present or represented by proxy at a general meeting 
and agree to do so.228 But even here there are still restrictions. Section 18 of the STA 
triggers sections 56 and 57 of the Deeds Registries Act to apply if there is the transfer 
of any mortgaged common property.229 What this means is that if the property is 
mortgaged, the common property cannot be transferred unless the bondholder cancels 
or discharges the debt obligation230 or if the bondholder agrees to allow the buyer to 
assume the bond debt obligation.231  
                                                        
224 UCIOA § 3-112 (a). 
225 UCIOA § 3-112 comment 1. 
226 See n 225 supra.  
227 STA s 17 (1) reads with s 25. See also Body Corporate of Brenton Park Building No 44/1987 v 
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230 The Deed Registries Act 47 of 1937 s 56. 
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 154
The STA distinguishes three different common property transactions. They are: 1) 
selling or leasing a portion of the common property which contains no sections, 2) 
selling a portion of the common property which contains a section or part of a section, 
and 3) selling all of the common property land.232 In all three cases the procedures for 
transferring the registration are technically different.233  
Chinese law, including the new Property Code, does not contain express provisions 
on the selling or leasing of common property. But Chinese law permits the 
management body to “make commercial use of parts of the common property with the 
consent of the relevant condominium owners.” Then the “proceeds of the commercial 
use are used as a maintenance fund for all the owners.”234 This implies that the 
management body can at least lease parts of a condominium’s common property to 
subsidize the maintenance and repair costs of the common property.235 Since the 
apartment owners are the joint owners of the common property, it is appropriate for 
the management body to transfer or lease the common property. In China it is 
common for unit owners to lease a billboard on a condominium building’s roof for 
commercial advertisement as well as small retail stores on the ground floor. This 
provides a steady income for maintenance and repair purposes. But Chinese law does 
not address whether condominium owners can either unanimously or by special 
resolution authorize a management body to sell or lease common property. This is an 
issue that needs to be addressed in future condominium legislation.  
5 3 2 5 Alterations and Improvements of Common Property 
The UCIOA leaves the question of making alterations on the common property to the 
                                                        
232 STA s 17 (4). 
233 STA s 17 (4 A) & (4 B). 
234 Art 55 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007); read with art 7 of 
the Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989. 
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association by-laws or to property owners making their own ad hoc decisions.236 The 
unit owners’ association has power to raise money for common property 
improvements. It needs to be noted that the UCIOA allows a declarant to make 
improvements at a later stage as long as a general description of all improvements is 
made within the reserved development right.237 However, these improvements need 
to be compatible with the architectural style and quality of construction presented in 
the public offering statement.238 The UCIOA also allows unit owners to alter their 
units, but it has to be in such a way that it will fit in with the condominium’s common 
elements and there cannot be any prohibition against doing so.239 To trigger the 
appropriation of common elements, a unit owner must apply to the association for an 
amendment to the declaration. The amendment must be approved by at least 67% of 
the non-declarant voters in an association election.240 
  In South Africa, an owner is not allowed to make alterations likely to impair the 
stability of a building or the use and enjoyment of the common property.241 However, 
neither the 1971 nor the 1986 Sectional Titles Act discusses improvements to the 
common property.242 Rather, the issue is dealt with in the model rules of the scheme. 
Under the model conduct rules, the minor alteration of the common property can be 
effected with the written consent of the trustees.243 However, neither the STA nor the 
model rules have explicit provisions on making major alterations to common property. 
Therefore it is clear that for major common property alterations, the trustees’ consent 
is insufficient and more stringent requirements are needed.  
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The model management rules make a distinction between luxurious and 
non-luxurious improvements. 244  Luxurious improvements are made with the 
unanimous resolution of the body corporate.245 Non-luxurious improvements are 
made by the trustees giving written notice to all the owners on an improvement’s 
desirability, its cost, how it is to be financed, and the effect it would have on monthly 
contributions.246 However, the model rules do not provide a straightforward guideline 
as to what constitutes a luxurious improvement.247 But its definition is important 
since there are two very different requirements and procedures for luxurious 
improvements and non-luxurious improvements. One is simple and the other is more 
demanding.248  
In order to better understand this issue, the position of dissenting minorities in the 
context of a common property improvement plan needs to be discussed. It is not 
uncommon to have a minority of unit owners’ dissent on improving the common 
property. Particularly in a large condominium development, disagreement arises over 
almost any improvement plan with the owners split over cost, architectural style and 
emotional attachment or distaste for the existing form.249 This problem is common in 
China since many Chinese condominium complexes are large and have many unit 
owners. The more unit owners, the more likely a disagreement will arise. One way to 
make improvements is to obtain unanimous consent of all unit owners to make 
improvements.250 An owner, who has not consented to an improvement plan, is 
neither entitled to any of the benefits flowing from the improvement nor has to 
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contribute to the improvement expenses. 251  This method has its limitations. 
Oftentimes it is impossible to determine whether an improvement’s opponents are 
enjoying the improvement while not paying for it. For example, the market value of 
each unit may be significantly increased if the whole condominium complex is 
substantially improved.  
Other statutes allow improvements by a majority vote and protect minority interests 
by compelling the management body to purchase the dissenting owner’s unit at 
market value.252 This method also has a downside. On the one hand, dissenting 
minority owners are in effect forced to sell their units simply because they do not 
agree with a common property improvement plan. On the other hand, a financial 
burden is imposed on the management body to purchase the dissenters’ units. This 
method would not be suitable for a Chinese condominium statute. The most practical 
solution to this problem is found in the Massachusetts Condominium Act. Under this 
Act, if more than half but less than 75% of the condominium owners consent to a 
proposed improvement, only owners who consent are responsible for improvement 
costs.253 If more than 75% of the condominium owners agree, all of the owners share 
the cost.254 In addition, this Act provides that if the improvement cost exceeds 10% of 
the condominium’s value, it is considered to constitute an extraordinary expenditure. 
As a consequence, the unit owners’ association can be compelled by a court order to 
purchase any dissenting owners’ units at fair market value.255 This arrangement 
balances an owners’ natural desire to increase his or her condominium unit’s value 
with protecting the interests of a dissenting minority. The Act also makes a distinction 
between simple majority consent and the consent of a substantial majority.  
  The above arrangement provides a useful reference for a future Chinese statute. 
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However, a future Chinese statute should state clearly that a resolution on common 
property improvement be passed by all of the condominium’s owners rather than just 
those present at an association meeting. This protects any dissenting owners who are 
not present at the meeting. In addition, it was noted above that if improvement costs 
exceeded 10% of a condominium’s value, it was deemed an extraordinary expenditure. 
For Chinese condominium owners this would be much too high. They would be much 
more comfortable with a figure of 5% of the unit’s market value. Furthermore, since 
most Chinese condominium complexes are multi-building projects, stipulating that the 
management body would have to purchase up to 25% of the dissenting owners’ units 
would be a financial disaster. The reason is that a heavy financial burden is shifted to 
the shoulders of the consenting owners who have to buy out the units of the dissenting 
owners. Perhaps for China a more palatable formula would be when between 71% and 
89% of all of the owners agree, the improvement costs are borne by only those in 
favor. If 90% or more of all owners approve to make an improvement, then all owners 
need to bear the cost according to the participation quota allocated to each unit. The 
formula would only apply if the improvement expenditures worked out to be more 
than 5% of a unit’s market value for individual owners. If the cost should be less than 
5%, and 70% of all of the owners’ approved of the plan then every owner would be 
required to contribute. Finally, when more than 90% of all of the owners agree to an 
improvement plan, everyone would be required to share in the plan’s cost. By 
employing such a formula a management body would not be compelled to buy a 
dissenting owner’s unit at a fair market price. This not only avoids an unnecessary 
burden on the management body but also protect individual’s right to housing.  
5 3 2 6 Evaluation 
First, any proposed Chinese condominium statute needs to adopt the South African 
model rules approach on the use of common property even though it is rudimentary. 
The South African model rules need to be substantially supplemented by the 
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developer at the initial stage and by the body corporate at a later stage.256 This is 
because the South African model rules only provide a short list of examples of 
unreasonable common property use. There are many other unreasonable uses of 
common property that are unmentioned, such as ensuring children do not damage 
common property or create a nuisance by the noise they make when playing on the 
common property. Also there is the issue as to whether firearms should be prohibited 
as well as whether it is necessary to have an area to hang clothes so they will not be 
seen from outside the building. And finally a very basic issue as to how much owners 
need to be dressed or how little they need to be undressed to be considered modest 
and allowed to use the common property area. If there is to be a Chinese 
condominium statute, it should include quite detailed model rules that spell out 
owners’ rights and responsibilities when using the common property. The more 
detailed the rules, the less disputes will arise later. However, even a preventative set of 
model rules cannot anticipate every day-to-day problem and be tailored to every need 
a project might have. Perhaps in China it would be wise to introduce house rules to 
cover the finer details at a later stage as is the position in South Africa.257 Moreover, 
the general principles of neighbour law which have been applied in China need to be 
formalized in the model rules. For example, unit owners presently can neither change 
the structure or the color of their exterior walls, nor interfere with other owners 
making lawful use of the common property. 
Second, both the UCIOA and the STA provide that the association by-laws or rules 
of the scheme bind not only unit owners but also their tenants.258 This approach 
should be adopted in a future Chinese condominium statute. The leasing of units 
should be allowed and only be restricted in special circumstances. This may well lead 
to having more tenants than owner residents in a condominium community. In China, 
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disruptive tenants are already a headache for an association’s administration.259 The 
association needs to be granted the power to extend model rules and house rules to the 
tenants.260 Following one of the UCIOA provisions, associations may levy fines 
against tenants.261 However, a tenant’s obligation to abide by a condominium’s rules 
does not automatically give them voting rights.262 The UCIOA states that if a 
declaration permits, tenants may vote on certain matters in order to integrate them into 
the day-to-day management of the condominium.263  This is recognition of the 
importance of involving tenants in management and voting at meetings. However, the 
STA has no explicit provision on whether tenants have voting rights at meetings. But 
tenants can act as proxies with a vote under their owners’ authority at a general 
meeting.264 If there is to be special condominium legislation in China, tenants should 
be allowed to vote at meetings with a unit owner’s power of attorney.265 Although 
neither the UCIOA nor the STA specifically address visitors’ behavior, in China model 
rules should require that unit owners be responsible for the behavior of their visitors 
to ensure peace is not disturbed in the condominium community. 
It is not only model rules that are needed, for in China it would be worthwhile also 
to have a set of house rules to give the management body much greater discretion, as 
well as to be able to fine tune overall condominium complex policies. 
Finally, cooperation is vital for sound management of a condominium scheme. 
Although apartments are the most common form of housing in China, the idea that a 
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condominium is also private property is still a relatively novel concept. It is necessary 
to raise awareness among Chinese condominium owners of the importance and scope 
of this legal concept. This helps owners to understand their rights and obligations 
better. Therefore they are almost certain to enhance the efficient condominium 
management of the common property with their participation and cooperation.  
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CHAPTER 6  
MANAGEMENT 
 
6 1 INTRODUCTION 
Condominium ownership consists of three components, namely individual unit 
ownership, common ownership of the land and common parts of a building, and 
membership in a management body. Common ownership of common property gives 
rise to a need for a collective decision-making mechanism.1 In order to safeguard the 
common interests, a new organization responsible for the administration of a 
development’s management and maintenance needs to be established. Creating a 
management body is essential since a condominium community cannot function 
efficiently without a management association to represent all of the owners and to 
handle day-to-day operations. Without such a management body, management 
disputes surely will arise among unit owners. Effective management of a 
condominium community is vitally important to the condominium owners and the 
financial institutions with an interest in the development to ensure the venture’s 
durability. Worldwide, most condominium statutes create at least two administrative 
bodies, namely a general assembly of condominium owners to make management 
decisions and an executive council to carry them out.2  
  In China, there has been a dramatic increase in litigation in the condominium sector 
since the implementation of the housing reform policy.3 The increase in lawsuits has 
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heightened the need for a special condominium statute. Lawyers, association 
executive council members, and most importantly, unit owners have been left behind 
as regards their knowledge of the complexity and sophistication of condominium 
association law. It was only in 2003 that condominium stakeholders were provided 
with an authoritative but sketchy regulation, the Property Management Regulation.4  
This chapter, in four sections, critically evaluates the Chinese statutory documents 
dealing with condominium management and compares them with the relevant 
provisions of the United States UCIOA and the South African STA. The sections deal 
respectively with the management body, the general meeting, the executive council 
and the managing agent. Issues examined include the establishment, powers and 
functions of the management body, the need for a two-tier management body, 
arrangements during an initial period of management when a condominium project is 
only partially occupied before the first general meeting is convened, the executive 
council’s appointment and duties and the managing agent’s appointment and 
functions.  
6 2 THE MANAGEMENT BODY  
When unit owners become members of the condominium association they have the 
right to participate in the association’s management. Membership of the management 
body ensures that each condominium owner has a say in the control, management, and 
daily operation of the condominium community. Both the UCIOA and the STA 
recognize the need for effective management and organize the unit owners to 
participate through such a management body. The UCIOA entrusts the responsibility 
for efficient management to a management body consisting of all the unit owners 
designated as a unit owners’ association.5 The South African STA organizes the unit 
                                                        
4 The Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007).  
5 UCIOA § 1-103 (3). 
 164
owners in an essential management body called the body corporate.6  
  In China, a condominium project is either managed by the apartment owners 
themselves or by a management association consisting of all the unit owners. Under 
the new Chinese Property Code, unit owners may decide whether to organize a 
management body corresponding to a unit owners’ association or a body corporate.7 
Chinese law provides that if a condominium development has only a few owners, with 
their unanimous consent, all of the owners are jointly involved in management, so 
there is no need to create a separate management body.8 But this provision is vague 
since it does not define the size of a small condominium development. When Chinese 
lawmakers enact a special condominium statute, they should consider defining a small 
condominium as one with fewer than 24 units. If this should be done, it would be 
unnecessary for small condominiums to create a management body.  
6 2 1 Establishment 
Unit owners with a registered ownership certificate automatically become members of 
a management body responsible for the control and administration of the common 
parts of the condominium. Under the UCIOA, a unit owners' association must be 
organized no later than the conveyance of the condominium’s first unit.9 The STA has 
virtually the same provisions. Here a body corporate is automatically established from 
the time anyone other than the developer becomes a unit owner. 10  In China, 
apartment owners automatically become members of the management structure as 
                                                        
6 STA s 1 (1) s v “body corporate.” See Wimbledon Lodge (Pty) Ltd v Gore NO and others [2002] 1 
All SA 218 (C) 225f-h. The court held in this case that the entrustment of the day-to-day administration 
and management of the scheme is to the benefit of the unit owners.  
7 Art 75 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007 states that the unit owners “may” establish the unit 
owners’ general assembly and an executive council.  
8 Art 10 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
9 UCIOA § 3-101. 
10 STA s 36 (1).      
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soon as an apartment is conveyed to them.11 However, the management structure is 
unclear for Chinese law does not recognize a management body.12 Instead, the law 
provides for two administrative mechanisms, namely a rule-making general assembly 
made up of the unit owners and an executive council. 13  Unfortunately, this 
institutional arrangement is far from perfect. Theoretically, the first general meeting 
which constitutes the executive council is usually convened long after the first unit is 
conveyed. The problem is that the unit owners only can take control of management 
from the developer at the first general meeting.14 And the time which elapses between 
the first conveyance and the first general meeting may be considerable.15 The fact 
that the early unit owners are not part of the management body makes a mockery of 
the threefold-unity theory of condominium ownership for during the transitional 
period the first group of owners, usually quite a number of owners in a multi-building 
project, only have individual ownership of their units and joint ownership of the 
common property. They are not members of the management body. Therefore, it is 
essential that early unit purchasers have immediate membership of the management 
body. Since the management body legally clarifies the relationship between the 
developer and other unit owners, it would be easy for the developer to bring the unit 
owners into the condominium management during this initial period.16 Moreover, 
when a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, it would be worthwhile to establish a 
                                                        
11 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 121. 
12 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 238. Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang 
Property Entitlement & Property Management 120. 
13 Art 8 & 10 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
14 Art 6 & 9 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004; art 19 of the Property 
Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 25 September 2007. 
15 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 176-180; Xia 
Shansheng Property Management Law 151; The Chinese Zhi Gong Party Shanghai Committee The 
Investigation Report on the Implementation of the Property Management Regulation 2004. (Chinese 
version) 
16 UCIOA § 3-101 comment 1. 
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central management body instead of a vague and abstract general assembly.17  
Both the UCIOA and the STA state that only owners are members of the 
management body. It is made quite clear that lessees, mortgagees, family members, 
visitors, or any others with an interest in a unit are not members of the management 
body.18 A developer can be a member of the management body as long as he/she still 
owns property in the development.19 But when the developer ceases to own a unit, 
he/she loses membership of the management body. When an apartment is sold every 
subsequent owner automatically becomes a member of the management body by title 
deed registration.20 A judicial sale does not affect the existence or the standing of the 
management body since it has “perpetual succession”.21 Similarly, Chinese law also 
states that the general assembly is only made up of the condominium owners.22 
6 2 2 Legal Personality 
Under the UCIOA, a unit owners’ association can be organized as a profit or nonprofit 
corporation, trust, or partnership, or as an unincorporated association.23 The UCIOA 
preserves the flexibility for American states to organize a condominium association in 
a variety of ways. However, an unincorporated association should be avoided since 
then its members risk unlimited liability, for example, for personal injuries.24 In 
addition, an unincorporated association in the United States cannot own land.25 
Moreover, the UCIOA gives a unit owners’ association a legal standing to “institute, 
                                                        
17 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 120. 
18 UCIOA § 3-101 “…the membership of the association at all times consists exclusively of all unit 
owners…” STA s 36 (1); Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 97-98. 
19 STA s 36 (1). 
20 See n 19 supra.  
21 STA s 36 (6). 
22 Art 8 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
23 UCIOA § 3-101. 
24 Werner & Kratovil Real Estate Law 484-485. 
25 Ford “Dispositions of Property to Unincorporated Non-profit Associations” 1956 (55) Mich L       
Rev 235. 
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defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name on 
behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting the [condominium] 
community.”26 Therefore it is very clear that under the UCIOA, a unit owners’ 
association enjoys a legal personality quite distinct from it individual members.27  
Although the STA expressly states that the Companies Act does not apply to the 
body corporate,28 there is no doubt that the body corporate under the STA has full 
legal personality.29 First, the body corporate is expressly endowed with “perpetual 
succession”30 and capable of suing31 and being sued32 in its corporate name in 
various matters. These include: contracts it has made, damage to common property, 
matters dealing with land and buildings for which it is liable, and in any matters 
arising out of the exercise of any of its powers or the performance of any of its duties. 
In particular it has locus standi in any claim against the developer in respect of the 
scheme if so determined by a special resolution of members of a body corporate.33 
Second, since the body corporate can hold property apart from its members’ 
property,34 it can purchase or acquire property, mortgage, sell, insure, and let units.35 
Third, when the body corporate incurs liabilities, it has to sell its own assets to meet 
its responsibilities first.36 It is worth noting that the STA imposes a subsidiary liability 
                                                        
26 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (4). 
27 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 151. 
28 STA s 36 (5). 
29 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-22. 
30 Bugden Strata Title Management Practice in New South Wales 17-18. 
31 See Body Corporate of Greenwood Scheme v 75/2 Sandown (Pty) Ltd 1999 (3) SA 480 (W) at 485 
I-486B. In this case, it is confirmed that a body corporate has standing to claim damages for 
construction defects from the developer.  
32 See Faiga v Body Corporate of Dumbarton Oaks 1997 (2) SA 651 (W). In this case, the body 
corporate was sued and held responsible for the negligence in maintaining the scheme’s building and 
facilities.   
33 STA 3 36 (6). 
34 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-23. 
35 STA s 38 (b). 
36 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-20 & 2-21. 
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on members of the body corporate if its own assets are insufficient to satisfy a debt.37 
This means the body corporate is different from a limited company since it does not 
limit its members’ liability for its debts.38 However, the unit owners’ liability is only 
subsidiary: the unit owners can only be sued if the debt of the body corporate is 
unsatisfied by its own assets.39 Despite a body corporate being a legal entity it is 
similar to an unlimited liability association in terms of the financial liability of its 
members since a body corporate relies entirely on its unit owners’ contributions to 
meet its liabilities.  
In China, controversy surrounds the question as to whether a management body is 
endowed with a legal personality. Because a condominium management body has 
very specialized functions, regulating its decision-making powers cannot be guided 
only by general legal principles regarding contracts and associations. The difficulty 
here is that in China, most of the management bodies are ill-established and their 
operation is chaotic. Some progressive Chinese legal scholars argue that it would be 
premature to endow a unit owners’ general assembly with full legal capacity since the 
country is in an early developmental stage.40 Others argue that it is inappropriate to 
accord either an owners’ general assembly or an executive council with a legal 
personality since this would contravene the existing practice that management bodies 
usually do not have a juristic personality.41 Most importantly, when determining the 
nature of the management body, the prime consideration should be that the 
condominium owners’ interests are safeguarded.  
Although condominium litigation continues to increase, most courts initially were 
                                                        
37 STA s 47 (1). 
38 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-9.  
39 See In re: Body Corporate of Caroline Court [2002] 1 All SA 49 A par 8. 
40 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 240-243. Chen argues that “…as to legal 
structure of management body, it is better to be circumspect, not adopting the ‘legal person’ model at 
this stage, because the concept of legal personality of management body will not be fit with current 
Chinese special circumstances…”. 
41 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 118. 
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reluctant to grant a management body the power to sue or be sued in the absence of 
statutory authority.42 However, quite recently, some provincial courts have issued 
judicial opinions allowing the executive council of a management body to appear in 
court as either a plaintiff or a defendant on behalf of the owners.43 This has been 
well-received. But answers are vague as to whether a management body possesses 
exclusive or class-action standing for this purpose. When a Chinese condominium 
statute is drafted, it should grant the management body an exclusive right to pursue 
claims in common property disputes. First, multiple-party litigation with every unit 
owner individually involved is cumbersome and a procedural nightmare for the 
courts.44 Second, a management body’s exclusive standing is to the advantage of unit 
owners. When a management body is the sole party in a common property dispute it 
will avoid direct confrontation between unit owners. Moreover, an individual unit 
owner has little incentive to claim on behalf of other unit owners since any recovery 
goes to the association for common expenses.45 Third, when the management body 
has exclusive standing, defendants are protected from multiple and repeated suits 
regarding the same claim.46 With the above advantages, the management body’s 
exclusive standing is an efficient way to resolve common property disputes.  
The management body’s ability to sue and be sued is not the only consideration 
dictating the need for juristic personality. If existing legal structures are already 
inadequate for group litigation, or cannot adequately cater for a condominium context, 
there will be a greater need for the management body to have juristic personality. 
Additionally, the management body also needs to be able to (1) use contractual 
                                                        
42 Xue Yuan “Analysis on the Legal Status of Condominium Associations” 2007 (25) Hebei Law 
Science 72-73. (Chinese version) 
43 For example, the Opinions Concerning Trialing the Property Management Cases of the Beijing 
High Court issued by the Beijing High Court in December 2003. 
44 Jacobsen “Standing of Condominium Associations to Sue: One for All or All for One?” 1990 (13) 
Hamline L Rev 33. 
45 Jacobsen “Standing of Condominium Associations to Sue” 34.    
46 Xue Yuan “Analysis on the Legal Status of Condominium Associations” 74. 
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agreements to employ professional managing agents; (2) collect individual owners’ 
contributions and establish management and maintenance funds in its name; (3) pay 
taxes; and (4) obtain adequate insurance for the common property to protect the unit 
owners from tort liability.47 For these matters the management body needs a common 
seal arising from its personality.48 For example, a common seal is needed when the 
management body signs an employment contract with a managing agent, or when the 
management body provides receipts to owners who pay monthly contributions, or 
when it signs an insurance contract for the common property. However, since a 
general assembly of condominium owners has no legal personality in China, some 
local rules seem to grant corporate status to an executive council by providing that it 
should have a common seal.49 Some provincial high courts have pronounced that the 
executive council may have legal standing to sue and to be sued on behalf of unit 
owners.50 This is inappropriate since an executive council is the standing committee 
of a management body. It is at odds with the condominium concept that the 
condominium’s executive council, being the executive organ, should have legal 
personality rather than the management body, which is the rule-making body.  
In short, the justification for granting a management body a juristic personality is 
greater than the arguments against it. To ensure an effective multifunctional 
management body, its juristic personality is an important issue on the agenda for 
formalizing condominium law. 
6 2 3 Functions 
Under both the UCIOA and STA, the functions of a management body are assigned in 
                                                        
47 Moriarty “A Comparison of United States and Foreign Condominiums” 1974 (48) St John’s L R 
1025. 
48 Art 49 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007.  
49 Art 13 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004. 
50 Art 7 of the Opinions Concerning Trialing the Property Management Cases of the Beijing High 
Court of 2003. See n 43 supra.   
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accordance with the Acts’ provisions, the by-laws and the rules. Generally, there are 
three major functions of a management body. First, a management body acts as a 
vehicle for enforcing restrictions, liens and covenants as regulated in the Act, 
declaration and by-laws or rules. Second, a management body is responsible for 
administering the day-to-day running of the condominium community, including the 
common property. Third, subject to the Act, the management body can amend, discard, 
supplement, or add to the new applicable rules or by-laws.  
A management body should enforce restrictions and covenants prescribed in the Act 
as well as the declaration, the by-laws and the rules. The UCIOA expressly states that 
the association can exercise any powers conferred by the declaration. 51  More 
importantly, it further regulates that unless the declaration or the Act provides 
otherwise, a unit owners’ association can adopt rules and regulations to prevent any 
use of a unit that violates the declaration and to regulate any occupant’s behavior in a 
unit that violates the declaration.52 Under the STA, the body corporate should, subject 
to the provisions of the Act, be responsible for the enforcement of the rules of the 
scheme.53 Since the management body’s function is fundamentally important to 
enforce the condominium documents, a Chinese statute needs to explicitly regulate 
this function.  
The second function of the management body is to govern management and 
maintenance of the common property. Under the STA, this function is found either in 
the Act or in rules of the scheme. The functions contained in the Act can only be 
curtailed by statutory amendment.54 The functions contained in the rules can be 
changed by either unanimous or special resolution. The statutory functions of the 
management body are mandatory. They include: 1) establishing a fund to cover 
expenses incurred in the execution of its functions and to levy contributions to the 
                                                        
51 UCIOA § 3-102 (a). 
52 UCIOA § 3-102 (c) (1) & (2). 
53 STA s 36 (4). 
54 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-12 (7). 
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fund from the sectional owners;55 2) opening and operating an account or accounts 
with a bank or building society;56 3) procuring adequate insurance for the scheme and 
to perform all incidental functions;57 4) maintaining and repairing the common 
property, the machinery, fixtures and fittings used in connection with the common 
property and sections as well as the pipes, wires, cables and ducts used in connection 
with the enjoyment of more than one section or of the common property or in favour 
of one section over the common property;58 5) complying with any notice or order by 
any competent authority requiring any repairs to or work in respect of the land or 
building(s) and to comply with any law relating to the common property or to any 
improvement of land included in the common property;59 6) keeping a list of the 
names and addresses of the members of the body corporate and of the trustees and to 
make it available on request;60 7) notifying the Registrar and the local authority of its 
domicilium citandi et executandi which shall be its address for service of any 
process;61 8) controlling, managing and administering the common property for the 
benefit of all the owners;62 9) certifying in writing, on application by an owner or 
mortgagee, the amount of the owner’s contribution, the manner of payment, the extent 
to which it has been paid and also the amount of rates and taxes paid by the body 
corporate and not yet recovered by it.63 
  Therefore, it can be seen that under the STA, it is a mandatory that the body 
corporate maintains the common property and keeps it in good repair. Annexure 8 of 
the management rules places certain duties on the body corporate in addition to this 
                                                        
55 STA 37 (1) (a)-(d). 
56 STA s 37(1) (e). 
57 STA s 37(1) (f)-(i), (q) and 37(4). 
58 STA s 37(1) (j), (o) and (p). 
59 STA s 37(1) (k) and (n). 
60 STA s 37(1) (l). 
61 STA s 37(1) (m). 
62 STA s 37(1) (r). 
63 STA s 37(3) & s 51. 
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duty to manage and maintain the common property.64  For example, the body 
corporate should prepare accounts and financial statements, convene general meetings, 
supply information to the unit owners and implement the decisions of the body 
corporate. These functions are discussed in detail under the duties of the trustees in 
the following section. 
  Unlike the STA, the UCIOA does not specifically lay out the functions of the unit 
owners’ association. Instead, the UCIOA only provides basic principles such as the 
association’s responsibility for the maintenance, repair, and replacement of the 
common property,65 as well as to collect common expenses from all the unit owners 
for the maintenance and management of the common property.66 The UCIOA also 
states that the association must comply with insurance requirements to reasonably 
maintain property insurance and liability insurance on the common property.67 The 
UCIOA gives an association the power to specify its function in the by-laws and 
house rules. Under the UCIOA, limited common property is regarded as part of 
common property. This means that unless the declaration provides otherwise, the 
association is responsible for the upkeep of the limited common property.68 The cost 
of maintenance, repair, and replacement for the limited common property is assessed 
against all the units, unless the declaration specifies that the expenses be paid only by 
the units receiving the benefits.69 
  The third function for the management body is to amend the condominium 
association’s by-laws and rules. The UCIOA contemplates that most matters relating 
to an association’s internal operations will be regulated by the by-laws. An 
                                                        
64 These functions are performed by the trustees on behalf of the body corporate. See Annexure 8 r 
25-27. 
65 UCIOA § 3-107 (a) 
66 UCIOA § 3-115 (b). 
67 UCIOA§ 3-113 (a) (1) & (2). 
68 UCIOA§ 3-107 comment 1. 
69 UCIOA § 3-115 (c). 
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association’s by-laws must provide a formula to amend them.70 In addition, subject to 
the declaration, by-laws can regulate any matter the association deems necessary and 
appropriate.71 By contrast, the STA provides a set of model rules to deal with 
functions of the body corporate. The STA provides that if the body corporate decides 
to change the rules, it must notify the Registrar of Deeds of any substitution, addition, 
amendment or repeal of the rules.72 
Both the UCIOA and the STA provide for very much the same functions of the 
management body, although the two Acts do have very different approaches as to how 
this is achieved. When framing a Chinese condominium statute, the theoreticians 
should consider adopting the STA model with its extensive list of functions, which are 
unambiguous and easy to apply.  
Among the functions particularly important for a future Chinese condominium 
statute is requiring the management body to establish two different funds for the 
maintenance of the common property. One called a maintenance fund is for 
day-to-day recurrent expenses of maintaining the development. The other called a 
reserve fund provides for future capital needs.73 The UCIOA and the STA provisions 
on maintenance funds have been adopted by the Chinese as a model. A Chinese 
departmental rule requires that when an apartment purchaser signs a sale contract with 
a developer, the purchaser also needs to pay 2-3% of an apartment’s purchase price 
into the condominium’s maintenance fund.74 This provision is welcome since it 
embodies the maintenance fund concept. But it does not take the next step to regulate 
the periodic collection of a maintenance fund. The departmental rule is silent on 
collecting levies for the maintenance fund once the initial maintenance fund is 
                                                        
70 UCIOA § 3-106 (a) (6). 
71 UCIOA § 3-106 (b). 
72 STA s 35(5). 
73 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 11-37. 
74 Art 5 of the Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings in Housing 
Common Areas of 1998. 
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depleted. Therefore, when Chinese legislators are ready for a uniform condominium 
statute, this needs to be addressed. A reserve fund should be maintained for every 
condominium project. A reserve fund is worthwhile even for small condominium 
complexes. Therefore, following the UCIOA and STA, a Chinese statute could require 
that a management body should cater for contributions to a reserve fund in its annual 
budget that would be mandatory for all condominium associations.75  
  Chinese law does not at all mention a reserve fund. The rationale for establishing 
such a fund is to save for a rainy day. A reserve fund is a form of self-insurance 
against pro rata increases in repair cost over the years.76  Because repair and 
maintenance costs usually exceed a management body’s operating budget, a reserve 
fund is needed to save for such increases.77 Such a fund covers many common 
property expenses such as the administrative cost of convening meetings, the 
remunerations of the administrator and executive council members, painting the 
exterior wall of buildings, replacing, repairing or making good the common property, 
and purchasing facilities or tools for the common property. The reserve account and 
annual budget requirements promote a condominium association’s financial health in 
the long run. Additionally, mortgage lenders and insurers also are comfortable with an 
association that holds a reserve account. Under the UCIOA, a surplus fund of a unit 
owners’ association is almost always used for the pre-payment of reserves. 78 
Although the STA does not require a separate account for the reserve fund,79 it does 
stipulate a mandatory reserve fund to promote the stability and longevity of sectional 
title schemes.80 Moreover, the Sectional Title Regulations provide that the trustees of 
the body corporate may from time to time call on owners to make special 
                                                        
75 UCIOA § 3-115 (a); STA s 37 (1) (c) read with Annexure 8 r 31 (2). 
76 Gardiner The Condominium Act of 1998: A Practical Guide 233. 
77 Hinkston “Wisconsin’s Revised Condominium Act” 2004 (77 September) Wisconsin Lawyer 12.  
78 UCIOA § 3-114. It also provides that any surplus fund of the association remaining after payment 
of common expenses, any prepayment of reserves must be paid back to the unit owners. 
79 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-20 (4). 
80 STA s 37 (1) (a). See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-20. 
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contributions to cover expenses. They are not included in estimates and may be 
payable in one sum or by installments depending on what the trustees think fit.81 
Thus, a new Chinese statute should require condominium developers and management 
associations to establish a badly-needed reserve fund, financed by regular 
assessments.  
6 2 4 Powers 
Both the UCIOA and the STA contain provisions on a management body’s powers to 
manage and control the common property. As the management body is a statutory 
creature, its powers are carefully delineated under the Act.82  
The UCIOA section 3-102 provides an extensive list of powers that may be 
exercised by the owners’ association. This section of the Act allows the association to 
adopt and amend by-laws, rules, and budgets, collect assessments for common 
expenses from unit owners, and hire and discharge managing agents and other 
employees, agents, and independent contractors.83 An association can also institute, 
defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name or on 
behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting common interest 
issues.84 Equally, if not more importantly, an association can make contracts and 
incur liabilities, regulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification 
of common elements, and have additional improvements made as a part of the 
common elements.85 It can also acquire, hold, encumber, and convey in its own name 
any right, title, or interest in real estate or personal property, although common 
elements may be subject to a security interest.86 An association can grant easements, 
                                                        
81 Annexure 8 r 31 (4). 
82 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-25. 
83 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (1) (2) and (3). 
84 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (4). 
85 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (5) (6) and (7). 
86 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (8). 
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leases, licenses, and concessions over the common elements and can impose and 
receive payments, fees, or charges for the use, or rental of the common elements and 
for services provided to unit owners.87 An association also can impose charges for 
late payment of assessments and levy reasonable fines for violations of the declaration, 
by-laws, and rules of the association.88 It can also impose reasonable charges for the 
preparation and recordation of amendments to the declaration, resale certificates, or 
statements of unpaid assessments.89 A unit owners’ association can provide its 
officers and executive board indemnification and maintain directors' and officers' 
liability insurance.90 It can also assign its right to future income, including the right to 
receive common expense assessments unless limited by the declaration. 91  An 
association can exercise any other powers conferred by the declaration or by-laws, 
exercise other powers exercised by legal entities of the same type as the association as 
well as exercise any other powers necessary and proper for the governance and 
operation of the association.92  Finally, an association can require that disputes 
between the executive board and unit owners or between two or more unit owners 
about the condominium community be submitted to nonbinding alternative dispute 
resolution as a prerequisite to commencing a judicial proceeding.93 
Furthermore, the UCIOA states that a declaration should not impose limitations on 
the power of an association to deal with a declarant that are more restrictive than the 
limitations imposed on an association’s power to deal with other people.94 If a unit 
owner’s tenant violates the declaration, by-laws, or rules of the association, in 
addition to exercising any of its powers against the unit owner, the association also 
                                                        
87 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (9) and (10). 
88 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (11). 
89 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (12). 
90 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (13). 
91 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (14). 
92 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (15) (16) and (17). 
93 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (18). 
94 UCIOA § 3-102 (b). 
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can exercise powers directly against the tenant. However, the tenant and the unit 
owner should have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard and if a fine is 
levied against a tenant for a violation it has to be reasonable. An association can 
enforce any other rights against a tenant for a violation which the unit owner as 
landlord could lawfully have exercised under the lease and/or which the association 
could lawfully have exercised directly against the unit owner.95 However, these 
powers can only be exercised if the tenant or unit owner fails to remedy the violation 
within 10 days after the association notifies the tenant and unit owner of it.96  
Finally, the UCIOA makes it clear that its guidelines do not affect rights that the 
unit owner has to enforce a lease or that the association has under other legislation nor 
does it allow the association to enforce a lease to which it is not a party, unless there is 
a violation of the declaration, by-laws, or rules.97 
Under the South African Act, the most important powers of the body corporate are 
in section 38. It is notable that the statutory powers of the body corporate contained in 
section 38 are not mandatory.98 These powers allow: 1) the body corporate to appoint 
agents and employees; 2) to purchase, take transfer of, mortgage, and sell, hire or let 
units; 3) to purchase, hire or acquire movable property; 4) to establish and maintain 
lawns, gardens and recreational facilities on the common property; 5) to borrow 
money in order to carry out its responsibilities and exercise its powers, and to ensure 
that borrowed money is repaid; 6) to invest administrative and reserve funds; 7) to 
enter into agreements with local authorities or any other persons or bodies for the 
supply of electricity, gas, water, fuel, sanitation and other services for the sectional 
titles scheme; 8) to enter into agreements with unit owners or occupiers for the body 
corporate to provide amenities or services to a unit, its owner or occupier, including 
the right to let, other than a long lease, a portion of the common property to any owner 
                                                        
95 UCIOA § 3-102 (d). 
96 UCIOA § 3-102 (e). 
97 UCIOA § 3-102 (f). 
98 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-25. 
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or occupier; and 9) to do everything necessary for the enforcement of the rules and for 
the control, management and administration of the common property.99 
Now it can be seen that most of the management body enumerated powers under 
the UCIOA and the STA are very similar. To name a few, both Acts allow the 
management body to appoint a managing agent and to enter into a contract or 
agreement. Both Acts allow the use and maintenance of common elements and for the 
management body to acquire condominium units and hold them for the benefit of the 
unit owners. Moreover, both have statutorily enumerated powers that are extensive 
but not exhaustive. For example, under the UCIOA, the association’s power to have a 
priority lien on a unit for the unpaid assessment of a mortgage loan is regulated in a 
different section, that is section 3-116. Other sections of the STA also contain such 
powers as allowing the body corporate to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the 
unit owners.100  
Some powers that the UCIOA grants to the unit owners’ association in terms of the 
UCIOA correspond to functions of the body corporate under the STA.101 For example, 
the unit owners’ association has the power to assess and collect monies for expenses, 
to adopt and amend budgets, and to repair and maintain the common property. Second, 
some owners’ association powers under the UCIOA are regulated as a part of the 
trustees’ powers under the STA. An example of this is the power of the owners’ 
association to charge for late payment of assessments which is controlled by trustees 
under the South African statute.102 Third, unlike the UCIOA, the STA specifically 
gives the body corporate the power to invest any fund and to negotiate with local 
authorities for services for the unit owners.103 Fourth, the UCIOA allows the unit 
                                                        
99 STA s 38. 
100 STA s 36 (6). 
101 Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in Light of the Uniform Condominium Act” 1987 (20) 
CILSA 24. 
102 Annexure 8 r 31 (6) allows trustees to charge interest on arrears at a rate as they may from time to 
time determine. 
103 STA s 38 (g) & (h). 
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owners’ association to terminate management contracts and leases entered into by the 
association without penalty while a developer controls a project.104  
In summary, the STA separately provides for the functions and powers of the body 
corporate while the UCIOA only provides a single extensive provision of the 
association’ powers. The difference between a function and a power under the STA is 
what the body corporate must do and what it can do. In addition, the model rules 
annexed to the STA also regulate some powers of the body corporate. Overall, both 
Acts provide similar provisions for the management body’s powers.  
For Chinese law, since there is no concept of a management body, the Property 
Code attributes these powers to all of the apartment owners at their general meetings. 
The Chinese Property Code provides that the apartment owners collectively decide   
(1) to adopt and amend the regulations for the general meetings; (2) to make and 
amend the condominium rules; (3) to elect the executive council or replace its 
members; (4) to hire and discharge the managing agent and other employees; (5) to 
collect and use the maintenance fund for the building(s) and the common fixtures;    
(6) to alter, improve and reconstruct the building(s) and common fixtures; (7) to 
exercise any other powers necessary for the governance and operation of the common 
property.105 This is a worthwhile step to ascertain the powers of the management 
body although it is somewhat incomplete and superficial. Therefore, when a Chinese 
condominium statute is to be framed, both the UCIOA and the STA should be 
carefully scrutinized to provide an extensive list of management body powers. For the 
statutory structure, the more detailed and well-structured South African STA is 
preferred. 
6 2 5 Two-Tier Management Structure 
Generally, there are two options available in designing a management structure. First 
                                                        
104 UCIOA § 3-105. 
105 Art 76 of the Chinese Property Code of 2007. 
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an entire project is organized as a single condominium under one management body. 
Second, a two-tier condominium management is put into place with an umbrella 
management body managing the entire project at a senior level with more subsidiary 
management bodies managing their own particular common areas at a junior level.  
While the STA does not address this issue, the UCIOA provides that a master 
association may be established to exercise powers on behalf of one or more 
condominium communities.106 While the UCIOA provision was designed to merge 
two or more condominium communities, the concept is a two-tier management 
structure. This is made quite clear by the provision that if the declaration of a 
condominium community provides that the executive board delegates certain powers 
to a master association, the members of the executive board are not liable for the acts 
of a master association with delegated powers.107 It can be seen that the UCIOA deals 
with this issue by strictly limiting the delegation of unit owners’ association powers to 
the master association in the declaration.108 In the United States, master or umbrella 
associations are found in larger condominium complexes where the associations are 
layered according to function.109 In China, a two-tier management structure should be 
in place before the first unit is conveyed to a unit purchaser. This is primarily because 
most of the condominiums are multi-building projects or mixed-use ones. In addition, 
a Chinese condominium statute should allow the existing condominium developments 
to establish sub-bodies. 
The “single condominium, single association” approach is conventional. It is 
suitable for many single-building condominiums. However, with the appearance and 
development of multi-building projects and mixed-use developments, the traditional 
“single condominium, single association” approach is not an efficient way to manage 
                                                        
106 UCIOA§ 2-120 (a). 
107 UCIOA§ 2-120 (c). 
108 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 43-187. 
109 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 43-184. 
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the common property in more complicated developments.110 For example, for a 
condominium development comprising twelve buildings, first, it is financially 
burdensome to call a meeting of all the unit owners of twelve buildings to discuss a 
management problem in one building. Second, the unit owners in other buildings may 
not be familiar with the situation. Third, the owners in other buildings have less 
incentive to be concerned about a management issue encountered in a specific 
building. A single building’s management issue can be resolved more quickly and 
easily by its owners than by all the owners of the other buildings.  
Hence, a two-tier condominium management structure provides more effective and 
efficient management for the entire project. A first-tier management body could 
control the common property used by all unit owners in a project, for example, the 
entrance gate and driveways. The second-tier management body, i.e. sub-body could 
deal with the operation and maintenance of a particular common area or building in 
which it has an ownership interest, for example, the elevator and staircase belonging 
to a particular group of unit owners. 
A two-tier condominium is appropriate for several types of projects. First, in a 
multi-building development, each building can constitute a sub-body while the whole 
project could have an umbrella management body. This is especially useful for a 
multi-building project comprising luxury buildings and non-luxury ones, for example, 
some apartment buildings have elevators and dining halls while others do not have 
such facilities. Second, in a mixed-use development, the residential sub-body can take 
care of the common property reserved for its use only and a commercial sub-body 
might care for the retail shops’ central air-conditioning. For large condominium 
developments that mix the residential apartments with a hotel, shops, and recreational 
units, each type may constitute a sub-body managing their own operational affairs. 
The master association could be responsible for maintaining the building’s exterior, 
                                                        
110 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 122. 
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structure, and grounds.111  
However, to form a two-tier management structure, some matters need to be 
clarified. First, it is important to include the second-tier management bodies’ areas of 
jurisdiction in the declaration and by-laws. This will ensure that maintenance 
responsibilities between two-tier management bodies are clearly defined. Second, the 
limited common property, or the exclusive use area should be managed and used by 
only one sub-body and should not be shared by two or more sub-bodies. This will 
obviate management disputes between two or more sub-bodies over the limited 
common property. Third, there need to be enough units in each sub-body to ensure 
there are sufficient owners to serve on the executive committee of each sub-body. 
Fourth, at least a member from each sub-body’s executive committee should be a 
member of the executive council representing his or her sub-body.112 
The functions and powers of a sub-body should have the same powers and duties as 
the main or master management body. For example, a sub-body could establish its 
own maintenance and reserve funds. Thus, unit owners would need to contribute to 
the maintenance and reserve funds of both the main management body and their own 
sub-body. But this would not necessarily mean that the unit owners’ monetary 
contributions would be increased. Technically, the contributions paid by the unit 
owners would be divided into two kinds. One would be paid to the main management 
body for matters of common interest to all unit owners while the other would be paid 
to the sub-body for its particular needs. However, certain powers could not be 
exercised by a sub-body such as the power to transfer or make an addition to any part 
of the common property. 
To summarize, the two-tier management structure is important and much needed in 
China. Any future Chinese condominium statute should cover this issue. For this 
                                                        
111 Lundquist “Mixed Use Condominiums under the Minnesota Uniform Condominium Act” 1984 
(10) Wm Mitchell L Rev 105. 
112 Art 16 of the Regulation of the General Meetings of 2003; Art 15 of the Shanghai Property 
Management Regulation of 2004. 
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reason it merits a more deliberate study. 
6 3 GENERAL MEETING 
6 3 1 Significance of General Meetings 
A meeting comprising all the condominium owners is known as a general meeting as 
distinct from an executive council meeting comprising only council members. A 
management body functions through general meetings. The principal purpose of the 
general meeting is to gather the opinions and reflect the will of the unit owners about 
the management of their condominium.113 The condominium association’s general 
meeting is regarded as its highest rule-making authority.114 The function of general 
meetings is setting standards and making policies for the condominium administration, 
while the executive council’s task is to implement resolutions and decisions passed at 
general meetings and to perform statutory duties.115 The South African STA expressly 
states that the duties and powers of the trustees are subject to any restrictions imposed 
at an owners’ general meeting.116 China also acknowledges the legal status of the 
general meeting. Here the general meeting is the highest body of the community of 
owners117 and the council is an executive body for the general assembly.118 Therefore, 
this section discusses the types of general meetings, the time and manner in which 
general meetings are to be convened, matters addressed in general meetings, the 
manner in which voting is conducted, and the keeping of general meeting minutes. 
                                                        
113 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-35. 
114 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 152.  
115 Khublall Strata Titles 92 
116 Annexure 8 r 25. 
117 Liang Huixing Commentary on Chinese Property Code Draft 302. (Chinese version) 
118 Art 15 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
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6 3 2 Types of Meetings 
6 3 2 1 Overview  
Under the STA, three types of general meetings during the life of a body corporate are 
recognized, namely, the first annual general meeting, annual general meetings, and 
special general meetings.119 The first annual general meeting is the first compulsory 
meeting of a body corporate. This means that it must be held within sixty days of the 
establishment of the body corporate.120 Annual general meetings are compulsory 
meetings that are held each year on a regular basis. Specifically, they are held within 
four months of the end of each financial year.121 Unless the general meetings or the 
trustees decide otherwise,122 the financial year of the body corporate runs from the 
first day of March of each year to the last day of February of the following year.123 A 
special meeting is any general meeting other than the annual general meeting.124 The 
STA does not require these meetings to be held within any specified period or at 
regular intervals as is the case with the first annual general meeting and annual 
general meetings.  
  According to the UCIOA, an association’s general meeting of unit owners must be 
held at least once a year at a time stated or fixed in accordance with the by-laws.125 
The president, the majority of the executive board or the owners representing at least 
20 per cent, or any lower percentage specified in the association by-laws, may call a 
special meeting.126 
                                                        
119 Annexure 8 r 50-53. 
120 Annexure 8 r 50 (1). 
121 Annexure 8 r 51 (1). 
122 The term “trustees” under the STA corresponds to the terms “executive board” under the UCIOA 
and “executive council members” in the Chinese context.   
123 Annexure 8 r 51 (2). 
124 Annexure 8 r 52. 
125 UCIOA § 3-108. 
126 See n 125 supra.   
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  Clearly, the STA regulates meetings in considerable detail in the model rules while 
the UCIOA only provides sketchy principles. For example, the UCIOA simply states 
that a general meeting must be held each year. No provision is made for the specific 
period or time to hold an annual general meeting. However, the interval between 
annual general meetings may unpredictably fluctuate. For a Chinese condominium 
statute, the South African approach is preferable. Any future Chinese condominium 
legislation should classify the meetings into three types and contain detailed 
convening procedures for each type of meeting. 
6 3 2 2 The First Annual General Meeting  
The time to convene the first annual general meeting should be clearly regulated to 
ensure that unit owners immediately control the management of the condominium 
development once it leaves the hands of the developer. Early on many sectional titles 
schemes floundered in chaos for the Sectional Titles Act of 1971 failed to make 
someone responsible to convene this first meeting.127 The Sectional Titles Act of 1986 
remedies this problem by making the developer responsible for convening the first 
general meeting within 60 days after the body corporate is established.128 Hence, 
when a Chinese condominium statute is framed, the lawmakers should oblige the 
developer to convene the first annual general meeting within a prescribed period.   
Given that in China many condominiums are multi-building projects, they often 
cannot be occupied by many unit purchasers in a short period after the first unit’s sale. 
Under such circumstances, when to convene the first general meeting is a critical 
issue. One way is to prescribe a fixed time to convene it as is the case with the STA. A 
more flexible way found in many Chinese local property management regulations129 
is to stipulate that the first general meeting be held during two periods, whichever 
                                                        
127 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-36. 
128 STA s 36 (7) (a). 
129 At present, there is no provision at the national level to regulate when to hold the first annual 
general meeting. 
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occurs first. They are: 1) two years from the time the first unit is sold; 2) or as soon as 
50 per cent of the total units’ floor area is sold to individual owners.130 The latter 
method is preferable. On the one hand, it recognizes that when a developer still owns 
a large portion of the units, unit owners cannot have much of a voice on the 
condominium’s management even after the first general meeting. With only a few unit 
owners living in the condominium, the developer can muster a quorum with a 
majority of the votes and then control the management. A telling example is that a 
developer with control of the general meeting can appoint all the executive council 
members he or she favors. Consequently, the first general meeting should be held 
when a relatively large number of units have been sold. On the other hand, the 
alternative procedure caps the time the farthest out to convene the meeting, i.e. two 
years after the first unit has been sold. Two years after the first unit’s sale, the first 
general meeting is held irrespective of the number of units that have been sold. This 
statutory arrangement strikes a balance between the necessity of a speedy transfer of 
condominium management to unit owners and a concern whether or not unit owners 
genuinely control the management.  
Moreover, under the STA, to avoid an initial management debt of the body 
corporate when it comes into being, the developer is obliged to furnish the unit 
owners at the first general meeting with a certificate from the local authority showing 
that all of the developer’s financial obligations for the condominium are up to the date 
and have been paid.131 If such a provision is adopted in future Chinese condominium 
legislation, the developer would be responsible for all maintenance costs during the 
initial period prior to the first general meeting. As a consequence, developers would 
be under financial pressure to organize the first general meeting speedily.  
However, two years would seem far too long before the first general meeting is 
                                                        
130 Art 7 of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004; art 19 of the Property 
Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
131 STA s 36 (7) (a) (ii). 
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held, particularly since it is at this meeting when unit owners put together their 
executive council. Thus, a future Chinese condominium statute should require 
developers to convene the first general meeting at the latest one year after the first unit 
is sold. Moreover, any time within this first year, if the units purchased account for 50 
per cent of all units’ floor areas, the first general meeting should necessarily be 
convened. Here one concern still remains: the developer could control the 
management if he/she still owns 50 per cent or more of the total units’ floor area one 
year after the first unit’s sale. But this difficulty is not insurmountable. Any future 
Chinese condominium statute should stipulate that the maximum value of an owner’s 
vote, whether the developer or a unit owner, is reduced to 30 per cent voting power, 
ignoring any fraction. The purpose of this mechanism is to prevent a single “giant” 
owner from monopolizing the votes at any general meeting.   
Finally, most Chinese local regulations require that a sub-district office132 play a 
supervisory role in organizing the first general meeting for newly developed 
condominiums. 133  This provision should be kept in any future condominium 
legislation to ensure a timely and smooth first general meeting. Moreover, there 
should be sanctions against developer non-compliance to ensure that the developer 
also will perform his/her responsibilities. For example, following the South African 
experience, a developer should be liable to a fine and imprisonment for a short period 
if a meeting is not convened within a reasonable time.134 In South Africa the penalty 
for non-compliance is imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.135  . 
                                                        
132 In China, sub-district office (Jie Dao Ban Shi Chu) is the lowest level of governmental body. 
Literally, it means the block community office. Its ranking is inferior to the city’s district government 
or the county government.  
133 Art 5 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007; art 5 
of the Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004. 
134 STA s 36 (7) (b).   
135 See n 134 supra. Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-37 argues that such penalty of imprisonment 
serves as a deterrent for non-compliance.  
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6 3 2 3 Annual General Meetings  
In China, any drafting committee of the future condominium legislation should 
carefully evaluate the trade-offs of holding an annual general meeting on the basis of 
a calendar year or a fiscal year. Although the schedule based on the financial year is 
sensible for a condominium’s financial administration as is the case in South Africa,136 
the calendar year is easy to apply and makes sense to ordinary unit owners. With the 
calendar year, they can easily monitor the holding of an annual general meeting. It 
would seem better for a future Chinese condominium statute to stipulate that after the 
first general meeting, a condominium association must hold an annual general 
meeting in each calendar year.  
  More importantly, to ensure that unit owners can review the condominium affairs in 
a timely manner, an annual general meeting should be convened no less than fifteen 
months after the preceding annual general meeting. Nonetheless, it cannot be assumed 
that once the period has expired the annual general meeting could not be held in that 
particular year. If an annual general meeting is not called by the executive council 
within the time limit, unit owners should be able to request that the sub-district office 
summon the meeting.137  
6 3 2 4 Special General Meetings   
Different from the first general meeting and annual general meetings, neither the 
UCIOA nor the STA requires special meetings be held within any specified period.138 
These meetings should be held when necessary during the year.  
Under the STA, trustees may, whenever they think fit, call a special meeting and 
they must convene a meeting upon a written request either by owners entitled to 25 
                                                        
136 Annexure 8 r 50 (2) (ii).  
137 Art 12 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
138 Rosenberry & Sproul “A Comparison of California Common Interest Development Law and the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act” 1068-1070; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-41 & 14-42. 
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per cent of the total quotas or by no less than 25 per cent of the mortgagees holding 
mortgage bonds on individual units.139 If trustees fail to call a meeting within 
fourteen days of such a request, the unit owners or mortgagees are entitled to call the 
meeting.140 By specifying that a certain number of requesting owners is necessary to 
call a meeting the STA ensures that special meetings are convened only for urgent and 
important matters.141 When a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, it should 
stipulate that a special meeting can be convened by a majority vote of the executive 
council or in writing by 20 per cent of the unit owners entitled to vote. A Chinese 
statute needs to be flexible in convening a special meeting. Today in China when there 
is an emergency needing urgent attention, the executive council like the trustees under 
the STA may convene a special general meeting. However, if the executive council 
members breach their statutory duty to call a special meeting, the unit owners can 
apply to the sub-district office to order the executive council to call a special meeting. 
If the executive council continues to fail to do so, the sub-district office can call the 
special meeting.142   
6 3 3 Notice of Meeting 
Under the UCIOA, no less than 10 and no more than 60 days prior to any meeting, the 
secretary or other officers should send a hand-delivered or prepaid letter with a 
meeting notice to each unit’s mailing address or to any other mailing address the unit 
owner designates in writing.143 These meeting notices must specify the time and 
place of the meeting, the agenda and the matters the executive board intends to 
present for action by the members, including the general nature of any proposed 
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140 See n 139 supra.  
141 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-41. 
142 Art 10 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
143 UCIOA § 3-108. 
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amendments to the declaration or by-laws, budget changes, and any proposals to 
remove executive board members.144 
  The STA requires at least fourteen days' notice of a general meeting and must 
specify the place, within the magisterial district where the condominium complex is 
situated, or other place determined by special resolution of unit owners, and the date 
and the hour of the meeting.145 However, the 14-day period rule is not an absolute 
requirement. A general meeting may be called on shorter notice if agreed upon by 
everyone entitled to attend.146 Notice must be sent to all unit owners, all mortgagees 
and to the managing agent, if any.147 The purpose for allowing unit mortgagees and 
the managing agent to attend general meetings is to enable them to keep on top of a 
condominium’s affairs. They are not entitled to vote at these meetings.148 To pass a 
special or unanimous resolution, at least 30 days’ notice is necessary to convene a 
special meeting.149 The meeting notice should be sent by prepaid post to the owner at 
his/her permanent address.150  Notice needs to be accompanied by a copy and 
description of the meeting’s agenda.151 To have as wide a participation of unit owners 
as possible at the meetings, they should preferably be scheduled after working 
hours.152  
It is clear that first, the meeting notice should be sent out before the date of a 
meeting. Second, the notice has to be accompanied by an agenda sent to the unit 
owners and other interested persons via mail. Third, every general meeting notice 
must contain certain prescribed materials. This suggests that when a Chinese 
                                                        
144 See n 143 supra.   
145 Annexure 8 r 54 (1). 
146 Annexure 8 r 54 (6). 
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148 Annexure 8 r 54 (2). 
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152 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-42.  
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condominium statute is drafted, it should provide that for every meeting, at least 15 
days’ notice is required.153 In addition, the secretary or other executive council 
officers should mail the meeting notice to a mailing address designated in writing to 
people who are entitled to attend the meeting. Furthermore, a Chinese statute should 
provide that a notice for any kind of meeting must contain its place, day and hour, any 
proposed resolutions for consideration at the meeting, other business for consideration, 
and the meeting’s program. In addition, every annual general meeting notice must 
contain a copy of the association’s annual accounts and its auditor’s report, any 
motion for a review or adoption of the account statement, and a motion for the 
continuation or termination of the managing agent’s appointment, if one is employed. 
Finally, to guarantee the notice’s delivery, any future Chinese statute should also 
stipulate that in addition to sending the meeting notice to each and every unit owner, 
the executive council is responsible for placing the notice on a community notice 
board.       
6 3 4 The Agenda for the Meeting 
The agenda for a general meeting of a condominium association must include matters 
to be discussed and decision to be made at every meeting as an item of business on the 
agenda and a copy of the agenda must accompany the notice of the meeting.  
  Although the UCIOA does not specify the matters which need to be considered at 
general meetings, it is implicit that the general meeting, within the ambit of the Act 
and the by-laws, can make any resolution to fulfill the functions and exercise the 
powers of the unit owners’ association.154 When matters are placed on the agenda, 
they need to be discussed and voted upon in a general meeting.  
  The STA, on the other hand, provides an extensive list of matters to be dealt with at 
                                                        
153 Art 14 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003.  
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an annual general meeting.155 It is notable that the STA differentiates ordinary 
business from special business.156 Ordinary businesses are matters which must be 
addressed by an annual general meeting, while special business includes all other 
matters. For example, all matters considered at a special meeting are special 
business.157 The ordinary business which needs to be addressed at an annual general 
meeting is highlighted by the STA. This includes 1) the consideration of the trustees’ 
financial statement and report;158 2) the approval of the building and individual units’ 
schedules of replacement values and the annual budget for the following year;159 
3) the appointment of an auditor or an accounting officer;160 4) the determination of 
the number of trustees for the ensuing year;161 5) the election of trustees for the 
ensuing year;162 6) special business for which notice has been given;163 7) directions 
or restrictions on the powers of the body corporate;164 8) the address at which legal 
proceedings may be instituted by the body corporate;165 and 9) the confirmation by an 
auditor or accounting officer that any amendment, substitution, addition or repeal of 
the rules has been submitted to the Registrar of Deeds for filing.166 Note that although 
special business is normally considered at a special meeting, it may also be placed on 
the agenda at the annual general meeting provided that due notice is given of the 
general nature of the relevant business and that it is within the ambit of a general 
                                                        
155 The Schedule 1 of the Sectional Titles Act of 1971 provided only two kinds of ordinary business at 
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meeting’s powers.167 Trustees or the owners may place special business on the 
agenda.168  
  In China, the original drafters of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 
were reluctant to address the scope of issues on a meeting agenda. However, in the 
years since its adoption, numerous local property management rules have been 
enacted to address the matter in more detail than is already covered though 
superficially in the national level Property Management Regulation of 2003 or 
customarily applied in company by-laws.169 Against this background, when a Chinese 
condominium statute is drafted, the South African STA approach of enumerating 
items should be adopted to clearly state the competence of general meetings. 
Following the South African model, a Chinese condominium statute should prescribe 
a detailed agenda for the annual general meeting. The agenda of an annual general 
meeting consists of: 1) the election of executive council members; 2) a review and 
approval of the annual budget; 3) the confirmation of the minutes of the preceding 
general meeting; 4) an amendment, repeal, and addition to the by-laws in force; 5) a 
decision whether a managing agent should be appointed, and if so, which executive 
council powers and functions should be delegated to the managing agent; 6) an 
adoption of the financial statement and accounting records for the past financial 
period; and 7) the consideration of other motions submitted by the executive council 
or unit owners.  
  The approval of an annual budget for the ensuing year is the most important matter 
for careful and professional budgeting is essential for a well-run condominium 
development.170 Therefore, all accounts and financial statements of the management 
body are disclosed before the annual general meeting to enable unit owners to 
determine whether the budget is viable. Additionally, the condominium association 
                                                        
167 See n 163 supra.  
168 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-44. 
169 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 18. 
170 See n 168 supra. 
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should be encouraged to set aside a certain amount of agenda time for unit owners to 
ask questions and comment on the annual budget before casting their votes. It is 
important to note that only owners and the executive council members can submit 
motions. These motions should be accompanied with an explanatory note and 
addressed to the secretary of the executive council. 
6 3 5 Quorum 
A quorum is the minimum number of members who must be present for a body to 
transact business or take a vote.171 When a quorum is not met, a general meeting 
cannot hold a vote or pass resolutions. Therefore, before a meeting can proceed a 
quorum must be present. Nonetheless, under the STA, the quorum is not based on the 
number of unit owners present, either in person or by proxy. Instead, the criterion for 
a quorum rests on the share of voting quotas held by unit owners.172 Using the 
aggregate share of quotas rather than the number of owners to calculate a quorum 
indicates that greater emphasis is placed on the economic interests of unit owners than 
the democratic and social interests of unit owners.173 
  Both the STA and the UCIOA present quorum rules for general meetings.174 The 
UCIOA parallels the STA in a provision providing that a quorum needs not only be 
present in person but also by proxy.175 The STA has adopted a flexible system with 
variable vote percentages constituting quorums, depending on the number of units in a 
particular condominium.176 In projects with ten units or less a quorum requires that 
owners who are entitled to vote and hold at least 50 per cent of the total value of votes 
                                                        
171 Garner Black’s Law Dictionary 1263. 
172 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 163. 
173 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-46.  
174 UCIOA § 3-109; STA Annexure 8 r 57. 
175 UCIOA § 3-110; STA Annexure 8 r 57 (1). 
176 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 163. 
 196
are present either in person or by proxy.177 For projects with more than ten but less 
than 50 units, the number of owners able to vote must have at least 35 per cent of the 
votes and be present in person or by proxy or by a representative legally able to 
comprise a quorum.178 For projects with 50 or more units, the quorum is at least 20 
per cent of the votes present in person or by proxy.179 The rationale for lowering the 
quorum for larger schemes may be that owners would feel marginalized and have 
little influence with condominium’s management with a high quorum barrier.  
  Under the UCIOA, there is not a flexible quorum rule based on the number of 
condominium units. The minimum quorum permitted is 20 per cent of the voting 
power presented by unit owners in person or by proxy at the beginning of a meeting, 
unless the by-laws provide otherwise.180 Mandatory quorum requirements lower than 
50 per cent for general meetings are often justified due to the difficulty of inducing 
unit owners to attend meetings.181 The problem is particularly acute with resort 
condominiums where many owners reside elsewhere, often at considerable distances 
for most of the year.182 
  A provision in the Chinese Property Management Regulation states that a quorum 
is met if more than half of the unit owners are in attendance or by proxy of those 
representing at least 50 per cent of the condominium units’ floor areas.183 Thus under 
current Chinese law, a quorum is based on both unit owners’ floor area and the 
number of unit owners present. Requiring a large quorum percentage at the first 
annual general meeting is understandable for it is necessary to initiate wide-ranging 
owners’ participation, to establish a day-to-day running body and to put a collective 
decision-making mechanism into operation, i.e. the executive council. However, for 
                                                        
177 Annexure 8 r 57 (2) (a). 
178 Annexure 8 r 57 (2) (b). 
179 Annexure 8 r 57 (2) (c). 
180 UCIOA § 3-109 (a) (1). 
181 UCIOA 3-109 comment. 
182 See n 181 supra.   
183 Art 12 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007). 
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later annual general meetings and special meetings, a large quorum is risky, for it may 
be too difficult to assemble a quorum to hold the meeting. Therefore, when a Chinese 
condominium statute is to be framed, it should follow the UCIOA and the STA 
examples of lowering the quorum requirement to 30 per cent in order to convene a 
meeting.  
  Moreover, if a quorum is not present at the first meeting, it is necessary to have 
legal direction, a condominium statute, to provide instructions on how to convene a 
subsequent meeting. Under the STA, if a quorum is not present within half an hour of 
the time fixed for the meeting, then the meeting is adjourned to the same day a week 
later at the same place and time.184 If at the adjourned meeting a quorum is still not 
present within half an hour of the meeting’s commencement, it can still go ahead with 
the persons present or by proxy and entitled to vote as if they constitute a quorum.185 
At present, in China there is a legislative lacuna about the quorum issue both at the 
national level and the local level.186 A future Chinese condominium statute should 
therefore adopt the STA “half-hour” rule to deal with a situation of a quorum not 
being met. However, taking into account the efficiency of general condominium 
administration, the future uniform Chinese statute should provide that when a quorum 
is not met within half an hour after the meeting is called, the meeting will be delayed 
to a later hour on the same day at the same place. If there is still no quorum within 
half an hour of the delayed start, then unit owners present and entitled to vote will 
constitute a quorum. The merit of this proposal is that, on the one hand, the meeting 
adjournment prevents an active minority from dominating a condominium’s 
indifferent majority.187 On the other hand, holding the adjourned meeting on the same 
day at a later time saves time and enhances management efficiency. Moreover, this 
                                                        
184 Annexure 8 r 58. 
185 See n 184 supra.   
186 Zhang Lihong “To Perfect the Condominium Provisions in the Draft Property Code” 2005 (10) 
Legal Science Monthly 22-26. (Chinese version) 
187 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-47. 
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arrangement also avoids practical difficulties which an adjourned meeting held a week 
later encounters, because no notice needs to be given of the delayed meeting.  
6 3 6 Chairperson 
The UCIOA does not address the chairperson issue, presumably because corporate 
law covers the topic. However, the STA rules provide that the trustees’ chairperson 
presides at every unit owner general meeting unless another method is decided upon 
at the meeting by the body corporate members. 188  If there is not a trustees’ 
chairperson or the trustees’ chairperson is not present within fifteen minutes after the 
time a meeting is to begin or if the designated chairperson is unwilling or unable to 
act as chairperson, the members present elect a chairperson for the meeting.189 There 
is some question as to whether an acting chairperson at a general meeting needs to be 
a member, but rather could be an outsider such as a managing agent or for that matter 
any other kind of person.190   
  When a Chinese statute is drafted, it should provide that the chairperson of the 
executive council presides at a general meeting providing of course the person is 
present. In the absence of the chairperson, the chairperson can well in advance 
nominate a member of the executive council to chair the meeting. If neither the 
chairperson nor the designated executive council member is present within fifteen 
minutes after the time set for the meeting, the executive council members present can 
elect one of their own to be chairman and preside over the meeting. If there is only 
one member of the executive council present, that person will be the chairperson. A 
Chinese condominium statute should further stipulate that there cannot be a general 
meeting without any executive council members in attendance. In fact, there must be 
at least one member of the executive council present at any general meeting. Selecting 
                                                        
188 Annexure 8 r 59 (1). 
189 See n 188 supra. 
190 Sectional Titles Regulation Board Proposals (March 2003) 3.2.5. 
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a member of the executive council as chairperson when the executive council 
chairperson is absent is advantageous. First, executive council members are better 
acquainted with condominium affairs than non-executive council owners, let alone 
outsiders. Second, it is the executive council that organizes the general meeting, 
including sending notices, developing and putting forward meeting programs, and 
soliciting motions. It is illogical for an outsider or a unit owner who has not 
participated in the preparations for the meeting to preside. Third, the chairperson of 
the executive council cannot be derelict in his/her duty by being reluctant or unwilling 
to preside over any particular meeting. Only under very specific circumstances, such 
as being ill, away, suspended as chairperson for personal criminal liability, or having a 
conflict of interests regarding an issue to be discussed at a particular meeting, can the 
chairperson be absent.    
6 3 7 Majorities Required for Resolutions  
Resolutions are decisions made at a general meeting of the management body. Unit 
owners decide for themselves how to manage much of a condominium’s affairs by 
passing pertinent resolutions. According to the general principles of the law of 
associations, a resolution can be passed if approved by a simple majority of owners 
entitled to vote either in person or by proxy.  
  The UCIOA does not have a special provision for general meeting resolutions, 
presumably because the issue is under the jurisdiction of a condominium’s declaration 
or its by-laws.191 In other words, the declaration may state what percentage of unit 
                                                        
191 UCIOA 2-107 (d) states that “[t]he declaration may provide: (i) that different allocations of votes 
shall be made to the units on particular matters specified in the declaration; (ii) for cumulative voting 
only for the purpose of electing members of the executive board; and (iii) for class voting on specified 
issues affecting the class if necessary to protect valid interests of the class.” The cumulative voting, 
which usually used in the corporate governance, elects the top vote-getters, just as with a simple 
plurality election. However, voters are allowed to concentrate their full share of votes on fewer 
candidates than seats. With cumulative voting, voters are permitted to not split their votes and instead 
concentrate them on a single candidate at full value. 
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owners’ approval is required for any particular issue. There are cases of associations 
requiring a larger majority of at least 67 per cent of the votes to amend a declaration. 
The point is that a declaration may specify a larger majority of any percentage or the 
declaration can specify a smaller number if all of the units are exclusively for 
nonresidential use.192 While there is not a particular resolution section under the 
UCIOA, scattered provisions dealing with a meeting’s resolutions indicate that unless 
the declaration states otherwise, there are three categories of resolution, namely a 
simple majority resolution, a two-thirds vote super majority resolution, and an 80 per 
cent vote super majority resolution.  
  For a simple majority resolution, the UCIOA states that at a general meeting a 
majority of all unit owners can reject a proposed condominium budget unless a larger 
majority is specified in the declaration.193 A two-thirds resolution, a super majority, is 
used for amending a declaration and removing an executive board member. The 
UCIOA stipulates that the declaration can be amended only with a larger majority of 
at least 67 per cent or more of the unit owners depending on what the declaration 
specifies.194 In addition, the UCIOA specifies that the unit owners by a two-thirds 
vote of all owners present and entitled to vote at a unit owners’ meeting with a 
quorum, can remove any member of the executive board with or without cause as long 
as neither the declaration nor the by-laws prohibit it.195 A further example of a 
two-thirds resolution under the UCIOA is when making a decision on the relocation of 
boundaries between the owners’ units and the common property.196 The final category, 
the 80 per cent resolution, is used in a number of instances. For example, this “super” 
majority is used when a condominium project is terminated; when a part of the 
common property is transferred or encumbered by a security interest; when an 
                                                        
192 UCIOA 2-117 (a). 
193 UCIOA 3-103 (c).  
194 UCIOA 2-117 (a). 
195 UCIOA 3-103 (g). 
196 UCIOA 2-112 (b). 
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amendment is made to the declaration to restrict an occupant’s use of his/her unit or to 
restrict the behavior of people living in or making use of a unit. Specifically, the 
UCIOA provides that with the exception of taking a condominium unit by eminent 
domain, a condominium project can be terminated only when at least 80 per cent of 
the votes agree.197 Furthermore, the Act states that in a condominium project, 
portions of the common property can be conveyed or subjected to a security interest 
by the association if 80 per cent or more of those entitled to vote consent.198 
Moreover, the Act also states that if 80 per cent or more of the unit owners agree by 
vote or otherwise they may prohibit or severely restrict the uses of a condominium 
unit, the number of people who may occupy it or the qualifications and behavior of 
those who may occupy a unit.199 
  Similar to the UCIOA approach, the South African STA also has three categories of 
general meeting resolutions: ordinary resolutions, special resolutions and unanimous 
resolutions. An ordinary resolution is the least difficult to pass for it only requires a 
simple majority.200 A special resolution can be described as a “75 per cent resolution”. 
It can be obtained in two ways, either when a majority of not less than 75 per cent of 
the votes (reckoned in value and number) of members of a body corporate present or 
represented at a general meeting agree to the proposed resolution, or when at least 
75% of all the members of a body corporate (reckoned in number) and at least 75% of 
all such members (reckoned in value) personally or by proxy agree in writing.201 
Under the STA a unanimous resolution does not literally mean that a decision has to 
have unanimous approval. Rather, it would be more appropriate to call it an “80 per 
cent resolution”.202  Like the special resolution, a unanimous resolution can be 
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obtained in two ways. It can be either passed unanimously at a general meeting 
attended or represented by at least 80% of all unit owners or agreed to in writing by 
all the unit owners.203  
  Interestingly, in order to facilitate a unanimous resolution, the STA stipulates that a 
unit owner who abstains from the resolution is counted as having voted in favor of the 
resolution.204 This provision virtually discards abstention at any general meeting. 
Thus few if any unit owners abstain but rather they clearly vote for or against a 
resolution. The STA further facilitates a unanimous resolution with a provision that if 
a body corporate is unable to obtain a unanimous vote on a resolution, it can ask the 
court for relief.205 
  Under the STA, matters requiring a unanimous resolution include: 1) directing the 
body corporate to alienate or lease any portion of the common property; 206 
2) granting one or more unit owners exclusive use to a part of the common 
property;207 3) deciding whether to terminate or reconstruct a building which is 
damaged or destroyed or deemed to be destroyed;208 4) amending, substituting, 
adding to, or repealing the management rules of a scheme.209  
  Additionally, a special resolution is required in the following matters: 1) to decide 
whether an owner can extend the floor area of his or her unit;210 2) to direct the body 
corporate to execute or accept a servitude or restrictive condition burdening or 
                                                                                                                                                               
after the Act was enacted, the law makers discovered that it was almost impossible to obtain a 
unanimous resolution since owners are apathetic about attending meetings. As a result, the Sectional 
Titles Act of 1986 substantially changed how a unanimous resolution is defined and obtained. See more 
detail at Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-49. 
203 STA s 1 (1) s v “unanimous resolution”. 
204 STA s 1 (3) (b). 
205 STA s 1 (3A). 
206 STA s 17 (1). 
207 STA s 27 (2). 
208 STA s 48 (1) (b), s 48 (3) (a) (i) and s 49 (1). 
209 STA s 35 (2) (a). 
210 STA s 24 (3). 
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benefiting the land in the scheme;211 3) to change the value of an owner’s vote or to 
change the amount an owner has to pay into the administrative fund;212 4) to amend, 
substitute, add to, or repeal the conduct rules of a scheme;213 5) to authorize the body 
corporate to sue the developer regarding any condominium issue;214 6) to direct the 
trustees not to insure the scheme against damage except for the compulsory insurance 
required by Annexure 8 rule 29;215 7) to determine whether to make a non-luxurious 
improvement to the common property;216 8) to hold a general meeting outside the 
magisterial district where the scheme is situated;217 9) to revoke the contract of the 
managing agent and discharge the person.218  
 It is clear from the above that there are different categories of resolutions depending 
on the importance of the issue involved. The more important the issue, the more 
onerous is the resolution. When a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, a system of 
resolution categories needs to be adopted based on the STA and the UCIOA legislative 
experiences. However, the Chinese situation is unique in the sense that most housing 
owners live in a condominium development since cost prevents them from living in 
any other kind of housing. Since condominium owners are precluded from having a 
housing alternative it is extremely important that there should be unit owners’ 
consensus on important social and fiscal housing issues. One such example is the 
termination of a condominium complex. If a condominium can be terminated with 
only the consent of 80 per cent of unit owners, as is the case under the UCIOA, the 
remaining 20 per cent may well have an appalling struggle to find affordable housing. 
That said, the Chinese socio-economic factor matters. 
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  Hence, a Chinese condominium statute should include two other categories of 
resolution, namely, resolution by consensus and a 90 per cent super majority 
resolution. The former resolution could be used to terminate a condominium project. 
The latter resolution could be used to levy greater contributions to a maintenance fund 
and a reserve fund and when proposing a substantial improvement on part of the 
common property. Moreover, a Chinese condominium statute should maintain a clear 
division between the different categories of resolutions. Consequently, Chinese 
condominium legislation should adopt five kinds of resolution: resolutions by 
consensus, 90 per cent resolutions, 80 per cent resolutions, 67 per cent resolutions and 
simple majority resolutions.   
  Another noteworthy issue is allowing the passage of a by-law giving the unit owner 
the exclusive use of common property. Under the STA, this matter requires a 
unanimous resolution. However, in China, a resolution should be dependent on the 
period of exclusive use that is granted. A Chinese condominium statute should provide 
that a 67 per cent rate of approval should be used when granting an owner exclusive 
use of the common property for between one and three years. For a period that 
exceeds three years, an 80 per cent approval rate should be required.  
  More importantly, the STA provides that unanimous and special resolutions can be 
obtained in one of two ways. The required majority of the votes can be cast either by 
unit owners present or represented at a general meeting, or by means of a written 
resolution signed by the required number of owners, without a general meeting being 
held.219 This is in part because many unit owners are indifferent about attending 
general meetings and in part because owners may not have the time to attend. It is for 
this reason that a mail-in ballot method can efficiently be utilized without holding a 
meeting. At least one person has categorized and termed this procedure as making 
resolutions outside the general meeting.220 This method has some advantages. First, it 
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can attract better participation by involving unit owners in condominium management. 
For example, with a secret ballot, unit owners will not be exposed to possible 
intimidation for the way they cast their votes. Second, it can save cost in holding a 
meeting, for example, the expenses of renting a meeting hall. Third, unit owners are 
able to fill out their ballot on their time schedule as long as it is with a particular time 
period for they do not need to set a fixed time to attend a meeting. Accordingly, when 
a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, it should clearly make provision allowing a 
vote by ballot without a meeting either in writing or electronically.          
6 3 8 Voting by Joint Owners, Tenants and Proxies 
6 3 8 1 Voting by Joint Owners  
Under the UCIOA, if a unit is jointly owned by two or more persons, one owner who 
is present at a general meeting is entitled to cast all the votes allocated to the unit. If 
more than one owner is present, the vote of a majority is decisive, unless the 
declaration expressly provides otherwise. A majority agreement negotiated between 
joint owners can allow any one of the owners to cast the votes without protest.221  
  The STA states that when two or more persons are entitled to exercise one vote 
jointly, the vote should be exercised only by a person jointly appointed by them as 
their proxy.222 While normally it would be one of them, the person authorized to vote 
does not necessarily have to be one of the joint owners. However, where two or more 
persons are entitled to exercise one vote jointly, any one of them may demand a 
                                                                                                                                                               
robin’ method of the STA under which a written document containing the resolution is sent to all unit 
owners for their signature. This document is not secret and the method is open to peer pressure because 
an unwilling owner can be told that everyone else has signed. If instead of this, each owner is supplied 
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send it back to the chairman, the ballot would remain secret.  
221 UCIOA § 3-110 (a).  
222 Annexure 8 r 66 (1). 
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poll.223 
  In summary, under the UCIOA, when a unit is held by two or more owners the vote 
of any one of the co-owners is binding upon all. However, if more than one co-owner 
exercises the voting right, the vote of the majority of the co-owners binds all. This 
provision is logical. But the STA approach is simpler and easier for the meeting 
organizer to conduct. Under the STA, a unit jointly owned by more than one person 
should authorize one person to vote on their behalf. Obviously, this helps the meeting 
organizer to count the quorum since it is given to the meeting organizer in advance. 
The organizer does not need to spend extra time resolving a dispute concerning which 
joint owner has the legitimate right to vote. Therefore, when a Chinese condominium 
statute is framed, the South African approach is preferable. However, an additional 
concern is raised when joint owners cannot reach an agreement to authorize one proxy. 
In this case, the general principles of co-ownership should apply and the vote for such 
unit will count only if the co-owners agree on the way they must vote. When there is a 
tie between owners who are in conflict in designating a proxy, a Chinese statute 
should state that no vote is counted for that unit since the unit’s voting right is 
cancelled out by the actions of each joint owner.   
6 3 8 2 Tenant Voting  
Tenant voting is an increasingly important matter in the governance of condominium 
communities. The UCIOA permits a declaration requiring that votes on certain matters 
be cast by tenants as if they were unit owners, provided that unit owners also are given 
notice of any meeting at which an owner’s tenant is entitled to vote.224 This provision 
allowing owners’ tenants to vote on certain specific matters is particularly useful in 
resort condominiums where units are often leased. It is desirable to give tenants rather 
than unit owners the vote on issues involving day-to-day operation since tenants may 
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have a greater interest than owners and because it is desirable to have tenants feel they 
are an integral part of the condominium community.225 
  It has been observed that, in a significant percentage of condominiums in China, 
many tenants are prevented from attending general meetings and voting.226 The 
statutory lacuna of tenant voting is undoubtedly attributable to unit owners feeling 
reluctant to lose authority on important matters such as paying monthly contributions, 
and granting exclusive use areas to certain unit owners. Moreover, this issue is 
relatively new and has not received much attention from Chinese lawmakers. 
Therefore, any Chinese condominium statute should recognize the desirability of 
integrating tenants into the condominium community. It should be explicit that any 
tenant with a lease of more than three years should have a right to attend meetings and 
unit owners should be encouraged to authorize their tenants by a power of attorney to 
vote on their behalf.  
6 3 8 3 Proxy Voting  
Although neither the UCIOA nor the STA provides a specific definition of a proxy, it 
can be inferred that a proxy is a person to whom the unit owner has given permission 
to represent him/her at a meeting.  
Both the UCIOA and the STA allow votes to be cast through a duly appointed 
proxy.227 The UCIOA section 3-110 (b) provides that votes can be cast by a proxy 
duly executed by a unit owner. If a unit is owned by more than one person, each unit 
owner may vote or challenge the right to vote by the other unit owners through a duly 
executed proxy. A proxy, duly appointed by all the joint owners may in principle 
exercise the vote to the exclusion of all the joint owners. 228  The instrument 
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appointing a proxy must be in writing and is usually valid only for one year.229   
  Under the STA, a proxy must be in writing and should be handed to the 
Chairperson prior to the commencement of the meeting.230 A proxy can, but need not 
be an owner.231 However, the managing agent or any of his/her employees or an 
employee of the body corporate cannot act as a proxy.232 In practice, other owners, 
trustees and tenants are the most likely choices to be a proxy. A proxy should only be 
appointed for a particular general meeting and proxies usually should not be valid for 
more than one year.233  
The UCIOA also provides a provision pertaining to the revocation of proxies. Here, 
a unit owner can revoke a proxy by an actual notice of revocation given to the person 
presiding over the association’s meeting.234 While there is no special provision on the 
proxy’s revocation, the STA regards a proxy merely as a form of an agent. An owner 
can in principle revoke the appointment of a proxy at any time by notifying the 
chairperson prior to the meeting’s commencement.235     
  Hence, when drafting a Chinese statute, lawmakers should ensure that a valid proxy 
be in a form prescribed by regulations. Proof of the appointment of proxies must be 
given to the chairperson or the secretary two days prior to a meeting. Moreover, the 
proxy form must state whether the proxy can vote on all matters or only on certain 
ones. Since a proxy lapses with time, the period specified on the proxy form should be 
no more than twelve months. If a proxy form does not state the length of time it is 
valid, it will only be valid at one upcoming meeting. This differs from the stringent 
UCIOA approach which states that a proxy is void if it is undated.236 
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  In addition, a future Chinese condominium statute should be clear that a proxy 
cannot be irrevocable, cannot be transferred to a third party and that only the most 
recent proxy is valid. A unit owner can revoke a proxy with a letter of revocation to 
the chairperson or the secretary prior to the meeting. Apart from this, the owner who 
issues a proxy can revoke it by attending the meeting. Note that for a jointly owned 
unit it can only be revoked by written notice to the chairperson or the secretary. In 
other words, if one co-owner is present at a meeting, a proxy authorized by all joint 
owners can still vote.     
Two other issues need more attention. The first is the eligibility of a proxy at a 
general meeting. Under the UCIOA, there is not a special requirement on the 
eligibility of a proxy.237 It is implied that anyone can be a proxy as long as the person 
is duly appointed. However, reiterating the STA, the managing agent or its employees 
or body corporate employees cannot be proxies.238 This is primarily because of the 
potential for conflicts of interest. Those disallowed to be proxies could possibly seek 
financial or material benefits for themselves as proxy holders. Material benefits could 
include the extension of a term of appointment and an increase in remuneration. 
Hence, a future Chinese condominium statute should adopt this provision to defuse 
any such situations.   
The second issue is the accumulation of votes by means of proxies. It is 
conceivable for a member of the executive council to collect many powers of attorney, 
thus giving the person control over the affairs of the condominium. This phenomenon 
of concentrating voting power in the hands of a member of the council is not 
widespread in China.239 However, it would be worthwhile to forestall any such 
unhealthy situation. In general, there are two methods to dilute the over-concentration 
of voting powers by members of the executive council. One is to limit the number of 
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unit voting rights for each proxy. The other is to place a cap on the number of votes an 
individual can exercise as a proxy. Both methods are workable to resolve what can 
often become a problem. But it seems that the capping the number of votes that a 
single proxy has is more appropriate since it would be consistent with the mechanism 
which caps a developer’s voting power at the first general meeting. That is, any owner 
or any proxy at any general meeting cannot control more than 30 per cent of the total 
number of votes. Therefore, a method of capping the voting power of a single owner, 
whether a developer, a unit owner or a proxy, is preferable in China. 
6 4 EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
6 4 1 Introduction 
The executive council of the condominium association is a group that represents unit 
owners or their nominees. The executive council corresponds to the executive board 
under the UCIOA and the council of trustees under the STA. While the function of the 
general meeting is in principle legislative, the executive council has both an executive 
and administrative function.240 Because it is impractical for all owners to attend to the 
day-to-day management of a condominium complex, under the UCIOA and the STA, 
the executive council is usually elected to execute the general meeting’s resolutions 
and to administer the day-to-day affairs of the condominium complex.241 Chinese law 
provides virtually the same status to executive councils.242 Although the executive 
council is less powerful than the general meeting, its standing committee’s role is 
evident in the management of the condominium. A quick analogy is that the executive 
council is the equivalent of the board of directors of a corporation and the unit owners 
                                                        
240 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-58. 
241 UCIOA § 3-103; STA s 39 (1). 
242 Art 15 of the Chinese Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
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are the equivalent of the shareholders.243    
  Nonetheless, in exceptionally small condominiums, it is not necessary to establish 
an executive council since the unit owners are able to handle the condominium affairs 
themselves. 244  Hence, the creation of an executive council in a condominium 
complex should be strongly encouraged but not be made uniformly obligatory. 
  Perhaps the legal nature of the executive council can be better comprehended by 
examining the distinction between its internal relationship with the association and 
external relationships and transactions with third parties. Internally, the executive 
council, as an administrative body, is regarded as the standing committee of the 
condominium association and therefore a part of it. By contrast, when it comes to its 
external transactions with third parties, the executive council acts as an agent of the 
association, rendering the association bound by all acts its executive council 
conducted with actual or ostensible authority.245    
  Actual authority here means the executive council must perform its duties subject 
to the restrictions imposed by the Condominium Act, the by-laws and the general 
meeting’s resolutions. The executive council cannot act outside of its powers, that is 
ultra vires, for example, under the STA model rules, the trustees cannot loan money 
on behalf of the body corporate to owners or themselves.246 It hardly needs to be said 
that anyone seeking to enforce an agreement against the association he or she signed 
with its executive council should first determine whether the executive council had 
such signature power.247 In South Africa, it is assumed that everyone presumably is 
knowledgeable about any power that the Act or model rules reserve for the general 
meetings for they will have a constructive notice of the situation.248 This means that a 
                                                        
243 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 42-7; Liang Huixing Commentary on 
Chinese Property Code Draft 302. 
244 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 148. 
245 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-59. 
246 Annexure 8 r 26 (2). 
247 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-60. 
248 See Wiljay Invesments (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate Bryanston Crescent 1984 2 SA 722 (T) 727D. 
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member of the general public can inspect the restrictions and reservations of the 
executive council by examining the Act or relevant documents lodged in the deeds 
registry.249   
  However, a third party has an escape hatch if the person believes in good faith that 
the trustees have the authority through a general meeting’s resolution but later 
discovers the necessary resolution has never been passed. Then the so-called indoor 
management rule applies. This means that a third party is able to enforce a contract 
against the body corporate since a third party cannot be expected to look beyond a 
corporation’s public documents and investigate its internal governance.250  Such 
executive council’s ostensible authority also applies when a third party is unaware of 
the restrictions made by a general meeting resolution that was made without 
amending the rules.251 
  Following is a discussion of several issues involving an executive council’s powers 
and duties. Also dealt with are the executive council’s duty of care to the association, 
elections, council meetings, and council members’ remuneration and benefits.   
6 4 2 Powers and Functions  
The executive council is in principle entitled to exercise all the powers and functions 
of the condominium association as its executive body. However, it has to be kept in 
mind that the executive council is subordinate to the general meeting of unit owners. 
Moreover, the council’s powers and functions are subject to various restrictions. An 
example is that powers are reserved by the general meeting of unit owners to deal 
                                                        
249 Constructive notice means notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and 
circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of, such as a registered deed or a pending lawsuit; 
notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person. See Garner 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1088. 
250 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-61; also see Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors 
Aweigh 2006 3 SA 369 (W) [61]-[65]. In this case, the indoor management rule was confirmed by the 
South African court. 
251 See n 250 supra.  
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with such restricted matters as deciding to alter the rate of the unit owners’ monthly 
contributions and terminating the condominium complex.  
  These “restricted matters” rules are made clear under both the UCIOA and the STA. 
Under the UCIOA, the executive board may always act on behalf of the association 
except when prevented from doing so in the declaration, the by-laws, or in other 
provisions of the Act. 252  In addition to being prevented from terminating the 
development, an executive board is expressly restricted from amending a declaration, 
having anything to do with either the election of the executive board members or 
determining the board members’ qualifications, powers, duties and terms of office.253   
  Under the STA, the trustees exercise their powers and functions subject to the 
restrictions imposed by the Act, model rules and general meeting’s resolutions.254 Put 
another way, apart from the express restrictions made by the Act and prescribed rules, 
the general meeting, with its legislative function retains effective control over the 
trustees.255 This is because it can elect trustees and remove them from office and can 
direct trustees how to exercise their powers.256 The trustees’ power can only be 
delegated subject to the restrictions imposed by the model rules and the general 
meeting’s resolutions.  
  Consequently, when there is a disagreement between an owners’ association and its 
executive council on any issue, the decision of the general meeting prevails. An 
executive council cannot overrule the resolution of the general meeting. When a 
Chinese condominium statute is framed, this “restricted matters” principle must be 
formalized to defuse disputes caused by a blurring of power between the executive 
council and the general meeting.  
  The STA has adopted a minimalist approach to laying out the trustees’ statutory 
                                                        
252 UCIOA § 3-103 (a). 
253 UCIOA§ 3-103 (b). 
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255 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-35. 
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powers. They are the power: 1) to appoint agents and employees for the control, 
management and administration of the common property and to exercise the powers 
and duties of the body corporate;257 2) to delegate their powers and duties to one or 
more of the trustees as well as to revoke the delegation as they deem fit;258 3) to sign 
legal papers on behalf of the body corporate.259 Specifically, the trustees cannot only 
delegate the power to one of their members to be treasurer or secretary, but also 
designate some members to represent the body corporate in legal proceedings.260   
  Any future Chinese condominium statute should strive to root the fundamental 
powers of the executive council in statute as is the case in the South African Act. 
More importantly, a Chinese condominium statute should grant the executive council 
the power to delegate its powers to qualified persons. In China, since many 
condominiums are multi-building projects, the executive council alone finds it 
extremely difficult to function as a single body. Having a well thought-out 
organizational structure will assist the executive council to function much more 
smoothly. 261  While the STA contains no provision for a council of trustees’ 
organizational structure,262 the UCIOA stipulates that an association’s by-laws require 
the election of the executive board members including a president, a treasurer, a 
secretary, and any other officers.263 The American experience is that to ease the 
board’s workload and to facilitate communications with unit owners, the executive 
board establishes various “standing committees”.264 Consequently, when a Chinese 
condominium statute is drafted, the executive council should delegate certain powers 
to members acting among other things as the treasurer dealing with fiscal affairs and 
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262 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-70. 
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the secretary. Therefore in China, an executive council’s organizational structure at 
least should have the chairperson, the secretary, and the treasurer involved in the 
running of the condominium management. Clearly, the executive council can delegate 
limited powers to a managing agent if necessary to handle day-to-day operations.  
  A widely regarded suggestion is that the trustees also make house rules dealing with 
the finer details regarding the day-to-day running of a condominium.265 This is a 
sensible provision that should be borrowed for a Chinese condominium statute. 
Moreover, the executive council should be obliged to update and distribute the house 
rules regularly.    
  Finally, the executive council’s power to represent the body corporate in bringing 
legal action in a court is worthy of particular attention. Borrowing the UCIOA and the 
STA approach, condominium associations should be granted legal standing to sue in 
matters concerning the condominium project. However, in practice, granting the 
executive council the power to sue in court without reservation is somewhat insidious. 
This is particularly true with money disputes when a unit owner refuses to pay his/her 
contributions. First, the court proceedings are costly and distracted and very often 
litigation itself is more expensive than the money claimed. Second, with unfettered 
power to press a money claim in court, the executive council could probably insist on 
resolving disputes in court instead of first employing amicable persuasion, mediation 
or arbitration. Moreover, litigation may not be in the best interests of maintaining a 
harmonious community,266 since the court should be the last resort but not the first 
which comes into council members’ minds. In the United States, the question whether 
an executive board has an exclusive standing on behalf of an association has been 
considered by the courts. The courts have consistently held that an association has 
exclusive standing to assert such claims as the handling of association funds267 as 
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well as common property and limited common property.268 Given that Chinese 
condominium law is still undeveloped, many executive council members are not 
equipped well enough with legal skills and knowledge. When a Chinese condominium 
statute is framed, it would be worthwhile to stipulate that for legal matters involving 
large expenditures and unit owners’ fundamental interests, the power to commence 
legal proceedings be placed in the hands of the general meeting. For legal matters 
involving small expenses and daily controversies, the executive council would have 
jurisdiction. What constitutes a large expenditure and what constitutes a small 
expenditure as well as what constitutes a fundamental matter would be defined by the 
constitutive document or a general meeting’s resolution.  
6 4 3 Duty of Care  
The UCIOA makes clear that the officers and members of the executive board 
appointed by the developer hold their offices as fiduciaries of the unit owners.269 The 
rationale for this is to avert potential conflicts of interest between the developer and 
the unit owners.270 However, the executive board members elected by unit owners are 
only required to take ordinary and reasonable care rather than a higher standard of 
fiduciary duty.271 This only requires that “in the performance of their duties, the 
executive board members should discharge their duties in good faith, and with that 
diligence and care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar 
                                                        
268 Board of Directors of Kennelly Square Condominium Association v MOB Ventures LLC 359 Ill 
App 3d 991, 996, 296 Ill Dec 700, 836 N E 2d 115 (2005). 
269 UCIOA § 3-103 (a) stipulates that “In the performance of their duties, officers and members of the 
executive board appointed by the declarant shall exercise the degree of care and loyalty required of a 
trustee.” In addition, § 3-103 comment 3 expressly states that “[a]ny executive board member 
appointed by the declarant is liable as a fiduciary to any unit owner for his acts or omissions in such 
capacity.” 
270 UCIOA § 3-103 comment 1. 
271 Di Lorenzo The Law of Condominium and Cooperatives 3-4; Van der Merwe “The Sectional Title 
Act in the Light of the Uniform Condominium Act” 24.  
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circumstances.”272 It seems that the UCIOA only relies on a business judgment rule 
as the basis to evaluate an executive board’s actions.273 This means that as long as 
directors of a corporation decide matters rationally, honestly, and without a conflict of 
interest, the decision will not be reviewed by the courts.274    
  In contrast to the UCIOA, the STA requires each trustee to be in a fiduciary 
relationship with the body corporate.275 Here the trustee must act honestly and in 
good faith towards the body corporate and avoid any material conflict between his/ 
her own interests and those of the body corporate.276 Under the STA, the trustee has 
to notify the other trustees at the earliest opportunity of any direct or indirect conflict 
of interest in any contract between him/her and the body corporate.277 While the 
examples enumerated in section 40 (2) of the STA are not exhaustive they have wider 
implications.278 Nevertheless, the duty required by the STA is not a duty of care279 
reasonably expected from a person with his/her knowledge and experience as under 
company law.280 This is made clear in section 40 (3) (a) of the STA that states that a 
trustee can only be held delictually liable for any loss and any economic benefit 
derived by him/her on account of his/her mala fide or grossly negligent act or 
omission. When a trustee fails to disclose any conflict of interest in a contract entered 
into by him/her on behalf of the body corporate for an economic benefit, the contract 
is voidable at the discretion of the body corporate. The STA further provides that if the 
                                                        
272 See North Carolina General Statute § 47C-3-103(a). 
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body corporate decides to void such a contract, an interested person can ask for a 
court order directing that the contract is still binding if it is fair and fits the 
circumstances.281 This is quite different from the general principle applied in contract 
law when a contract is deemed void: the contract is ab initio non-existent but 
restitution must be applied to restore the status quo.282 Therefore, it can be seen that 
under the STA, far from being subject to a high standard of duty of care and skill, 
trustees in a sectional title scheme only incur liability if they are mala fide or grossly 
negligent in conducting their duties and functions and in exercising their powers.  
Hence, both the UCIOA and the STA impose a lower standard of duty of care on 
executive board members or trustees. For the STA, the main reason for this leniency is 
to encourage unit owners to serve as trustees.283 Similarly, under the UCIOA, the 
lower standard of duty of care has as its purpose to increase the willingness of unit 
owners to serve as board members and officers.284  
When a uniform Chinese condominium statute is drafted, a lower standard of duty 
of care also needs to be adopted. Specifically, a Chinese condominium statute should 
clearly state that a council member must: 1) disclose to other council members any 
direct or indirect contract with the unit owners’ association; 2) not vote on the contract; 
and 3) excuse himself/herself from the council meeting when the contract or any other 
related transaction is being discussed. Particularly important is that Chinese 
lawmakers should induce unit owners to be more inclined to be council members 
while at the same time preserving a high standard of council members’ services. To 
strike this balance, any future Chinese condominium statute should distinguish 
“owner council members” and “outsider council members” in terms of a standard, if 
any, for a duty of care. For unit owners who serve as council members, a lower 
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standard of duty of care is suitable because they are most probably unpaid.285 
However, for experienced professionals from outside serving on the executive council, 
an ordinary duty of care should apply since they are normally paid for their services.  
6 4 4 Appointment and Qualification 
Under the UCIOA, the appointment of executive council members has two stages: 
first, during the initial period, the developer can appoint transitional council members 
("developer's council members"); second, after the initial period, all of the council 
members appointed by the developer must be removed at the first general meeting 
when new council members are appointed or old ones re-appointed with the unit 
owners’ approval.286 The developer has no choice but to turn over control of the 
association to owner-elected council members within a specified time. The UCIOA 
carefully lays out the provisions for a gradual turnover of control of the association to 
the unit owners: 1) 60 days after the developer transfers title to purchasers of 25 per 
cent of the units, at least one member and not less than 25 per cent of the members of 
the executive board must be elected by the unit owners; or 2) 60 days after the title 
transfer of 50 per cent of the units to purchasers, not less than 33 per cent of the 
members of the executive board must be elected by unit owners.287 
  Under the STA, the model rules provide that all owners are trustees from the time 
the body corporate is established until the first general meeting.288 The rule is that the 
developer must convene the first general meeting within 60 days after the 
establishment of the body corporate.289 The developer or his/her nominee can be the 
chairperson during this period but all transitional trustees, whether unit owners or the 
developer, must resign at the first general meeting but they still are eligible for 
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re-election.290   
  While Chinese law provides for the appointment of a managing agent during the 
initial period,291 there is no such a “developer’s council members” provision. It is 
only practical for the developer to be in control during the developmental phases of a 
project. Therefore, when a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, it should provide 
that the “developer’s council members” are in charge during the transitional period 
but are required to resign at the first general meeting. Subsequently, the unit owners 
elect an executive council at the first general meeting.  
  Who is eligible to be an executive council member, and who is not, is an important 
issue. The UCIOA implies that a council member does not necessarily need to be a 
unit owner for it has a provision that at least a majority of the executive board 
members must be unit owners.292 Likewise, under the STA, the model rules stipulate 
that a trustee need not be an owner or even the nominee of a juristic person owner.293 
But like the UCIOA, the STA also mandates that the majority of the trustees have to 
be owners or spouses of owners.294 Therefore, both the UCIOA and the STA allow 
any person who is not an owner but nominated by an owner standing for election to be 
a council member. However, the STA provides an important exception. That is, the 
managing agent or one of the agent’s employees or a body corporate employee cannot 
be a trustee.295  
   Under Chinese law, executive council members must be either a unit owner or a 
representative of a corporation owner.296 In short, only unit owners can be eligible as 
council members. This is inappropriate since excluding outside candidates may be an 
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obstacle in bringing professional experience to the executive council. 297  When 
additional skills or experience is needed or an insufficient number of unit owners are 
willing to serve as council members, suitably qualified outsiders should fill the gap as 
appointees.298 In China it is difficult to have experienced council members with 
required skills, since the management of condominiums by unit owners is still a 
novelty. Nevertheless, a future Chinese condominium statute should follow the STA 
approach requiring that the majority of council members should be unit owners. This 
ensures that the majority of executive council members have a genuine economic 
stake and a personal interest in the efficient management of the condominium.  
   Hence, for future Chinese condominium legislation, a restricted number of 
non-owners with expertise should be eligible for election to the council. Moreover, the 
STA approach to disqualify the managing agent and its employees as well as the 
employees of the body corporate from council membership is a sensible measure to 
forestall conflict of interest problems.299 This provision should also be employed in 
any future Chinese condominium statute to erect a barrier against conflicts of interest, 
graft and corruption. Finally, a uniform condominium statute should provide expressly 
that unit owner candidates seeking election to the executive council must show seven 
days prior to the election that they are not in arrears with their condominium 
contributions.  
6 4 5 Number of Council Members  
Under the UCIOA, unit owners should elect an executive board of at least three 
members. 300  The exact number of the executive board members of each 
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condominium complex is stated in the by-laws of the association.301 Under the STA, 
the unit owners must determine the number of trustees needed for the ensuing year at 
every annual general meeting.302 Although the number of trustees can vary at every 
general meeting,303 the STA requires there should be no less than two trustees.304   
  Under Chinese law, the number of council members remains largely unregulated. 
Neither the national level Property Management Regulation of 2003 nor the Shanghai 
Property Management Regulation of 2004 contains a provision as to the number of 
council members. In practice, many problems may arise through this oversight, since 
the number of council members determines the difficulty of constituting a council 
meeting quorum and of obtaining a council decision with a simple majority. The most 
recent local property management rule namely the Property Management Regulation 
of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, removes this uncertainty by stipulating that the 
number of the executive council’s members in a condominium association should be 
an odd number from five to seventeen.305 This is a worthwhile step and should be 
employed when a uniform condominium statute is drafted. However, it is 
inappropriate to cap the number of council members at seventeen, as is done in 
Shenzhen. The reason it would not work is that an executive council should include at 
least one representative from the executive committee of each subsidiary body.306 
And, since multi-building condominium projects vary greatly in their number of 
subsidiary bodies, i.e. the number of their buildings, it is not realistic to cap the 
number of council members by statute. Rather, any future Chinese condominium 
statute should clearly state that the number of directors be no less than three and not 
subject to a maximum number. It should be left to the condominium association using 
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its by-laws to determine and regulate the size of its council.   
6 4 6 Election, Terms of Office, and Removal 
Under the STA, the trustees are elected at the first annual general meeting and each 
subsequent annual general meeting. 307  Similarly, the UCIOA specifies that the 
election of an executive board is subject to the by-laws of the association.308 An 
example of this is having ballots listing all nominees’ names prepared in advance of 
the election for each unit.309 When a Chinese condominium statute is drafted, it 
should employ the UCIOA approach and allow each condominium association 
employing a by-law or special resolution to show the fine details of its council 
member elections.  
  The UCIOA contains no special regulations about the term of office of board 
members, their re-election or their removal. All such matters fall under an 
association’s by-laws.310 However, the UCIOA does state that an executive board 
may fill any board vacancies for the remaining period of any term.311  
  Under the South African model rules, trustees hold office until the next annual 
general meeting at which time they are eligible for re-election.312 When there are no 
nominations or insufficient nominations, the trustees are eligible for re-election but 
must be nominated in the same way as any other person who is elected for the first 
time.313 A trustee who fills a vacancy by appointment holds the office until the next 
annual general meeting.314 If a trustee is absent or unable to function, he or she may 
appoint an alternate trustee, whether the person is a unit owner or not. An alternate 
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trustee ceases to hold office if the trustee he or she replaces ceases to be a trustee, or if 
the trustees revoke the alternate’s appointment.315 A trustee may be removed from 
office before the expiry of his/her term of office by an ordinary resolution at a special 
general meeting.316 The STA model rules provide that a trustee ceases to hold office 
in the following circumstances: 1) when the trustee resigns his/her office by written 
notice to the body corporate;317 2) when the trustee has severe mental problems, or 
put another way, is of unsound mind;318 3) when the trustee’s estate is insolvent or it 
has been seized; 319  4) when the trustee is convicted of an offence involving 
dishonesty;320 5) when the trustee is no longer qualified from acting as a director of a 
company in terms of the Companies Act.321 Finally, it is maintained that a paid 
non-owner trustee with an appointment contract is entitled to claim damages should 
the body corporate breach the contract by removing the person from office without 
sufficient cause.322  
Although Chinese national level law is silent on the term of office of a council 
member, local property management regulations tend to fill the gap. Among others, 
the Shanghai Property Management Regulation states that the term of office for the 
executive council is from three to five years,323 while the Property Management 
Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone stipulates that a council member’s 
term of office is three years.324 Legislative experience suggests that the best choice is 
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a staggered three-year term since this maintains the continuity of a smooth-running 
management, especially in large multi-building developments. A system of rotation at 
every subsequent annual general meeting with one-third of the council members 
finishing their term, retiring or resigning, rejuvenates the administrative structure. If 
the number of council members is not three or a multiple of three, the number nearest 
to one-third should leave. Generally, council members who retire or resign by rotation 
are those who have been in office the longest. The major advantage of this kind of 
continuity is to maintain a majority of experienced council members in office while 
providing for an infusion of new members.325 Moreover, a maximum term prevents 
trustees from being re-elected indefinitely. 326 Consequently, a new Chinese 
condominium statute should provide for the “rotation system”. Furthermore, a 
condominium statute should follow the STA approach by stipulating that the unit 
owners’ general meeting can appoint a person by ordinary resolution who is willing to 
be a council member either to fill a vacancy or as an alternate council member. 
However, there is long-standing argument as to whether the longer council 
members are in office, the more likely they will be abusive in office. Along the same 
lines, the longer term of office will encourage the dereliction of duty by some council 
members. It also unnecessarily keeps incompetent council members in office. 
Nonetheless, these concerns can be mitigated by strict rules on removing council 
members from office. Under the Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003, 
the existing council members can be removed from office in the following instances: 
1) when the member is no longer a unit owner because he or she has moved or there is 
substantial damage to his/her unit; 2) when the member is absent for three consecutive 
or more from council meetings without good cause; 3) when the member is not 
capable of performing his/her duties due to a serious physical or mental illness;       
4) when the member has been convicted of any criminal offence; 5) when the member 
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resigns his/her office by written notice; 6) when the member refuses to undertake a 
unit owner’s responsibility such as paying the contributions.327  
It is clear from the above that the Chinese provision to remove council members 
from office is more stringent than the STA approach. For instance, under Chinese law, 
any council member who has been convicted of any criminal offence is liable to be 
dismissed. But under the STA model rules, a trustee can only be removed from office 
when the trustee is convicted of an offence involving dishonesty. Another example is 
that under Chinese law, a council member’s dereliction of duty can result in the 
member’s dismissal; this usually comes into play if a member has not attended a 
council meeting continually for three sessions during the member’s term of office. 
There is no such provision in the STA. The reason why Chinese law needs to be 
draconian on a council member’s dismissal is to maintain a balance between the 
continuity of a member’s office and the timely removal of unqualified council 
members. Still, the less stringent STA approach is understandable since most 
condominium projects struggle to find members willing to serve as trustees.328 
However, a future Chinese condominium statute in addition to maintaining the 
existing departmental provisions, should borrow the STA provision that the office of a 
council member must be vacated when the council member becomes bankrupt.329   
6 4 7 The Executive Council Meeting 
The executive council exercises its powers by passing resolutions at a council member 
meeting. However, when a by-law or rule authorizes the executive council to delegate 
certain powers to one or more of its members, the member can exercise the delegated 
power without the need for a council meeting. 
                                                        
327 Art 30 of the Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003.  
328 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-66. 
329 See n 319 supra. 
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6 4 7 1 Holding Council Meetings 
Neither the UCIOA nor the STA specify how often executive board or trustees 
meetings must be held. Consequently, council meetings are held from time to time as 
the need for them arises. This is also the case in Chinese law.330  
  While there is no express provision as to how to convene a council meeting under 
the UCIOA, the STA allows any trustee to call a meeting at any time after giving not 
less than seven days’ written notice to other trustees and all first mortgagees who have 
requested in writing that they want to receive all of the trustee meeting notices.331  
  The most recent local property management regulation, namely, the Property 
Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 stipulates that 
more than one third of the council members can request the chairperson of the 
executive council to convene a council meeting. 332  The chairperson then is 
responsible for summoning and chairing the council meeting. If the chairperson or 
his/her deputy is present, the person must chair all executive council meetings. If the 
chairperson is away, the sub-district office must designate another council member to 
summon and chair the meeting.333 It would seem the reason it takes at least a third of 
the council members to call for a meeting rather than a single member is that there are 
a great many multi-building complexes in China, so there are executive councils with 
quite a number of council members. If a single council member could propose a 
meeting at any time, the council’s workload would increase significantly and it would 
be at risk of being overwhelmed by trivial matters. Therefore, this provision should be 
incorporated into the future Chinese condominium statute.    
                                                        
330 Art 25 of the Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003.   
331 Annexure 8 r 15 (2) read with r 15 (3). 
332 Art 29 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
333 See n 332 supra. 
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6 4 7 2 Notice 
The UCIOA says nothing about a council meeting’s notice, presumably because it 
falls under the jurisdiction of an association’s by-laws. The STA model rules provide 
that trustees may give notice of convening meetings.334 It would be unreasonable and 
unnecessary to give notice to a trustee when he or she is away from South Africa, but 
notice of a meeting should be given to his/her alternate provided the trustee has 
appointed one.335 Also a trustee who wants to convene a meeting should give at least 
seven days’ written notice to other trustees and concerned institutional lenders before 
the meeting is held.336 Furthermore, the STA model rules provide that a shorter notice 
is justified if the circumstances warrant it.337   
  In China, neither law at the national level nor at the local level has a provision 
concerning a council meeting’s notice. However, there is the implication that notice 
should be served under certain circumstances. As an example, the chairperson is 
bound to summon a council meeting when requested to do so. It is implied that the 
chairperson needs to send a notice to each and every council member beforehand. 
However, there is a loophole, for in the absence of an explicit requirement of having 
to send out a notice of a council meeting, the council is able to go into a closed 
meeting. The availability of closed meetings has reportedly been abused by a number 
of executive councils in China.338 Therefore, a future Chinese condominium statute 
should make a provision that not only should notice of a council meeting be given to 
each executive council member seven days in advance but also that the secretary of 
the executive council must post a notice on the condominium’s public notice board at 
                                                        
334 Annexure 8 r 15 (1). 
335 See n 334 supra.  
336 Annexure 8 r 15 (2) & (3). 
337 Annexure 8 r 15 (2). 
338 Xin Time Report “Deep Investigation of Disputes in the Executive Council of Condominium 
Owners’ Association” Online: http://www.cq.xinhuanet.com/2007-03/12/content_9486113.htm [2008 
03 15] (Chinese version) 
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least three days before an executive council meeting is held. If the secretary is away, 
an alternate council member designated by the chairperson or his/her deputy should 
take care of the notice board issue. The notice must contain a detailed meeting 
agenda. 
6 4 7 3 Owners and Other Parties’ Attendance 
Under the STA, an owner is entitled to attend and speak at any meeting of the trustees, 
but the owner cannot vote.339 Likewise, any unit’s first mortgagee’s representative is 
entitled to attend and speak at all trustee meetings but is not allowed to vote.340 These 
provisions represent a so-called “sunshine” meeting policy,341 in that they grant unit 
owners the right to information by allowing them to attend council meetings. The 
purpose is to make the trustees’ activities transparent and to make it difficult for 
autocratic trustees to bypass and override owners intentionally.342 In a future uniform 
Chinese condominium statute lawmakers should borrow this policy and stipulate that 
all executive council meetings be open to unit owners. Owners who wish to attend a 
council meeting should give the secretary notice no later than three days before the 
meeting.   
  However, it is sometimes argued that it is more appropriate not to allow unit owners 
to speak at council meetings since this practice would result in inefficiency and cause 
a great deal of disquiet. First, since there are usually dozens of unit owners and their 
families in a Chinese condominium complex, if many of them attend and speak, the 
council meeting functions much like a general meeting. Second, there are instances of 
owners at council meetings being held up to ridicule and scorn for a decision made by 
the council. Both of these problems should be avoided in order to achieve the efficient 
management expected from elected executive council members. Accordingly, a 
                                                        
339 Annexure 8 r 15 (4). 
340 Annexure 8 r 15 (5). 
341 For example, Virginia Condominium Act of 1974 (Virginia Stat Ann 55-510.1). 
342 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-72. 
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Chinese condominium statute needs to strike a balance between the owners’ right to 
information and the efficiency of council meetings. That said, a Chinese statute should 
allow unit owners to attend council meetings as observers without the right to speak 
unless a majority of the executive council agrees to give it to them.   
 6 4 7 4 Quorum 
Under both the UCIOA and the STA, the quorum for an executive council meeting is 
at least half of the members. The UCIOA states that unless the by-laws specify 
otherwise, a quorum is present for any executive board meeting if board members 
entitled to cast 50 per cent of the votes are present at the beginning of the meeting.343 
Under the STA, 50 per cent of the trustees but not less than two constitute a meeting’s 
quorum.344 If the number of trustees falls below a quorum, the remaining trustees can 
continue to act but only for the purpose of appointing or co-opting additional trustees 
to make up a quorum or to convene a general meeting of owners.345 The STA is quite 
specific and stipulates that if at a meeting a quorum is not present within thirty 
minutes of the meeting being called to order it should stand adjourned to the next 
business day at the same time when a quorum can be formed as long as it is no less 
than two members.346 
  In China, a local property management regulation specifies that more than half of 
the council members should be present at any council meeting.347 This needs to be 
fleshed out and placed in a future Chinese condominium statute. Specifically, it 
should state that to form a quorum for a council meeting, at least 50 per cent of the 
council members must be present at the meeting. To avoid uncertainty, provision 
should be made where necessary for the number to be rounded up to the next highest 
                                                        
343 UCIOA § 3-109 (b). 
344 Annexure 8 r 16 (1). 
345 Annexure 8 r 16 (2). 
346 Annexure 8 r 17. 
347 Art 29 (5) of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007.  
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number. For example, if there are five members the quorum is three rather than two. 
In addition, it should also adopt the STA “thirty minutes” rule of having a second 
meeting rescheduled to the same time on the next business day if no quorum is present 
thirty minutes after the first meeting begins.  
  However, whether to allow council members to appoint or co-opt others in order to 
constitute a quorum, as is the case under the STA, merits further discussion. The 
justification for this rule is to avoid intentional “quorum-busting” by some council 
members.348 Council members favoring the status quo would use this obstructive 
strategy. If a significant number of members choose not to be present, the meeting 
fails due to lack of a quorum and the status quo remains. To prevent such actions, this 
rule may be a solution. However, the pitfall of its use is obvious. It is possible for the 
remaining council members to co-opt their spouse or others who will act in concert 
with them.349 Consequently, the remaining council members can impose their own 
ideas and decisions upon the unit owners. Fortunately, the “thirty minutes” rule can 
provide a resolution for if council members intend to be absent from the meeting, the 
adjourned second meeting will go ahead as if the quorum was present. Hence, on 
balance, given that condominium governance in China is still in the early 
development stage, Chinese law should not adopt this rule.  
6 4 7 5 Voting  
While the UCIOA does not state the voting procedure for council meetings 
expressly,350 the STA provides a great amount of detail on the matter. The STA 
requires that all matters at a trustees’ meeting be determined by a simple majority of 
the trustees present and voting.351 If the votes are evenly divided, the chairperson has 
                                                        
348 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-73. 
349 See n 348 supra.  
350 This is because the UCIOA adopts a liberal approach allowing such issue to be regulated by 
condominium by-laws. See Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 43-54. 
351 Annexure 8 r 22. 
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an extra vote to break the tie.352 Moreover, a trustee with an interest in a contract or 
litigation with the body corporate is disqualified on a vote pertaining to the contract or 
litigation.353  
  For a future Chinese condominium statute, all the abovementioned provisions from 
the STA need to be adopted including allowing a chairperson’s casting vote. A casting 
vote is necessary, because even having an uneven number of members for the council 
and for the quorum, 354 does not prevent there being an even number of members 
attending, or voting. Therefore, with a quorum a motion is passed when a majority of 
the members present vote for it. A council member having an interest conflict with the 
motion is disqualified from voting automatically.  
  Particularly important is that under the STA, unlike general meetings, trustees can 
vote with a written ballot even though the meeting is not actually held. If the trustees 
wish to resolve a matter without holding a meeting, a written resolution signed by all 
the trustees who are present in the country and constitute a quorum is as valid as if it 
had been passed at a duly held trustees’ meeting.355  
  The “written resolution” method is sensible and convenient since it effectively 
deals with trivial matters for which it is not worthwhile holding a meeting.356 Hence, 
a future Chinese condominium statute should provide that the executive council can 
act by unanimous consent as documented in a resolution signed by all its members in 
lieu of a meeting. When the “written resolution” method is followed, a notice must be 
placed on the notice board of the condominium and given to each council member 
beforehand in a timely manner. When decisions passed by unanimous written consent 
in lieu of a formal meeting, the unit owners must be notified and the decision must be 
put in the minutes and be available for inspection.  
                                                        
352 Annexure 8 r 18. 
353 Annexure 8 r 23. 
354 See n 305 supra. 
355 Annexure 8 r 24. 
356 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-74. 
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6 4 8 Remuneration and Indemnification of Council Members 
Generally, executive council members serve without any remuneration. Before 
authorizing payment for a council member, the association should examine its own 
condominium documents to determine whether such a payment for services is 
permissible.  
  Although the UCIOA contains no special provision dealing with the remuneration 
of executive board members, the STA makes it clear that unless there is a special 
resolution of the body corporate, “owner trustees” are not entitled to remuneration for 
their services.357 This is based on the presumption that “owner trustees” have such a 
genuine personal interest in efficient management of the condominium that they 
provide their services for love and charity.358 However, the model rules allow 
non-owner trustees to receive pay as long as there is an agreement between the body 
corporate and the non-owner trustees. 359  Furthermore, the model rules make 
provision for the reimbursement of all trustees, including “owner trustees”, of 
expenses reasonably incurred in performing their duties and exercising their 
powers.360 
In summary, being a council member means among other things, attending 
meetings regularly, dealing with correspondence from owners, organizing general 
meetings, and amending and enforcing by-laws and house rules. This is not an easy 
job. One can argue that good trustees who have a genuine interest in management of a 
condominium complex deserve remuneration. But payments to council members may 
change the dynamics in a condominium association since council members would 
become “employees” of the management body. Consequently, not only would the 
standard of their duty of care be higher, but they would be subject to being dismissed. 
                                                        
357 Annexure 8 r 10 (1). 
358 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-69. 
359 Annexure 8 r 10 (2).  
360 See n 359 supra.  
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In short, they could be fired. Consequently, when a Chinese condominium statute is 
drafted, it should employ the STA approach to let the unit owners decide council 
members’ payment for services. This kind of flexibility is a reflection of unit owner 
autonomy. Moreover, allowing non-owner council members to be remunerated is an 
effective measure to attract skillful and experienced “outsider professionals” to serve 
as council members. Furthermore, when unit owners consider it necessary and fit to 
compensate “insider council members” for their services, such remuneration can be 
made a budget item in the agenda for general meetings in the by-laws or approved at 
an annual or special general meeting by special resolution. Finally, it is necessary to 
transplant the STA provision that council members be reimbursed all expenses 
reasonably and properly incurred in the exercise of their duties. Particularly 
noteworthy are expenses incurred for attending training courses and professional body 
meetings.   
During their term of office, executive council members should realize the potential 
risk of personal liability in the performance of their duties. An executive council 
member may be held personally liable for a wrongful action even though the wrongful 
conduct was engaged in on behalf of the condominium association.361 For example, 
condominium council members can be held liable for failing to fix a broken lock362 or 
for a unit owner being raped on common property of an apartment building.363 
Council members also may find themselves to be liable for libel and defamation364 or 
mismanagement of a condominium’s affairs. 365  For these reasons, the UCIOA 
stipulates that the owners’ association can provide for the indemnification of its 
executive board members and officers and maintain liability insurance for its directors 
                                                        
361 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 42-49.  
362 Lay v Dworman 732 P 2d 455 (Okla 1986). 
363 Nixon v Mr Property Management 690 S W 2d 546 (Tex 1985). 
364 Hyatt & Stubblefield “Community Association Boards Should Minimize Potential Liability” 1987 
(5) Real Probation & Property 25-26.   
365 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 42-50. 
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and officers.366 Similarly, under the STA, the model rules indemnify trustees and 
other officers of the body corporate against all costs, expenses and claims which a 
trustee may incur or become liable for while conducting his/her duties, unless the 
trustee was acting mala fide or with gross negligence.367  
    Such indemnities often comfort executive council members and encourage unit 
owners to take office on the executive council.368 It is for this reason that any future 
Chinese condominium statute should include an indemnification clause for executive 
council members. Such expenses are borne by all the unit owners by means of their 
contributions to the management fund.  
6 5 MANAGING AGENT  
6 5 1 Legal Nature  
A managing agent is either a natural person369 or a management company with 
professional qualifications engaged by a condominium’s management to manage a 
property for a fee. The managing agent provides specialized service providers to 
attend to the day-to-day maintenance and repairs of the common property, in short, to 
handle the management of the condominium project. 
The status of the managing agent depends on his/her relationship with the 
management body. The managing agent is a representative appointed by the 
condominium association and entrusted with the daily management and maintenance 
of the condominium project.370 Powers and functions are usually specified in an 
                                                        
366 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (13). 
367 Annexure 8 r 12 (1) (a). 
368 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-70; Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 
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369 Van der Merwe maintains that any person, even a trustee or sectional owner, may be appointed as 
a managing agent. See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-4. However, Chinese law only allows a 
company which is a legal entity to be a managing agent.  
370 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
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employment contract. In practice, the management body or its executive council 
appoints a managing agent to undertake broad administrative, secretarial, and 
financial tasks. But a managing agent is not entrusted with decision-making on such 
policy-making functions as permission to keep animals, to subdivide or consolidate 
units, or to improve the common property.371 In short, certain powers cannot be 
entrusted to a managing agent. A managing agent cannot make decisions that affect 
the lives of owners or their living conditions.372 The UCIOA makes it clear that the 
executive board may delegate its powers to a managing agent.373 In South Africa, a 
managing agent may exercise any entrusted powers subject to the employment 
contract or the model rules of the scheme.374 The STA model management rules 
stipulate that a managing agent acts as a delegate of the body corporate rather than 
simply as a traditional employee.375 Although Chinese law does not specify the legal 
nature of managing agency, it specifies that a managing agent should provide services 
in accordance with the appointment contract.376 It implies that the executive council 
delegates powers to a managing agent in the contract of employment.  
In summary, the powers of the managing agent are delegated or derived from the 
management body or its executive council.377 Hence, the management body, even if it 
has delegated certain powers to a managing agent, exercises all powers since it has the 
final say as the employer.378 In other words, although a management body through its 
executive council may appoint a managing agent and delegate certain functions and 
powers to an agent, the ultimate control of the condominium project rests with an 
                                                        
371 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-11. 
372 Robinson Strata Title Units in New South Wales 62. 
373 UCIOA § 3-106 (a) (4). 
374 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-13. 
375 Annexure 8 r 46 (1), also see Fairbrass v Estate Agents Board 1999 (4) SA 1052 (W).  
376 Art 36 (1) of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
377 Gao Fuping & Huang Wushuang Property Entitlement & Property Management 170. 
378 UCIOA § 3-102 (a) (3); also see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-14. 
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executive council under the supervision of a management body.379 It is crucial that 
Chinese management companies understand their legal relationship with the 
management body or its executive council in order to avoid potential power abuses by 
management companies. For example, some management companies in China require 
that their nominees be voted onto the association’s executive council.380 Sometimes, 
due to a statutory omission, unit owners are under the impression that the 
management company has the power to override owners’ interests in managing the 
condominium complex.381 In 2007, in the wake of the new Property Code, the 
Property Management Regulation was amended to change the designation of a 
management company to that of a property service provider.382 This makes apartment 
owners aware of the fact that a managing agent does not control the unit owners but 
rather acts as a “servant” appointed by them. Nonetheless, there is no statutory 
mechanism to hold a managing agent responsible for the fiduciary responsibilities that 
the executive council has delegated or contracted out to him or her.  
6 5 2 Qualities and Qualifications 
Generally, the title “professional managing agent” assumes that the person appointed 
must be capable of undertaking all the services required of a managing agent. In 
addition, the person should have a good knowledge of the pertinent statutes, a good 
reputation and a proven track record.383 
In South Africa both a natural person, including a trustee or sectional owner, and a 
management company can act as a managing agent. By contrast, Chinese law restricts 
                                                        
379 Note that in China, art 11 of the Property Management Regulation stipulates that the power to 
appoint or remove a managing agent is currently in the hand of the general assembly of unit owners.  
380  Xiao Jiangping “A Natural Monopoly of Managing Agent’s Market and Its Suggested 
Resolutions” 2006 (26) Studies in Law and Business 22. (Chinese version) 
381 See n 380 supra.  
382 See the Decree no 504“The Decision to Amend the ‘Property Management Regulation’” of 2007, 
issued by the State Council. 
383 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-5. 
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the position of managing agent to management companies with legal personality.384 
The exclusion of a natural person from being a managing agent is meant to distinguish 
a professional managing agent from an in-house self-managing team. The UCIOA 
addresses neither this issue nor that of the managing agent’s qualifications since such 
matters are regulated by condominium by-laws.385  
A major problem under the STA is that no qualifications are prescribed for the 
“profession” of a managing agent. 386  Consequently, the managing agency 
“profession” in South Africa is largely self-regulatory. For example, since all 
managing agents are estate agents by definition, they are to comply with all the 
applicable provisions of the Code for Estate Agents.387 Presently, the Estate Agency 
Affairs Board is in the process of promulgating a special code of conduct for 
managing agents.388 Consequently, most agents lack the required special skills to 
provide a professional service. Trustees often have difficulty in finding a suitably 
qualified managing agent and therefore should be sensitive and prudent in their choice. 
In South Africa legislation needs to create a professional body to stipulate 
qualifications for managing agents and provide for their training.389 
The Chinese Property Management Regulation stipulates that management 
companies should be qualified and licensed before being employed.390 Moreover, a 
license should require a certain degree of education and training including a 
familiarity with relevant legislation and qualifications to handle money. If a 
management company employs a person without a license, Chinese law empowers the 
local real estate authority to order the management company to rectify the position 
                                                        
384 Art 32 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
385 UCIOA § 3-106 (a) (4). 
386 See n 383 supra. 
387 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-6 (1). 
388 The Sectional Titles Regulations Board Proposals (March 2003) 3.1.12. 
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and impose a fine.391 While this intervention is well conceived, there are still 
problems. For example, there is no provision that deals with the misconduct of a 
licensed employee of a managing agent. Therefore, a local real estate authority should 
be empowered to revoke the license of a managing agent’s employee for continued 
abuse and gross incompetence.  
In addition, there are accreditation systems for managing agents under a special 
departmental rule in China.392 This is to assure that the management company meets 
the quality and standards of services. Management companies are divided into three 
classes. The first class management company, among others must have at least 30 
licensed professionals in the fields of engineering, management, and accounting, a 
registered capital of five million Yuan, equivalent to about 700,000 USD, and must be 
accredited by the Ministry of Construction. 393  The second class management 
company must have 20 licensed professionals, a registered capital of three million 
Yuan and be accredited by the provisional construction authorities.394 The lowest 
class, the third one, must comply with the minimum standards required for 
qualification as a management company in China. These requirements include, among 
others, the employment of at least 10 professionals in relevant fields, a registered 
capital of 500,000 Yuan and accreditation by the local real estate authority.395 The 
level of accreditation determines the agent’s business scope. For example, the third 
class managing agent cannot provide services for a project with 200,000 or more 
gross square meters in floor area.396  
Furthermore, Chinese law states that any newly created management company must 
be categorized as the lowest level and reviewed by a real estate authority for one 
                                                        
391 Art 61 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
392 See the Measure Governing the Property Managing Agent’s Accreditation of 2004, issued by the 
Ministry of Construction on 17 March 2004.   
393 Art 5 (1) of the Measure Governing the Property Managing Agent’s Accreditation of 2004. 
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year.397 Accordingly, when a management company in China tenders for a job, it 
must provide a full and proper disclosure of its accreditation and its experience in 
managing condominiums. This ensures that a management body employs an 
accredited managing agent to provide professional management services for its 
condominium community.   
In summary, some of the most recent local regulations in China have recommended 
that a competent and autonomous professional body of managing agents ensures high 
standards of management services. 398  Such an autonomous professional body 
promotes the managing agent industry by standardizing the way in which managing 
agents’ business is conducted and developing a Code of Conduct to monitor managing 
agents’ business conduct. This professional body should also be responsible for 
training managing agents’ employees and resolving internal disputes among its 
members. Therefore, when framing a uniform Chinese condominium statute, 
following the South African experience, it should contain a Code of Conduct. The 
Code should require managers and their associates to have a sound knowledge of 
condominium laws and to conduct themselves in a responsible manner in the best 
interests of the management body they serve.399 It is particularly important that the 
Code should contain disciplinary rules, for instance publicly censuring an incompetent 
or reckless managing agent from tendering for a job for two years. In addition, a 
Chinese condominium statute should provide that the Code be included in the 
management contract. 
6 5 3 Appointment and Remuneration  
There are two situations under which a managing agent may be appointed. First, an 
agent may be appointed to manage a condominium development during the initial 
                                                        
397 Art 7 of the Measure governing the Property Managing Agent’s Accreditation of 2004. 
398 Art 6 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007.  
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period before the first general meeting is held. Second, a managing agent may be 
appointed after receiving an employment contract from a management body or its 
executive council.400  
Prior to the sale of condominium units, a developer may choose a managing agent 
to manage the development. Before the promulgation of the Property Management 
Regulation, the common Chinese practice for the initial period of management was 
that “whoever develops is the person who manages”.401 Consequently, condominium 
developers often engaged in subterfuges forcing unconscionable obligations on 
unwary purchasers. One such abuse was presubscribed self-dealing. For example, 
developers in China often arranged and/or signed “sweetheart” contracts with their 
favorite managing agents before any condominium owners moved in.402 Quite often, 
managing agents appointed before the first general meeting were affiliated with the 
developer or one of the developer’s subsidiary companies.403 The risk was that these 
agents did not genuinely put the interests of unit owners first in making decisions 
about which contractors to hire for repairs, and extending the condominium complex. 
For condominium owners, this could result in considerably higher management costs 
and lower standards of service than if they dealt with such activities in the open 
market.  
Moreover, these “developer” management contracts would usually bind future 
purchasers for a long time period.404 Consequently, developers with a continuing 
financial interest in a condominium complex often remained on the scene even after 
they relinquished control to the owners’ management body. 405  To resolve this 
problem, the Property Management Regulation provides that a developer has to select 
                                                        
400 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 156. 
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Property Management Regulation 67. 
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a qualified managing agent through a public bidding process.406 Only in a situation 
where there are three or less managing agents bidding for a position, is a developer 
allowed to choose a managing agent by agreement. 407  And even then, the 
appointment is subject to the approval of the local real estate authority.408 Finally, the 
appointment has to be concluded in a written contract.409 These measures increase the 
transparency of the management contract and avoid self-dealing transactions entered 
into by developers. In addition, a managing agent is under a statutory obligation to 
disclose any prior direct or indirect relationship with developers in bidding for a job. 
It is generally thought that a developer-owned managing company should be 
disqualified from bidding in order to avoid any undisclosed conflicts of interest and 
better protect unit owners’ interests.410 
A managing agent’s appointment in the initial period is transitional until the first 
general meeting when the management body employs a managing agent. Such a 
transitional appointment cannot extend beyond the initial period unless an extension is 
authorized at the first general meeting. One can also argue that a management contract 
must not impede the management body from managing the condominium as an 
independent autonomous body. Consequently, a long-term management contract 
enabling the developer to control the management body should be voided. 411  
Therefore, Chinese law limits the duration of a written transitional management 
contract agreed upon by a developer and a managing agent. When the executive 
council created at the first general meeting signs a formal management contract with 
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Pre-formation Property Management, issued by the Ministry of Construction on 26 June 2003.   
407 Art 24 (2) of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
408 See n 406 supra. 
409 Art 21 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
410 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 81. 
411  Case note “Long Term Management Contracts between Condominium Associations and 
Developer-controlled Management Corporations Held not Violative of the Florida Condominium Act” 
1974 (28) U Miami L Rev 455. 
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another managing agent, the transitional management contract is automatically 
terminated even if it has not expired.412 The purpose of this provision is of course to 
grant unit owners the power and autonomy to choose their own managing agent.  
An alternative way to choose a managing agent is for the management body or its 
executive council to make the appointment. The UCIOA expressly provides that a unit 
owners’ association may hire and discharge managing agents.413 In South Africa, the 
trustees can, when required by a registered mortgagee of 25 per cent of the units or by 
the members of the body corporate in general meeting, appoint a managing agent in 
writing.414 The appointed managing agent will control, manage and administer the 
common property and the obligations to any public or local authority on behalf of the 
unit owners.415 This requires that a managing agent may be employed by a request of 
a mortgagee who finances condominiums or a resolution of the meeting of the trustees 
or a resolution of the general meeting. On employment, a written agreement must be 
entered into between the trustees and the managing agent.416 Moreover, as in the case 
of the appointment of a managing agent, subject to section 39 (1) of the STA, no 
special resolution is needed to revoke or discharge a managing agent.417 A decision 
by the trustees suffices.418  
Similarly, Chinese law stipulates that the executive council should enter into a 
written contract with a managing agent chosen by the management body.419 However, 
the Property Management Regulation at the national level does not specify well 
defined procedures to appoint a managing agent. Since many members of the 
executive council may be inexperienced, the Chinese Property Code provides that the 
                                                        
412 Art 26 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003.  
413 UCIOA 3-102 (a) (3). 
414 Annexure 8 r 46. 
415 Annexure 8 r 46 (1).  
416 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-10. 
417 See also annexure 8 r 46 (d) and r 47. 
418 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-12 n 44. 
419 Art 35 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
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final say on employing a managing company should be vested in a management body 
at a general meeting.420 Accordingly, when a Chinese condominium statute is to be 
drafted, it should stipulate that a managing company can be appointed either at a 
management body’s general meeting by an ordinary resolution with more than 50 per 
cent of the unit owners at the meeting approving, or by an executive council if it has 
been authorized at the previous general meeting. Needless to say, an executive council 
has the responsibility to select a suitable managing company and then at a general 
meeting explain the selection procedure.421 
   Managing agents generally charge a management fee for a service that is a 
recurring cost to the condominium complex. A managing agent can be paid in one of 
two ways, either on a pro rata basis or a standard basis.422 A pro rata basis means 
that the monthly management fee is calculated as a particular percentage of the total 
amount of the owners’ contributions. A standard basis means that a fixed amount for 
instance per unit is paid to a managing agent. According to Chinese law, the parties 
are free to select either method.423 In South Africa, although the Institute of Estate 
Agents has recommended a tariff of fees, it is argued that management fees should be 
subject to negotiation between parties since the fees should be dictated by free market 
competition. 424  Chinese law sustains this argument since many local property 
management rules state that the remuneration of a managing agent is a matter of 
negotiation between a management body or the developer and a managing agent.425  
There should not be a prescribed scale of managing agents’ fees. The condominium 
association’s point of view is that like any other contractual relationship with a service 
                                                        
420 Art 76 (1) (4) of the Chinese Property Code of 2007.  
421 Art 31 (3) of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
422 Art 9 of the Measures Governing Property Management Fee’s Collection of 2003, jointly issued 
by the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Construction.  
423 Art 11 & 12 of the Measures Governing Property Management Fee’s Collection of 2003.  
424 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-17. 
425 For example, art 68 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
of 2007. 
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provider, the executive council should continually monitor whether it is getting value 
for the fee being paid. If not, it is time to shop around for another management 
company.  
6 5 4 Functions  
The managing agents’ business is highly labor-orientated.426 Generally, a managing 
agent’s function is to assist the management body to maintain and oversee the 
common property and enforce the by-laws. Moreover, being on-site the agent can deal 
with issues involving unit owners, tenants, visitors and others. The various functions 
of a managing agent can be categorized as administrative, secretarial and financial.427 
Administrative functions include collecting monthly contributions; secretarial 
functions include organizing and preparing the paperwork for general meetings and 
keeping meeting records, accounting records and other relevant documents; and 
financial functions include preparing the budget and calculating the unit owner 
contributions. The main functions of a managing agent are delegated by the 
management contract.428 Therefore, the functions of a managing agent vary greatly 
depending on the contract and the particular circumstances of the condominium. The 
more services provided, the greater the management fees. The managing agent's basic 
functions need to be circumscribed in any future Chinese condominium statute. 
Although there is no uniform set of services for every condominium community, the 
following is a list of services more commonly provided by a managing agent. 429  
   They are: 1) to collect monthly contributions; 2) to do maintenance, repair and 
replacement of the common property; 3) to prepare and serve notices for meetings and 
for entering individual units for repairs; 4) to attend the annual general meeting and/or 
                                                        
426 Bugden Strata Title Management Practice 39. 
427 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-6 (2), 7, 8. 
428 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-13.  
429 Bugden Strata Title Management Practice 39-40; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-6 (2), 7, 8. 
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other meetings; 5) to prepare and distribute meeting minutes; 6) to attend to 
correspondence; 7) to appoint, oversee, control and dismiss staff; 8) to maintain all 
minute books, records, notices and other documents pertaining to condominium 
management; 9) to ensure that proper and adequate insurance is in force and renew 
and attend to common property insurance claims; 10) to assist and advise the 
executive council on common property maintenance and to negotiate and obtain 
quotes on behalf of the council and to employ plumbers, electricians and other 
handymen;430 11) to prepare an annual budget of income and expenditure for the 
following year for approval by the council of trustees and the annual general meeting; 
12) to enforce by-laws and house rules as required by the executive council; 13) to 
hand over all relevant documents and management body’s assets to the executive 
council and to a new agent.431 
  With the decentralization of condominium management responsibilities from the 
state to private owners, little attention has been given to the many owners who are not 
skilled or trained to undertake management duties. Accordingly, despite the costs 
involved and the resultant loss of control, an increasing number of condominium 
complexes in China, particularly the larger ones, employ or appoint professional 
managing agents.432 However, it is common in China for managing agents to exercise 
the powers of often ill-structured owners' associations. Therefore, it is paramount to 
incorporate a managing agent’s minimum functions in a statute in order to guarantee 
the quality of service and to stave off potential management malfunctions. In addition, 
a statutory definition of the minimum functions of a managing agent would assist in 
determining whether the managing agent is acting within his or her authority. This 
would ensure that the managing agent would not be able to exercise any powers and 
functions in excess of the authority of the management body. 
                                                        
430 Art 40 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
431 Art 39 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003.  
432 The Department of Law and Policies of the Ministry of Construction of PRC Commentary on the 
Property Management Regulation 9-10. 
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   It should be noted that directors of a managing agent are not automatically 
members of a condominium’s executive council. In South Africa, the managing agent 
can only attend trustees’ meetings with their consent.433 However, a future Chinese 
condominium statute should provide that a management company’s directors or 
representatives should have the right to attend meetings but without a right to vote or 
speak at meetings. This brings the managing agent into the condominium 
decision-making process as the agent receives timely maintenance reports and keeps 
record of the meetings. When Chinese lawmakers draft a uniform condominium 
statute, it should ensure that a management company is not allowed unilaterally to 
transfer the management contract without the consent of the management body. When 
a management body is considering such a transfer, it should take into account the 
proposed transferees’ qualifications, financial standing, experience and other relevant 
factors. It is notable that a managing agent cannot transfer the management contract 
entirely but can farm out certain jobs to independent professionals such as plumbers 
and electricians.434    
  In summary, whatever functions and powers are delegated to the managing agent 
must be clearly stated in the written contract of appointment, regardless of how 
insignificant a task may seem.435 The more detailed the functions, the fewer the 
disputes that will occur later.  
6 5 5 Termination 
Under the STA, a decision to terminate a managing agent’s appointment needs not be 
made at a general meeting by resolution. Instead, the trustees’ decision is sufficient.436 
More importantly, any owner or unit mortgagee has the right to require the trustees to 
                                                        
433 Annexure 8 r 49 (1). 
434 Art 40 of the Property Management Regulation of 2003.  
435 Art 36 (1) of the Property Management Regulation of 2003. 
436 STA s 39 (1) read with Annexure 8 r 46 (1). 
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cancel the management contract if the managing agent is in breach of the contract or 
guilty of misconduct.437 In contrast, under the UCIOA, unit owners can terminate 
long-term “self-dealing” contracts without court action before an executive board is 
elected.438 However, the executive board must strictly follow the voting procedure for 
terminating a management contract.439 For a well-managed condominium project, it 
is in the best interests of both the management body and the managing agent to 
maintain a continuity of services. Unless it is impossible to work with the managing 
agent, an executive council should not consider a change of the managing agent 
without putting the matter to a vote at a general meeting. Hence, when a Chinese 
condominium statute is drafted, it should employ the UCIOA approach stipulating that 
a decision to terminate or remove a managing agent can only be achieved by a 
resolution of a general meeting.440 Moreover, written notice must be given to that 
effect.  
A management contract can be terminated under the Act or under the contract terms. 
Under the STA, a managing agent can also be removed when a managing company is 
liquidated or placed under judicial management,441 when a managing company or one 
of its directors, is convicted of fraud or dishonesty,442 or when a special resolution is 
passed to that effect.443 All of these statutory grounds need to be included in a future 
Chinese condominium statute. Moreover, a Chinese condominium statute should also 
stipulate that a management contract can be terminated when a managing agent is 
mala fide or grossly negligent in carrying out his/her duties. Examples are when a 
managing agent infringes unit owners’ interests by serious misconduct, or when a 
                                                        
437 Annexure 8 r 46 (2) (b). 
438 UCIOA § 3-105. 
439 Rohan & Reskin Condominium Law and Practice: Forms 42-68.7. 
440 Art 76 of the Chinese Property Code provides that to discharge or terminate a managing agent’s 
contract is under the jurisdiction of a management body.  
441 Annexure 8 r 47 (i). 
442 Annexure 8 r 47 (ii). 
443 Annexure 8 r 47 (iii). 
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managing agent contracts with other agents without approval of the management body 
or its executive council. Apart from the above, other contractual grounds of 
termination can be included in a management company’s contract of employment. 
However, notice of termination should be given to give the managing agent a chance 
to remedy its errant behavior before being dismissed. The warning notice should 
contain details of the alleged failure or misconduct. The purpose of serving a remedial 
notice is to enable the managing agent to remedy the problem and to comply with the 
Act and the contract terms. Then further non-compliance can lead to termination of 
the appointment.  
  Under the STA, a managing agent may only be appointed for a year at a time. 
However, an appointment is renewed automatically from year to year, unless the body 
corporate notifies the managing agent to the contrary.444 There is no such provision in 
the UCIOA. Although Chinese law at the national level does not address the issue, a 
recent local condominium management rule, namely the Property Management 
Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007 provides for management 
contracts lasting between two and five years.445 Therefore, when drafting a Chinese 
condominium statute, there is a need to balance addressing unsatisfactory managing 
agents’ services with the principle of continuity of management services. Any 
proposed legislation should stipulate that the maximum term for a managing agent is 
three years for multi-building condominiums and one year for single building or small 
condominiums. If the contract term is longer than three years (one year for a small 
condominium), it is taken to be three years (one year for a small condominium). On 
expiry of the term, the appointment can either be renewed or terminated. In order to 
maintain the continuity of management services, there should not be a limit on the 
number of times a contract can be renewed when unit owners are satisfied with the 
services provided.   
                                                        
444 Annexure 8 r 46 (1). 
445 Art 69 of Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007.  
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In China, it is common for management bodies to experience difficulty in 
recovering their books and records from former managing agents after termination of 
an appointment.446 Obviously, a newly appointed management company cannot work 
properly without these documents, all to the detriment of the condominium 
development.447 This is always a headache for a management body that would like to 
terminate the services of an unscrupulous management company.448 To remedy this 
problem, any future Chinese condominium statute should place a duty on a managing 
agent to hand over all relevant documents on termination of its services.449 In 
addition, a professional body of managing agents should monitor whether a managing 
agent discharges his/her management functions professionally and in a responsible 
manner. If not, relevant disciplinary procedures found in a Code of Conduct should 
apply. From the unit owners’ perspective, it is advisable for a management body or its 
executive council to send a notice to the departing managing agent requiring that all 
relevant documents be returned.   
6 5 6 Evaluation 
Neither the UCIOA nor the STA contains a legal requirement that a condominium 
should be managed by a professional managing agent. The appointment of a 
professional managing agent is in the hands of the management body or its executive 
                                                        
446 Hu Jiefeng “The Legal Analysis of Disputes Arising from Managing Agent’s Transfer” 2004 
Modern Property Management 4. (Chinese version) 
447 Yang Yusheng “Appointing a Property Managing Agent at Free Choice, Maintaining the Owners’ 
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449 Art 70 of the Property Management Regulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of 2007. 
Additionally, art 71 states that when terminating a management contract, the departing managing agent 
not only is obliged to deliver all the relevant documents and records to the executive council but also 
needs to deliver a duplicate copy of them to the newly appointed managing agent.   
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council.450  
  There are good reasons why a professional managing agent should be employed to 
handle the affairs of a condominium complex. The major advantage is the 
professionalism a managing agent brings to a condominium association which cannot 
be matched by a self-managing team comprising a group of individuals separately 
hired by a management body. The managing agent’s personnel usually have academic 
and technical qualifications in property management as well as experience in 
condominium governance. Moreover, a professional managing agent usually has 
excellent computer expertise and other relevant management skills. Computerized 
management certainly increases the standard of service. Hence, large projects, 
especially mixed-use projects comprising both residential and commercial units, 
require a professional agent’s assistance to deal with day-to-day operations and 
particularly the maintenance and administration of the common property in the 
condominium. Executive council members and unit owners often have limited time 
and energy to manage these matters. Quite simply, a managing agent can relieve a 
management body and its executive council of most of its day to day management and 
maintenance duties. Moreover, the executive council members are generally not 
sufficiently knowledgeable and skillful to perform complicated management tasks 
efficiently. Unfortunately, it is common practice for executive councils in China to opt 
for self-management and then to perform only very basic functions, namely to collect 
common expenses.451 Other management duties such as establishing a reserve fund 
for future capital needs are ignored. Moreover, internal conflict among unit owners is 
almost an unavoidable result of self-management. 452  Oftentimes, unit owners’ 
diversified interests render the self-management of a condominium complex 
unworkable. Consequently, it is crucial to appoint a full-time, on-site professional 
                                                        
450 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-3. 
451 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 15-4. 
452 Bugden Strata Title Management Practice in New South Wales 41.  
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management company for large condominium developments. It stands to reason that 
experienced managing agents can manage a condominium project more effectively 
and economically than the unit owners themselves. Moreover, institutional lenders are 
inclined to do business with a condominium project in which day-to-day operations 
are conducted in a professional manner by a managing agent.   
  However, many small projects or lower-income family condominium projects 
cannot afford the cost of appointing a professional agent. These owners prefer to 
manage on their own in the belief that they are able to perform efficiently such daily 
tasks as cleaning and security. Whether the unit owners’ monthly contributions will 
remain in line with a managing agent fee is not an issue of professional versus 
do-it-yourself management. The issue is rather what kind of professional management 
the unit owners can afford.453 In China, some local regulations require that all 
residential buildings be managed and maintained by professional managing 
companies regardless of the owners’ financial abilities. These regulations were 
promulgated to promote the local managing agent business.454 At the same time one 
cannot ignore the fact that numerous public housing complexes have been converted 
to private ownership and are now owned by low-income families.455 They cannot 
bear the financial burden of expensive managing agent fees.456 The emergence of a 
professional managing agent industry is a relatively new phenomenon.457 Therefore, 
many Chinese condominium owners are not conscious of the importance and 
necessity of hiring a managing agent. It has been reported that in some provinces in 
China such as Shandong, Jiangsu and Guangdong, 50 per cent of all condominiums 
have a professional managing agent.458 However, only around 20 per cent of the 
                                                        
453 Rohan “Condominiums and the Consumer: A Checklist for Counseling the Unit Purchaser” 1974 
(48) St John’s L Rev 1052. 
454 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Chinese Condominium Law” 72. 
455 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 298. 
456 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 19. 
457 Li Xiandong The Legal Guide for Resolving the Disputes Resulted from Property Management 28. 
458 Xia Shansheng Property Management Law 9. 
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condominiums employing a professional managing agent pay managing agent fees 
regularly and on time.459 Consequently, many managing agents quit their job soon 
after they have been appointed.460 For such condominium complexes, the ideal 
management model would be either self-management or hiring a small-sized and 
affordable managing company. 461 A particularly important advantage of 
self-management by unit owners is management continuity.462 Compared with a 
relatively short-lived managing agent contract, in-house do-it-yourself management 
usually has a feature of continuity that helps a management body to manage soundly 
on a long-term basis. The second advantage of self-management is integrity and 
communication. Since the do-it-yourself management team, consisting mostly of unit 
owners, is an integral part of the condominium community, they have real interests 
and real stakes in what they are doing. Also, they have an open line of communication 
with other owners about management issues. Therefore, in view of the Chinese 
socio-economic condition and the pros and cons of the two management styles, it is 
clear that one model is not necessarily better than the other but that the choice of 
model should be guided by the special circumstances of each condominium 
complex.463 The drafters of a new Chinese condominium statute should thus be 
sensitive to socio-economic and cultural factors and make provision for the 
co-existence of both management styles.464 The choice to appoint a professional 
managing agent by special resolution or to manage the condominium by themselves is 
ultimately in the hands of the owners of a particular condominium.
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 
7 1 BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM 
STATUTE 
With an ever-expanding housing market the legislature in China must enact a uniform 
condominium act that is compatible with the market. While there are permissive 
condominium provisions in the newly enacted Property Code, it is doubtful whether it 
would flourish without special legislation.1 The sketchy condominium provisions in 
the Property Code do not provide the kind of detail that a special statute is able to do 
with precision and candor. 2  Additionally, the Property Management Regulation 
adopted by the State Council in 2003 only lays out general principles in this domain.3 
The National People’s Congress is seeking to change this less than ideal situation that 
has divergent and fragmented condominium rules all across the country. 4 
Nevertheless, the new Property Code provides some of the basic building blocks for a 
special condominium statute.5 It is noteworthy that in the United States and South 
Africa statutes dealing with condominiums not only go back decades, but these 
                                                        
1 Zhang Lihong “The Perfection of Condominium Clause in the Property Code Draft” 2005 (10) Legal 
Science Monthly 22-26.  
2 Chen Huabin “On Condominium Ownership of Apartment Owners: Comments on Chapter 6 of the 
Draft Law on Real Right” 2006 (18) Beijing University Law Journal 63. (Chinese version) 
3 Tan Ling & Hu Danying “Reevaluation of Real Property Management” 2006 (6) Modern Legal 
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4 Chen Lei “The New Chinese Property Code” 2007 (11) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law.  
5 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 64. 
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pioneering jurisdictions have been developing condominium legislation with second 
and third generation statutes to update their original ones.6  
  However, China is still lacking a badly-needed uniform condominium act. The need 
to formalize condominium legislation is becoming increasingly urgent if 
condominium ownership is to be effectively deployed for development. China needs 
to encourage the development of residential dwellings and safeguard the interests of 
condominium owners by providing them with effective legal mechanisms. 
Consequently, the country’s legal system needs to respond as quickly and effectively 
as possible to the rapid increase in condominium ownership. A uniform legal 
framework needs to fit into a system of private property law that is also new to the 
Chinese legal system.7 Drafting a condominium statute on the basis of Chinese social 
and economic factors might be an appropriate starting point, but borrowing the 
experience from other jurisdictions will improve the success of such a law.  
  The objective of a new law should be to protect the interests of both condominium 
owners and real estate investors. The long-term objective is the enhancement of the 
country's economic growth and to provide housing for the populace.8 There is an 
urgent need for a reliable, consistent, and properly drafted uniform condominium law 
to solve the many practical problems caused by a housing policy that has triggered a 
mass privatization of tenant occupied buildings.9 Placing condominium ownership in 
                                                        
6 The first generation and second generation statutes on apartment ownership in the United States and 
South Africa were introduced at Chapter Two, footnote 19. In the United States, the third generation 
condominium act is well underway. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSAL) has been drafting “Homeowners Bill of Rights” and “Meeting”. Once the drafts are 
approved, they will be inserted into the UCIOA. See more detail at NCCUSAL website: 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucioa/. In South Africa, the looming third generation Act is 
highlighted by the “Third-generation Sectional Title Conference” held in September 2006. See more 
detail at West “Third-generation Sectional Title Conference” 2007 (11) South African Deeds Journal 
25-27.        
7 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 83-84. 
8 Ohnesorge “The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the Developmental States of Northeast 
Asia” in Antons (ed) Law and Development in East and Southeast Asia 91. 
9 Chen Limei “Management of Sold Public Housing in Urban China” 5. 
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a proper legal framework will stabilize and stimulate housing privatization.10 It can 
also demarcate and define private property rights, thus providing guidance for legal 
practitioners.11 Last but not least, it will aid the rapid urbanization process by 
providing a framework for better land use.  
  The life of a law lies in its application. However, lucidity and transparency in the 
law limit the implementation costs of this legal framework.12 With condominium 
purchase, there are significant transaction costs that can be minimized if there is a 
uniform law that provides efficient enforcement mechanisms.13 Now, the piecemeal 
manner that condominium ownership is regulated in China frequently results in 
disputes needing court resolution.14 According to one Beijing district court report, the 
number of cases involving condominium management disputes in Chaoyang Court of 
Beijing increased from 194 in 2002 to 2649 in 2005. Thus, in three years, the 
condominium cases increased approximately thirteen times as much as in 2002. In the 
Chaoyang Court the percentage of condominium cases among all civil cases increased 
as well from 0.79% in 2002 to 8.5% in 2005.15 This accounts for high lawsuit costs 
and hinders economic development.  
  There also are additional social and economic benefits to formalizing and legalizing 
condominium ownership in China. First, unifying condominium rules will contribute 
to security of tenure. With a single set of national condominium rules, a condominium 
                                                        
10 Chen Huabin Study on Modern Condominium Ownership 296-297. 
11 Jin Jian Housing Law of China 9-10; Rosen & Ross “Increasing Home Ownership in Urban China: 
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[2008.2.28] (Chinese version) 
 257
owner is in a better legal position to guard and protect his/her unit, especially when 
compared to other types of tenure such as tenancy.16 Second, a formally unified 
condominium law promotes investors’ confidence by reducing the unpredictable as 
well as the high commercial transaction costs for the purchase and sale of 
condominiums.17 This also will tend to preserve foreign investors’ confidence and 
advance foreign investment in Chinese real estate. 18  Third, the ambiguity of 
condominium owners’ rights and the uncertain position of mortgagees of 
condominium units are the main reasons why mortgage finance for units in 
condominium projects is not well established. 19  Unifying and consolidating 
condominium law will enhance this specialized real estate market and generate funds 
for further development. Finally, formalizing condominium law is also a major 
element in the restructuring of social housing policy. 20  Making it easier for 
working-class people to own their homes is crucial to the success of the national 
housing strategy. 
7 2 CRITICAL COMPARATIVE APPROACH  
To better understand the development of condominium law, it is useful to examine 
countries with long histories of apartment ownership law. This is extremely helpful in 
working out what a useful Chinese condominium law might look like. Taking lessons 
from jurisdictions with an established condominium law system lessens pitfalls and 
helps to avoid dysfunctional practices as well as to identify pertinent elements that can 
                                                        
16 Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership 191-192. 
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be dovetailed into an approach sensitive to Chinese values and culture.21  
  A comparative approach identifies and analyzes a universal problem encountered in 
several countries, and then determines how the different legal systems solve it.22 The 
legal solutions are functionally equivalent and hence are comparable.23 However, 
there is a downside to the functional approach. It pays little attention to the origins of 
problems or to cultural factors that contribute to or diminish the gravity of a problem 
in a particular context.24 In the Chinese context, a functionalist approach might render 
the comparative results less relevant in practice.25 It is for this reason that the critics 
of the functional approach often attribute the difficulties and problems of 
transplanting legal institutions simply to the differences in legal cultures.26 As an 
example, culture itself influences which foreign legal institutions to borrow and bring 
into an existing legal system.27 Legal terminology, the court system, the local 
political power structure, social networks, legislative custom and the degree to which 
people rely on the court to resolve disputes, all play a role in enacting a condominium 
statute.28 Simply put, it would be unworkable to transplant a whole untrimmed body 
                                                        
21 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 83. 
22 Zweigert & Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law translated by Weir 39. They maintain “[L]egal 
systems give the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life . . . .” 
23 Gordley “Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law” 1995 
(43) Am J Comp L 555-560.  
24 Legrand “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants” 1997 (4) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111.  
25 Zhou Yongkun “Ten Dilemmas of the Modernity of Chinese Law” 2006 (6) Legal Science Monthly 
77. 
26 Kozyris “Comparative Law for the Twenty-first Century: New Horizons and New Technologies” 
1994 (69) Tul L Rev 168. Kozyris maintains that to borrow truly foreign law there are “serious 
linguistic and cultural obstacles”. One cannot pursue the comparative method only through the study of 
formal legal texts alone. One has to understand the “legal culture that produced the laws and the social 
and economic structures and the ethical and political values that support them. Laws cannot be grasped 
in an idealized form outside the context of the society that created them”. 
27 However, there is no clear-cut definition of legal culture. Mezey demonstrates that the notion of 
culture is ubiquitous but almost never explained. See Mezey “Law as Culture” 2001 (13) Yale J L & 
Human 35; also see Cotterrell “Law in Culture” 2004 (17) Ratio Juris 1. 
28 King “Comparing Legal Cultures in the Quest for Law's Identity” in Nelken (ed) Comparing Legal 
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of law into a completely new environment.29  
  Nevertheless, equally foolhardy is blaming legal culture for all of the difficulties 
involved in embarking on a path of legal borrowing. In an examination of the 
intricacies of condominium ownership and the complexities of the real estate market 
in China, the particularities of Chinese culture have to be taken into consideration. But 
then there has to be a willingness to borrow the most useful and pertinent mechanisms 
from foreign legal systems where condominium ownership is regulated and conducive 
to strengthening the real estate market both for the buyer and the seller. After all, one 
can give prominence to culture, and at the same time carefully borrow ideas from 
long-standing and well run legal systems.  
  To summarize, on the one hand, the success of formalizing condominium ownership 
in China depends on careful comparative research and then to cherry pick and borrow 
ideas from systems that are experienced in this field of law. On the other hand, 
directly transplanting foreign laws or legal institutions into a new context may not 
always have the desired effect because of different cultural values and philosophical 
outlooks. 30  Here architecture provides a pertinent analogy. Architects plan all 
apartments in a building in a functional way. However, apartment owners decorate 
and furbish their apartments in their own unique style that defines themselves distinct 
from others according to their own taste. Likewise, this thesis assumes a critical and 
cautious attitude by combining two approaches to undertake a comparative study that 
formalizes Chinese condominium law.  
7 3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The enactment in the near future of a special Chinese condominium statute is 
                                                                                                                                                               
Cultures 132. 
29 Legrand “On the Singularity of Law” 2006 (47) Harv int’l L J 517-530. In this article, Legrand 
argues that “law-texts always and already speak culturally or traditionally.” 
30 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 86-87. 
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imperative. It is for this reason that the thesis utilizes selective and important topics 
for a comparative analysis. Preceding chapters discuss the theoretical structure of 
condominium ownership, creation of condominiums, the condominium participation 
quota, condominium owners’ rights and responsibilities for their units and the 
common property, and management body’s structure and its operation. The thesis does 
not cover every field and all aspects of condominium law for that would be beyond 
the scope of this pilot study. Among the unaddressed topics, termination of 
condominium schemes and dispute resolution are noteworthy. It would be misleading 
to assume that the resolution of disputes is neither relevant nor worthwhile to study, 
for it is a very important and practical issue. However, in the United States, the court 
primarily resolves condominium disputes, which is similar to what takes place in 
China. South Africa is undergoing a sweeping change on dispute resolution with a 
newly proposed Ombudsman service that has not yet been formally adopted.31 It 
would make little sense to try to gain comparative insights on the topic until after the 
reform is in place.  
  With a comparative evaluation, six elements deserve special attention when putting 
together a uniform Chinese condominium statute. They are: 1) a macro view to 
integrate existing property arrangements; 2) a clear demarcation of individual 
property rights and cooperation between neighboring owners; 3) a balance between 
standardization and flexibility; 4) raising unit owners’ awareness for collective action; 
5) local government’s intervention; and 6) cooperation between neighboring owners.     
7 3 1 A Macro Study  
Formalization and unification of the law is a macro rather than a micro process.32 A 
macro view of private property rights is a prerequisite for a sustainable market 
                                                        
31 Maluleke “Department Considers Sectional Titles Ombudsman” 2005 (March) De Rebus 43; Van 
der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-44 & 9-45.  
32 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 88. 
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economy. For this reason, any attempt to formalize a unified condominium system 
will fail without taking into account existing property arrangements.  
  Law is a living entity. To discover law through comparative study is one thing, but 
to systematize it is quite another. Researching and then drafting a condominium 
statute should accommodate existing statutes and be compatible with correlative 
legislation, such as statutes on urban planning, real estate administration law and the 
mortgage and registration system. Drafters of this new legislation should anticipate 
possible judicial antagonism. Moreover, training for lawyers and para-legal workers 
needs to be strengthened to reduce dysfunctions in the condominium ownership 
system. Particularly noteworthy is the need to develop and formalize a 
well-coordinated system with the institutional lenders, i.e. commercial mortgage 
providers who finance private housing.   
7 3 2 A Clear Demarcation of Property Rights  
The developing rules on condominium ownership can be visualized as a path to 
increase legal certainty and predictability. 33  During this process, ideological 
jurisprudence and technical constraints must be unraveled, while individual 
proprietary interests must be placed on a steady path to title security.34 Chinese 
lawmakers should embrace full disclosure as a part of the legislative approach to 
protect unit purchasers. This requires a formal legal document that has a legal 
description of the owner’s individual property as well as the common property. This 
document shows the percentage of ownership a unit purchaser has in the common 
property, the allocation of an exclusive use area to the individual unit owner, when 
and how to constitute a condominium association to govern the community, and 
                                                        
33  Upham “Speculations on Legal Informality: On Winn’s ‘Relational Practices and the 
Marginalization of Law’” 1994 (28) Law & Sco’y Rev 233-235. 
34 Huang “The Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China” 2004 (17) Columbia 
Journal of Asian Law 191. 
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information about restrictions and limitations on such owners’ rights as resale, 
mortgages, insurance, leasing, and what owners can and cannot do. Boundary lines 
between unit owners’ individual property and common property need to be clearly 
marked since they determine maintenance responsibility. Simply put, the unit owner is 
responsible for maintaining his/her individual unit while the condominium association 
takes care of common property repair and maintenance. Unit owners need to know the 
exact boundaries of their condominiums in order to know where their individual 
interests stop and where they begin. At present, the lack of such a constitutive 
document is a bonanza for the developer. Not only is the developer free to alter the 
dimensions of a buyer’s unit, but the developer can also hide costs to unit purchasers 
such as the cost of an additional charge for a parking space. Moreover, the restrictions 
and covenants also need to be disclosed to potential unit purchasers to ensure they are 
knowledgeable about what they can and cannot do in the condominium complex. 
When property owners are aware of their properties’ exact location and dimensions 
many potential disputes can be averted. Thus, in China the concept of legal disclosure 
needs to be institutionalized and embedded in a legal condominium document.  
  The constitutive document needs to be written in clear and unambiguous language. 
In the United States, these documents often are comprised of confusing phrases and 
obscure legal jargon that confuses unit purchasers no end in trying to understand 
them. 35 Therefore, Chinese lawmakers should pay heed to using simple 
straightforward language to make these documents more accessible and readable to 
prospective unit purchasers. 
7 3 3 Standardization v Flexibility 
The United States UCIOA adopts a very different approach from the South African 
STA. Not only does the UCIOA provide substantial flexibility for developers in their 
                                                        
35 Butcher The Condominium Book: A Guide to Getting the Most for Your Money 101. 
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declarations but it also enhances the autonomy of the unit owners’ association. By 
contrast, the STA achieves its success with the use of standard documents. A typical 
example of this is the Act’s model rules. Each one of the approaches maximizes a 
different set of values. 
  On the one hand, the UCIOA’s flexibility has produced “residential private 
government”.36 This concept is in accordance with the themes of self-governance and 
private autonomy. Moreover, this flexibility had led to condominium complexes that 
are diverse and vary greatly from one to another. Some are mixed-use developments 
while others are exclusively residential ones. Some are public rental housing 
conversions, while others are newly developed projects. Some have 300 units while 
others only have ten units. It is this diversity that makes it unrealistic to standardize 
condominiums with very diverse characteristics into a single document. But, on the 
other hand, standard documents streamline the application and make it easier to 
enforce the statute. Under the STA, besides providing the standard model rules, it uses 
relative floor area as a basis for the participation quota for all residential 
condominiums. However, it promotes flexibility where needed by using a different 
method for non-residential condominium developments.  
  When drafting a Chinese condominium statute, a balance needs to be struck 
between flexibility and standardization. Given that the Chinese condominium system 
is still in an early development stage, more standard documents, such as default rules 
and a method to calculate a participation quota should be adopted. In the long run, 
when Chinese condominium owners develop the necessary management skills and 
knowledge, perhaps flexibility and innovation will gain ground.         
                                                        
36 Sterk “Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments” 1997 (77) B U L Rev 278-279; also 
see general Mckenzie Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential private 
Government.  
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7 3 4 Enhancing Unit Owners’ Awareness 
Condominium ownership implies three elements, namely, home ownership, shared 
responsibility, and participation in community life.37 Among factors that constitute 
community life, participation in collective management is particularly noteworthy. 
The idea of condominium ownership is closely linked with concepts of independence 
of control and autonomy of unit owners. This leads to issues of collective action, 
mutual dependence and democratic participation.38 North succinctly states that the 
performance of institutions is determined by “the motivation of the players, the 
complexity of the environment, and the ability of the players to decipher and order the 
environment”.39 However, Chinese unit owners are insufficiently aware as to how to 
shift from a “public property is nobody’s property” mindset to one in which the 
emphasis is on “one’s own private property”.40 Ways have to be found to create and 
run owners’ associations while simultaneously elevating condominium owners’ 
awareness of their rights and obligations. 41  Only recently has there been the 
realization that unit owners’ apathy about management issues stems from their lack of 
awareness on the issue. Unit owners need a push to overcome this “mental inertia”. 
To formalize property rights and formulate the mechanics of condominium 
management takes continual adjustments in order to equip condominium owners with 
management knowledge. Without active participation in collective action driven by an 
awareness of “my property, my destiny”, the effects of condominium legislation are 
questionable. 
                                                        
37 Wekerie, Dragicevic, Jordon, Kszyk & Sorenson “Contradictions in Ownership, Participation and 
Control: the Case of Condominium Housing” in Ungerson & Karn (eds) The Consumer Experience of 
Housing 171. 
38 Yip & Forrest “Property Owning Democracies? Home Owner Corporations in Hong Kong” 2002 
(17) Housing Studies 704. 
39 North Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 34. 
40 See n 9 supra.  
41 Chen & Mostert “Formalizing Condominium Ownership in China” 73. 
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7 3 5 Local Government’s Intervention 
Local governments are able to exert substantial influence on the success of 
condominium developments. Their job should not be just administering around the 
condominium’s edges with local zoning and subdivision ordinances. More 
importantly, local governments should be actively involved in condominium living. 
An example would be for a local government agency to monitor and at times to take 
part in the management of the condominium complexes. For example, when the 
chairperson of the executive council fails to call a council meeting requested by a 
council quorum, the local government should intervene and designate one of the 
council members for the job. This keeps the condominium association functioning by 
avoiding a deadlock. In this sense, the role of local government is far more significant 
and workable than simply recourse to a local court.  
  Another function for local government would be making condominium owners 
aware of their rights and obligations in condominium life with a local government 
training program. Education is also needed if unit owners are to play a significant role 
in condominium governance. At present it seems that efforts to introduce new 
condominium laws are hindered by a lack of understanding of the complexities of 
“residential private government” and by a shortage of well-educated and well-trained 
unit owners.  
  One can reasonably argue that local government intervention could inhibit and 
restrict unit owners’ control of their own condominium affairs. This concern is eased 
in two ways. First, local government intervention does not mean a local government 
has unlimited power to intervene in the private life of the condominium community. 
Rather, intervention as a policy tool has a fine line drawn that lays out the 
circumstances under which the local government can step in. This needs to be 
considered by lawmakers when framing the condominium statute. Second, most 
Chinese condominium owners are unfamiliar with how to properly manage their 
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property properly. In order to lessen management problems and to redress any power 
abuses caused by inexperienced council members, the local government’s intervention 
is regarded as worthwhile at this stage.   
7 3 6 Advocating A Cooperative Culture 
Property law scholars note that property is not about relationships of people to things, 
but rather about relationships among people with respect to things.42 The interplay 
between unit owners is crucial for harmonious condominium living. People who live 
in condominiums must out of necessity work closely with each other to make a 
condominium association function.  
  If condominium law legislation is thought of as social “hardware”, then the 
relationship between unit owners can be thought of as social “software”. Unit owners 
should regard the condominium association not only as an agency to protect their 
investment but also as a “self-governance organization”.43 When this takes place each 
unit owner has a sense of belonging to their community with a voice in condominium 
affairs. This sense of belonging is important for it bears on whether or not there is 
enthusiastic participation in the management of condominium complexes. Equally 
important is to have a cooperative and tolerant culture. Very often, defects in 
management structures and procedures are thought to cause disputes. But the real and 
significant conflicts are the confrontations between neighboring owners over 
conflicting interests.44  
  Forming an owner’s association does not automatically solve management 
problems.45 Unit owners’ “individualistic” approach to problem solving can easily 
trigger disputes in condominium living. The underlying and essential solution is for 
                                                        
42 See for example, American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Property (vol 1) 3.  
43 Mckenzie Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential private     
Government 147. 
44 Olsen The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Group 25-33. 
45 Yip & Forrest “Property Owning Democracies? Home Owner Corporations in Hong Kong” 715. 
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unit owners to realize that they are interdependent rather than living freely in nature. 
Therefore, as a matter of social policy, a cooperative condominium culture is needed. 
7 4 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY  
This thesis has shown that research to develop a guideline for a uniform Chinese 
condominium law is only in its early stages. When China’s condominium movement 
broadens and has heightened visibility by the National People’s Congress of China, it 
is hoped that this research will be examined to provide guidelines for national 
condominium legislation. Hopefully, as a late bloomer, China will learn from its 
experienced predecessors and avoid dysfunctional practices in the housing area. If the 
national legislature should fail to consider a uniform condominium act, this thesis will 
still have evaluative merit. One will be able to ponder and speculate why apartment 
ownership legislation failed despite having a modicum of government commitment.  
With little published work on this topic, this study fills a gap in respect of 
condominiums in Chinese law. Therefore, it is hoped that the study will attract the 
attention of Chinese legislators. The subject matter of this study cuts across property 
law, law of associations, and comparative law methodology. Now it is necessary to 
initiate discussions within the legal profession to spearhead a movement towards a 
more controlled and better-regulated apartment ownership market in China. In this 
endeavor lies the major value of the study.  
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• Forsyth v Josi 1982 2 SA 164 (N) 
• Kennaway (Pty) Ltd v Controlling Body, Kennaway Court 1988 2 SA 479 (E) 
• Richtown Development v Dusterwald 1981 3 SA 691 (W) 
• Torgos (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate of Anchors Aweigh 2006 3 SA 369 (W)  
• Wiljay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate , Bryanston Crescent 1984 2 
SA 722 (T) 
• Wimbledon Lodge (Pty) Ltd v Gore NO and others [2002] 1 All SA 218 (C)  
United States 
• Barclay Square Condominium Owner’ Association v Grenier 153 New 
Hampshire 514, 899 A 2d (2006). 
 291
• Bernardo Villas Management Corp Number Two v Black 190 California App 
3d 153, 235 Cal Rptr 509 (1987) 
• Chateau Village North Condominium Association v Jordan 643 P2d Colorado 
Ct App (1982) 
• Hidden Harbor Estates Inc v Basso 393 So 2d Florida 4th Dist Ct App (1981) 
• Hidden Harbour Estates Inc v Norman 309 So 2d 181-2 72 A L R 3d Florida 
4th Dist Ct App (1975) 
• Hill v Fontaine Condominium Association Inc 255 Georgia 24, 334 S E 2 d 
(1985) 
• Nahrstedt v Lakeside Village Condominium Association 8 Cal 4th 361, 33 Cal 
Rptr 2d (1994) 
• Schmidt v Sherrill 442 So. 2d Florida Dist Ct App (1983) 
• Shadow Lake Village Condominium Association Inc v Zampella 238 New 
Jersey Ct Super 132 569 A 2d (1990) 
• Sterling Village Condo Inc v Breitenbach 251 So 2d Florida Dist Ct App 
(1971) 
• Sulaney Towers Maintenance Corp v O’ Brey 46 Maryland App 464, 418 A 2d 
1233 (1980) 
Statutory Documents 
China 
Constitution and Statutes 
• Constitution of the People’s Republic of China of 1982 (as amended in 1988, 
1993, 1999 and 2004) 
   [《中华人民共和国宪法》1982 年颁布实施 (1988, 1993, 1999, 2004 年修 
   订)] 
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• Chinese Property Code of 2007 
   [《中华人民共和国物权法》2007 年颁布] 
• General Principles on the Civil Law of 1986 
   [《中华人民共和国民法通则》 1986 年颁布] 
• Law of Contracts of 1999 
   [《中华人民共和国合同法》1999 年颁布] 
• Law of Building Construction of 1997 
   [《中华人民共和国建筑法》1997 年颁布] 
• Law of Urban Planning of 1989 
   [《中华人民共和国城市规划法》1989 年颁布] 
• Law of Urban Real Estate Development Administration of 1994 (as amended 
in 2007) 
   [《中华人民共和国城市房地产管理法》 1994 年颁布 2007 年修订] 
• Land Administration Law of 1986 (as amended in 1998 & 2004) 
   [《中华人民共和国土地管理法》1986 年颁布 1998, 2004 年修订] 
National Level Administrative Regulations and Departmental Rules 
• Decisions on Furthering Housing Reform in Urban Areas of 1994 by the State 
Council 
   [《国务院关于深化城镇住房制度改革的决定》国务院 1994 年颁布] 
• Detailed Rules on Designing Building Plan of 2003 by the Ministry of 
Construction 
   [《全国民用建筑工程设计技术措施》建设部 2003 年颁布] 
• Measures Governing Demolition and Redevelopment of Urban Housing of 
2001 by the State Council 
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   [《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》国务院 2001 年颁布] 
• Measures Governing the Examination and Administration on Building Plan 
Designs of Housing Buildings and Municipal Basic Infrastructure of 2004 by 
the Ministry of Construction 
   [《房屋建筑和市政基础设施工程施工图设计文件审查管理办法》建设部   
   2004 年颁布] 
• Measures Governing the Preliminary Approval of Land Use for Construction 
Projects of 2001 (as amended in 2004) by the Ministry of Land and Resources 
   [《建设项目用地预审管理办法》国土资源部 2001 年颁布 2004 年修订] 
• Measures Governing the Property Management Fee’s Collection of 2003 by 
the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of 
Construction 
   [《物业服务收费管理办法》国家发展和改革委员会和中华人民共和国 
   建设部 2003 年颁布] 
• Measures Governing the Management of Urban Adjacent Housing of 1989 (as 
amended in 2001) by the Ministry of Construction 
   [《城市异产毗邻房屋管理规定》建设部 1989 年颁布 2001 年修订] 
• Measures Governing Urban Housing Entitlement Registration of 1997 (as 
amended in 2001) by the Ministry of Construction 
   [《城市房屋权属登记管理办法》建设部 1997 年颁布 2001 年修订] 
• Measures on Examination and Approval of Land Use for Construction 
Purpose of 1999 by the Ministry of Land and Resources 
   [《建设用地审查报批管理办法》国土资源部 1999 年颁布] 
• Measures on Land Registration of 2007 by the Ministry of Land and Resources 
   [《土地登记办法》国土资源部 2007 年颁布] 
 294
• Measures on Management of Maintenance Fund for Fixtures and Fittings of 
Apartment Common Areas of 1998 by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Construction 
   [《住宅共用部位共用设施设备维修基金管理办法》财政部和建设部 1998  
   年颁布] 
• Property Management Regulation of 2003 (as amended in 2007) by the State 
Council 
   [《物业管理条例》国务院 2003 年颁布 2007 年修订] 
• Provisions on Construction Quality Administration of 2000 by the Ministry of 
Construction 
   [《建设工程质量管理条例》建设部 2000 年颁布] 
• Provisions on Management of Annual Land Use Plan of 1999 by the Ministry 
of Land and Resources 
   [《土地利用年度计划管理办法》国土资源部 1999 年颁布] 
• Provisional Measures on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of 
Common Property of Commercial Housing of 1995 by the Ministry of 
Construction 
   [《商品房销售面积计算及公用建筑面积分摊规则（试行）》建设部 1995 
   年颁布] 
• Regulation Governing Real Estate Development and Operation in Urban 
Areas of 1998 by the Ministry of Construction 
   [《城市房地产开发经营管理条例》建设部 1998 年颁布] 
• Regulation of the Owners’ General Meetings of 2003 by the Ministry of 
Construction 
   [《业主大会规程》 建设部 2003 年颁布] 
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Local Regulations and Provincial Court Judicial Pronouncements  
• Measures to Enforce ‘Property Management Regulation’ of Weihai 
Municipality of 2007 by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of 
Weihai 
   [《威海市市区〈物业管理条例〉实施办法》 威海市人民代表大会常务委 
   员会 2007 年颁布] 
• Provisional Opinions Concerning Trialing the Property Management Cases of 
the Beijing High Court of 2003 no (2003) 389 
   [《北京市高级人民法院关于审理物业管理纠纷案件的意见 (试行) 》北京 
   市高级人民法院 2003 年 12 月 24 日京高法发［2003］389 号] 
• Rules on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of 
Housing in Hunan Province of 2004 by the Department of Construction of 
Hunan Province 
   [《湖南省房产面积测算及共有建筑面积分摊规则》湖南省建设厅 2004 
   年颁布] 
• Rules on Calculation of Floor Areas and Allocation of Common Property of 
Housing in Shanghai of 2003 by the Shanghai Real Estate and Land Resources 
Bureau 
   [《上海市房屋建筑面 积计算及共有建筑面积分摊规则》上海市房屋土地  
   资源管理局 2003 年颁布] 
• Shanghai Property Management Regulation of 2004 by the Standing 
Committee of People’s Congress of Shanghai 
   [《上海市住宅物业管理规定》上海市人民代表大会常务委员会 2004 年  
   颁布] 
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• Shanghai Real Estate Registration Rule of 2002 (as amended in 2004) by the 
Standing Committee of People’s Congress of Shanghai 
   [《上海市房地产登记条例》上海市人民代表大会常务委员会 2002 年颁 
   布 2004 年修订] 
Germany 
• Gesetz über das Wohnunseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht of 1951 
Israel 
• Israeli Land Law of 1969 
Italy 
• Italian Civil Code of 1865 
Japan 
• Japanese Civil Code of 1898 
• Japanese Condominium Act of 1962 
New Zealand 
• The Unit Titles Act 15 of 1972 
Portugal  
• Portuguese Civil Code of 1966  
Singapore 
• Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act of 2004 
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• The Land Titles (Strata) Act of 1988 
• The Land Titles (Strata) Amendment Act of 1999 
South Africa 
• The Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 
• The Companies Act 61 of 1973 
• The Deed Registries Act 47 of 1937 
• The Land Survey Act 8 of 1997 
• The Sectional Titles Act of 1971 
• The Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 
United States 
• Massachusetts Condominium Act: General Laws of Massachusetts Chapter 
183A 
• Model Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership of the Federal Housing 
Administration of 1962 
• North Carolina Condominium Act: North Carolina General Statutes Chapter 
47C 
• The Federal Communications Commission Over-the-air Reception Devices 
Rule of 1996 
• Uniform Condominium Act of 1977 (amended in 1980) 
• Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 1982 (as amended in 1994) 
• Virginia Condominium Act of 1974 (Virginia Stat Ann § 55-79 chapter 416) 
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